



State of California
Franchise Tax Board

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California Income Tax Expenditures Compendium of Individual Provisions

Updated December 2008

Economic and Statistical Research Bureau

INCOME TAX EXPENDITURES
Compendium of Individual Provisions

Updated December 2008

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CALIFORNIA INCOME TAX EXPENDITURES COMPENDIUM OF INDIVIDUAL PROVISIONS

Final Report

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Overview

This California Income Tax Expenditures Report is an update of an annual report of the Franchise Tax Board that began publication in 2007. The report describes only tax expenditures found in the California Corporation Tax and the California Personal Income Tax (PIT). We begin by discussing the concept of tax expenditures and cover many definitional and policy issues. We then present analyses of current tax expenditures within the California income tax system. The tax expenditures are organized within the report according to whether or not they conform to provisions of federal tax law, then by rank order according to their impact on state revenue.

Figures 1, 2, and 3 summarize the costs and policy goals of the expenditure items discussed in this report. Figure 1 provides a list of all the nonconformity expenditure items, the cost of the expenditure, and the page number where the expenditure write-up can be found. Figure 2 provides the same information for conformity expenditure items. Figure 3 provides tax expenditures listed by policy goal. Figure 4 presents the usage of carryover credits from expired tax expenditures. For purposes of California income tax, references to a spouse, a husband, or a wife also refer to a registered domestic partner unless otherwise specified.

Figure 1: Estimates of State Revenue Loss for Nonconformity Items
 Compendium of Individual Income Tax Provisions
 (In \$ Millions)

Item Number	Page	Nonconformity Items	Calendar Year 2005	Fiscal Year 2007/08	Fiscal Year 2008/09	Fiscal Year 2009/10
1	<u>12</u>	Exclusion of Social Security Benefits	1,592	1,688	1,754	1,1842
2	<u>14</u>	Dependent Exemption Credit in Excess of Personal Exemption Credit	1,203	1,346	1,402	1,453
3	<u>15</u>	Research and Development Expenses Credit	1,007	1,315	1,290	1,225
4	<u>19</u>	Water's-Edge Election	621	720	705	700
5	<u>20</u>	Special Treatment for Economically Depressed Areas	421	445	459	497
6	<u>24</u>	Double-Weighted Sales Apportionment Formula	217	250	245	245
7	<u>26</u>	Child and Dependent Care Expenses Credit	180	162	154	150
8	<u>28</u>	Exclusion of Interest on Federal Government Obligations	167	245	231	233
9	<u>28</u>	Exclusion of Unemployment Insurance Benefits	121	134	151	153
10	<u>30</u>	Senior Exemption Credit	118	132	137	141
11	<u>31</u>	Renter's Credit	97	101	102	104
12	<u>32</u>	Exclusion of Nonresident Military Pay	76	82	84	86
13	<u>33</u>	Exclusion of State Lottery Winnings	44	46	47	47
14	<u>34</u>	Low-Income Housing Credit	43	55	57	59
15	<u>36</u>	Exclusion of Capital Gains on Small Business Stock	21	30	34	38
16	<u>37</u>	Casualty Loss Deduction	21	24	26	29
17	<u>39</u>	Credit Union Treatment	10	10	10	10
18	<u>39</u>	Limited Partnership Investment Source Rules	10	10	10	10
19	<u>40</u>	Natural Heritage Preservation Credit	6	6	6	6
20	<u>41</u>	Employer Childcare Credits	3	2	2	2
21	<u>43</u>	Child Adoption Expenses Credit	2	2	2	2
22	<u>44</u>	Blind Exemption Credit	1	2	2	2
23	<u>45</u>	Enhanced Oil Recovery Costs Credit	2	2	0	0
24	<u>46</u>	Joint Custody Head of Household Credit	1	1	1	1
25	<u>47</u>	Community Development Financial Institution Credit	1	Minor	Minor	Minor
26	<u>48</u>	Qualified Senior Head of Household Credit	Minor	Minor	Minor	Minor
27	<u>49</u>	Disability Access Expenditure Credit	Minor	Minor	Minor	Minor
28	<u>50</u>	Rice Straw Credit	Minor	Minor	Minor	Minor
29	<u>51</u>	Dependent Parent Credit	Minor	Minor	Minor	Minor
30	<u>52</u>	Transportation of Donated Agricultural Products Credit	Minor	Minor	Minor	Minor
31	<u>53</u>	Prison Inmate Labor Costs Credit	Minor	Minor	Minor	Minor
32	<u>54</u>	Farmworker Housing Costs Credit	Minor	Minor	Minor	Minor

Figure 2: Estimates of State Revenue Loss for Conformity Items

Compendium of Individual Income Tax Provisions

(In \$ Millions)

Item Number	Page	Conformity Items	Calendar Year 2005	Fiscal Year 2007/08	Fiscal Year 2008/09	Fiscal Year 2009/10
1	<u>56</u>	Exclusion of Capital Gains on the Sale of Principal Residence	6,171	3,531	3,637	3,746
2	<u>57</u>	Mortgage Interest Deduction	4,432	5,027	5,118	5,414
3	<u>59</u>	Exclusion of Employer Contributions to Pension Plans	3,522	4,293	4,521	4,756
4	<u>60</u>	Basis Step-up on Inherited Property	3,171	4,027	4,244	4,477
5	<u>61</u>	Exclusion of Employer Contributions to Accident and Health Plans	2,351	3,246	3,530	3,801
6	<u>62</u>	Charitable Contribution Deduction	1,579	2,050	2,061	2,046
7	<u>64</u>	Real Property Tax Deduction	1,244	1,392	1,449	1,503
8	<u>66</u>	Exclusion of Proceeds from Life Insurance and Annuity Contracts	1,041	1,100	1,130	1,158
9	<u>66</u>	Exclusion of Benefits Provided Under Cafeteria Plans	950	1,244	1,375	1,507
10	<u>67</u>	Employee Business and Miscellaneous Expense Deduction	710	808	851	885
11	<u>69</u>	Head of Household and Qualifying Widower Filing Status	670	700	710	720
12	<u>70</u>	Depreciation Amounts Beyond Economic Depreciation	586	560	575	615
13	<u>71</u>	Individual Retirement Accounts	436	633	690	757
14	<u>73</u>	Self-Employed Retirement Plans	329	357	392	439
15	<u>73</u>	Medical and Dental Expense Deduction	258	289	298	308
16	<u>74</u>	Exclusion of Miscellaneous Fringe Benefits	230	260	270	285
17	<u>75</u>	Exclusion of Transportation Related Fringe Benefits	170	180	185	190
18	<u>76</u>	Self-Employed Health Insurance Premium Deduction	159	178	185	192
19	<u>77</u>	Tax-Exempt Status for Qualifying Corporations	113	118	121	123
20	<u>78</u>	Exclusion of Employer Contributions for Life Insurance	95	99	101	103
21	<u>78</u>	Personal Property and Other Tax Deductions	92	109	117	125
22	<u>80</u>	Deferral of Gain on Like-Kind Exchanges	85	171	172	174
23	<u>81</u>	Exclusion of Compensation for Injuries or Sickness	54	57	57	58

Estimates over \$100 million are rounded to the nearest \$5 million.

Figure 2: Estimates of State Revenue Loss for Conformity Items
Compendium of Individual Income Tax Provisions
(In \$ Millions)

Item Number	Page	Conformity Items	Calendar Year 2005	Fiscal Year 2007/08	Fiscal Year 2008/09	Fiscal Year 2009/10
24	<u>82</u>	Exclusion of Scholarships, Fellowships, and Grants	44	52	55	58
25	<u>82</u>	Accelerated Depreciation of Research & Experimental Costs	40	80	140	195
26	<u>84</u>	Exclusion of Employee Child and Dependent Care Benefits	38	41	41	42
27	<u>85</u>	Exclusion of Meals and Lodging Provided by an Employer	34	35	37	38
28	<u>86</u>	Employee Stock Ownership Plans	33	39	43	46
29	<u>86</u>	Exclusion of Employer-Provided Education Assistance	30	31	33	34
30	<u>87</u>	Moving Expense Deduction	26	29	31	32
31	<u>88</u>	Percentage Resource Depletion Allowance Deduction	24	25	26	26
32	<u>89</u>	Student Loan Interest Deduction	21	21	21	21
33	<u>91</u>	Exclusion of Foster Care Payments	19	21	22	24
34	<u>91</u>	Exclusion of Housing for Clergy	16	19	19	21
35	<u>92</u>	Exclusion of Income Earned on Section 529 Accounts	16	21	25	31
36	<u>92</u>	Amortization of Reforestation Expenditures	5	5	5	5
37	<u>93</u>	Exclusion of Earnings on Coverdell Education Savings Accounts	3	3	3	4
38	<u>94</u>	Expensing of Agricultural Costs for Soil or Water Conservation and Prevention of Erosion	2	2	2	2
39	<u>95</u>	Exclusion of Recycled or Redeemed Beverage Container Redemption Payments	1	1	1	1
40	<u>95</u>	Expensing of Circulation Costs for Periodicals	1	1	1	1
41	<u>96</u>	Medical Savings Account Deduction	1	1	1	1
42	<u>97</u>	Reserve Allowance for Bad Debts Deduction	Minor	Minor	Minor	Minor

Estimates over \$100 million are rounded to the nearest \$5 million.

Figure 3: Tax Expenditures by Topic

Topic	Item	Page
1. Expenditures Benefiting Children		
A. Bolstering Income for Families		
1. Dependent Exemption Credit in Excess of Personal Exemption Credit	N 2	14
2. Exclusion of Foster Care Payments	C 33	91
3. Head of Household and Qualifying Widower Filing Status	C 11	69
4. Joint Custody Head of Household Credit	N 24	46
5. Qualified Senior Head of Household Credit	N 26	48
B. Assistance for Non-Biological Parents		
1. Child Adoption Expenses Credit	N 21	43
2. Exclusion of Foster Care Payments	C 33	91
3. Qualified Senior Head of Household Credit	N 26	48
C. Subsidizing Single Parents		
1. Head of Household and Qualifying Widower Filing Status	C 11	69
D. Child Care Subsidies		
1. Employer Childcare Credits	N 20	41
2. Exclusion of Employee Child and Dependent Care Benefits	C 26	84
3. Child and Dependent Care Expenses Credit	N 7	26
2. Expenditures for Education		
A. Saving for College		
1. Exclusion of Earnings on Coverdell Education Savings Accounts	C 37	93
2. Exclusion of Income Earned on Section 529 Plans	C 35	92
B. Third Party Funding for Education		
1. Exclusion of Scholarships, Fellowships, and Grants	C 24	82
2. Exclusion of Employer-Provided Education Assistance	C 29	86
3. Student Loan Interest Deduction	C 32	89
3. Expenditures Benefiting the Elderly		
A. Income Subsidies		
1. Exclusion of Social Security Benefits	N 1	12
2. Senior Exemption Credit	N 10	30
B. Subsidies for Care of the Elderly		
1. Dependent Parent Credit	N 29	51
2. Head of Household and Qualifying Widower Filing Status	C 11	69
C. Subsidies for Elderly with Dependents		
1. Qualified Senior Head of Household Credit	N 26	48

Note: The N and the C in the column designates expenditure item as either a nonconformity or conformity item, respectively.

Figure 3: Tax Expenditures by Topic

Topic	Item	Page
4. Expenditures for Modifying the Environment		
A. Land and Water Conservation		
1. Expensing of Agricultural Costs for Soil or Water Conservation and Prevention of Erosion	C 38	94
2. Amortization of Reforestation Expenditures	C 36	92
3. Natural Heritage Preservation Credit	N 19	40
4. Exclusion of Recycled or Redeemed Beverage Container Redemption Payments	C 39	95
B. Reducing Air Pollution		
1. Rice Straw Credit	N 28	50
5. Expenditures Facilitating Employment		
A. Benefits for Employees Requiring Childcare		
1. Employer Childcare Credits	N 20	41
2. Exclusion of Employee Child and Dependent Care Benefits	C 26	84
3. Child and Dependent Care Expenses Credit	N 7	26
B. Transportation Subsidies		
1. Exclusion of Transportation Related Fringe Benefits	C 17	75
2. Moving Expense Deduction	C 30	87
C. Benefits for Specific Industries		
1. Farmworker Housing Costs Credit	N 32	54
2. Exclusion of Housing for Clergy	C34	91
3. Exclusion of Nonresident Military Pay	N12	32
D. Benefits for Targeted Disadvantaged Populations		
1. Special Treatment for Economically Depressed Areas	N 5	20
2. Prison Inmate Labor Costs Credit	N 31	53
6. Expenditures for Health Care		
A. Insurance Purchase Subsidies		
1. Exclusion of Employer Contributions to Accident and Health Plans	C 5	61
2. Self-Employed Health Insurance Premium Deduction	C 18	76
3. Exclusion of Benefits Provided Under Cafeteria Plans	C 9	66
B. Other Medical Expense Prepayment Subsidies		
1. Medical Savings Account Deduction	C 41	96
C. Benefits for Taxpayers Who Have Incurred Major Health-Related Expenses		
1. Medical and Dental Expense Deduction	C 15	73
2. Exclusion of Compensation for Injuries or Sickness	C 23	81

Figure 3: Tax Expenditures by Topic

Topic	Item	Page
D. Benefits for Assistance Providers		
1. Disability Access Expenditure Credit	N 27	49
E. Benefits for Specific Medical Problems		
1. Blind Exemption Credit	N 22	44
7. Expenditures for Housing		
A. Benefits for Homeowners		
1. Mortgage Interest Deduction	C 2	57
2. Exclusion of Capital Gains on the Sale of a Principal Residence	C 1	56
3. Real Property Tax Deduction	C 7	64
B. Benefits for Rental Housing		
1. Renter’s Credit	N 11	31
2. Low-Income Housing Credit	N 14	34
C. Exclusion of Housing for Clergy	C 34	91
8. Expenditures Related to Finance		
A. Rules for Alternative Business Ownership Structures		
1. Limited Partnership Investment Source Rules	N 18	39
2. Credit Union Treatment	N 17	39
3. Employee Stock Ownership Plans	C 28	86
B. Special Rules for Banking		
1. Reserve Allowance for Bad Debts Deduction	C 42	97
2. Credit Union Treatment	N 17	39
3. Community Development Financial Institution Credit	N 25	47
C. Financing Small Businesses		
1. Exclusion of Capital Gains on Small Business Stock	N 15	36
D. Other Finance Provisions		
1. Deferral of Gain on Like-Kind Exchanges	C 22	80
9. Expenditures for Business Investments		
A. Depreciation		
1. Depreciation Amounts Beyond Economic Depreciation	C 12	70
2. Accelerated Depreciation of Research & Experimental Costs	C 25	82
B. Research and Development		
1. Accelerated Depreciation of Research & Experimental Costs	C 25	82
2. Research and Development Expenses Credit	N 3	15

Figure 3: Tax Expenditures by Topic

Topic	Item	Page
C. Equipment and Infrastructure		
1. Disability Access Expenditure Credit	N 27	49
2. Enhanced Oil Recovery Costs Credit	N 23	45
D. Subsidies for the Petroleum Industry		
1. Enhanced Oil Recovery Costs Credit	N 23	45
2. Percentage Resource Depletion Allowance	C 31	88
E. Subsidies for Other Specific Industries		
1. Expensing of Circulation Costs for Periodicals	C 40	95
2. Low-Income Rental Housing Expenses Credit	N 14	34
F. Subsidies for Investments in Targeted Locations		
1. Special Treatment for Economically Depressed Areas	N 5	20
2. Community Development Financial Institution Credit	N 25	47
G. Preferential Treatment for Small Businesses		
1. Exclusion of Capital Gains on Small Business Stock	N 15	36
2. Reserve Allowance for Bad Debts Deduction	C 42	97
H. Other		
1. Deferral of Gain on Like-Kind Exchanges	C 22	80
10. Expenditures for Employer Provided Benefits		
A. Insurance		
1. Exclusion of Employer Contributions to Accident and Health Plans	C 5	61
2. Self-Employed Health Insurance Premium Deduction	C 18	76
3. Exclusion of Employer Contributions for Life Insurance	C 20	78
4. Exclusion of Benefits Provided Under Cafeteria Plans	C 9	66
B. Pension Plans		
1. Exclusion of Employer Contributions to Pensions Plans	C 3	59
2. Self-Employed Retirement Plans	C 14	73
C. Transportation Subsidies		
1. Exclusion of Transportation Related Fringe Benefits	C 17	75
2. Moving Expense Deduction	C 30	87
3. Employee Business and Miscellaneous Expense Deduction	C 10	67
4. Exclusion of Miscellaneous Fringe Benefits	C 16	74
D. Childcare Benefits		
1. Exclusion of Employee Child and Dependent Care Benefits	C 26	84
2. Exclusion of Benefits Provided Under Cafeteria Plans	C 9	66
E. Employee Housing		
1. Exclusion of Meals and Lodging Furnished by an Employer	C 27	85

Figure 3: Tax Expenditures by Topic

Topic	Item	Page
2. Farmworker Housing Costs Credit	N 32	54
3. Exclusion of Housing for Clergy	C34	91
F. Other Employer Provided Benefits		
1. Exclusion of Employer-Provided Education Assistance	C 29	86
2. Employee Business and Miscellaneous Expense Deduction	C 10	67
3. Exclusion of Miscellaneous Fringe Benefits	C 16	74
11. Expenditures Encouraging Savings		
A. For Retirement		
1. Individual Retirement Accounts	C 13	71
2. Exclusion of Employer Contributions to Pensions Plans	C 3	59
3. Self-Employed Retirement Plans	C 14	73
B. For Medical Expenses		
1. Medical Savings Account Deduction	C 41	96
C. For College		
1. Exclusion of Earnings on Coverdell Education Savings Accounts	C 37	93
2. Exclusion of Income Earned on Section 529 Accounts	C 35	92
12. Expenditures for Capital Gains		
1. Basis Step-Up on Inherited Property	C 4	60
2. Exclusion of Capital Gains on the Sale of a Principal Residence	C 1	56
3. Exclusion of Capital Gains on Small Business Stock	N 15	36
4. Deferral of Gain on Like-Kind Exchanges	C 22	80
13. Expenditures for Government Programs		
A. Expanded Benefits for Payments Received		
1. Exclusion of Interest on Federal Government Obligations	N 8	28
2. Exclusion of Unemployment Insurance Benefits	N 9	28
3. Exclusion of State Lottery Winnings	N 13	33
4. Exclusion of Scholarships, Fellowships, and Grants	C 24	82
B. Compensation for Non Income Taxes		
1. Real Property Tax Deduction	C 7	64
2. Personal Property and Other Tax Deduction	C 21	78
C. Exclusion of Nonresident Military Pay	N12	32

Figure 3: Tax Expenditures by Topic

Topic	Item	Page
14. Expenditures for Catastrophes		
A. Life Insurance		
1. Exclusion of Proceeds from Life Insurance and Annuity Contracts	C 8	66
2. Casualty Loss Deduction	N 16	37
3. Exclusion of Employer Contributions for Life Insurance	C 20	78
B. Other Catastrophes		
15. Expenditures Related to the Definition of Corporate Income		
A. General Structure of Corporate Taxation		
1. Water's-Edge Election	N 4	19
2. Double-Weighted Sales Apportionment Formula	N 6	24
B. Nonprofit Activities		
1. Charitable Contribution Deduction	C 6	62
2. Tax-Exempt Status for Qualifying Corporations	C 19	77
3. Transportation of Donated Agricultural Products Credit	N 30	52
4. Credit Union Treatment	N 17	39

Figure 4: Usage Of Carryover Credits From Expired Tax Expenditures

Former R&TC	Type of Credit	Sunset	2004		2005	
			PIT (\$ Thousands)	Corp	PIT (\$ Thousands)	Corp
17053.12, 23608	Agriculture Production Food Donation	12/31/1991	\$1	\$1,799	\$1	\$85
17052.5, 23601.5	Commercial Solar Electric System	12/31/1993	\$4	*	\$2	\$2
17052.4, 23601.4	Commercial Solar Energy	12/31/1993	\$154	\$430	\$80	\$75
23606.1	Contribution of Computer Software	12/31/1992	n/a	*	n/a	*
17052.4, 17052.8, 23601.5	Energy Conservation	12/31/1986	\$778	\$1	\$767	\$646
17053.37	Joint Strike Fighter Property**	01/01/06	\$2	*	*	*
17053.36	Joint Strike Fighter Wages**	01/01/06	\$75	\$2,236	\$71	\$4,117
17053.80	Long-term Caregiver	01/01/2005	\$2,482	n/a	\$47	n/a
17053.10;17053.17 23623.5, 23625, 17052.15, 23612.6	Los Angeles Revitalization Zone	12/31/1997	\$6,128	\$12,649	\$5,044	\$11,504
17052.11, 23603	Low Emission	12/31/1995	\$157	\$2	\$281	*
17053.49-0 thru 17053.49-11, 23649-0 thru 23649-11	Manufacturers Investment	01/01/2004	\$12,924	\$186,745	\$4,845	\$164,223
17052.2	New Infant	12/31/1993	\$28	n/a	\$45	n/a
17057, 23609.5	Orphan Drug	12/31/1992	\$18	*	\$10	\$99
17053.14	Political Contributions	12/31/1991	\$561		\$671	
17052.14, 23612.5	Recycling Equipment	12/31/1993	\$122	\$834	\$145	\$784
	Resident & Farm Sale	12/31/1991	\$1,443		\$1,227	
17053, 23605	Ridesharing -- Employer Subsidize	12/31/1995	\$124	\$3	\$100	*
17053, 23605	Ridesharing -- Transit Pass	12/31/1995	\$137	*	\$110	*
	Ridesharing -- Vanpool	12/31/1995	\$276		\$251	
17053, 23605	Ridesharing -- Carryover	12/31/1995	\$1,210	\$11	\$1,328	*
17052.5, 23601	Solar Energy	12/31/1988	\$315	\$240	\$346	\$121
17052.1, 17052.4, 17052.8,23607	Solar Pump	12/31/2005	\$29	\$170	\$87	\$176
17053.84	Solar Systems Credit**	12/31/2006	\$6,025	\$348	\$6,390	\$687
17053.66, 23666	Salmon & Steelhead Trout Habitat Restoration	12/31/1999	*	*	\$5	*
23606	Technology Property Contributions	12/31/1992	n/a	*	n/a	*

* Less than \$500

**Amounts reported are prior to sunset

TOTAL \$32,994 \$205,468 \$21,853 \$182,519

Section I: The Concept of Tax Expenditures

1. Tax Expenditures are Deviations from Normal Tax Law

Tax expenditures, as defined by federal law, are “revenue losses attributable to provisions of the federal tax laws that allow a special exclusion, exemption, or deduction from gross income or which provide a special credit, a preferential rate of tax, or a deferral of tax liability.” According to the federal Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT), the legislative history of this definition indicates that tax expenditures are to be defined with respect to a “normal income tax structure.” This same concept of tax code provisions which reduce tax relative to normal tax law can be applied to California tax law. We will explore the concept of normal California tax law below.

The term *tax expenditures* alludes to the fact that the policy objectives could be achieved by means other than the tax provisions. Rather than reducing beneficiaries’ taxes, the Legislature could, for example, establish direct expenditure programs to allocate money toward its policy goals.

Normal Tax Law

Conceptually, a broad definition of income should be used in determining the normal tax law against which tax expenditures are to be measured. Using the broadest possible definition of income generally makes for sound tax policy, because the broader the base, the lower the tax rate needed to achieve a desired level of revenues; and lower tax rates produce less economic distortion.

Following the JCT methodology, our report assumes the existing tax rate structure is part of normal tax law, even though the tax rates vary for different levels of income. The JCT methodology includes the zero percent tax bracket as part of normal PIT Law. The zero bracket is the maximum amount of income that a taxpayer, who has no extraordinary deductions or credits, can earn and still owe no taxes. This maximum amount is determined by the standard deduction, the personal exemption credits for each taxpayer, and a dependent exemption credit for each dependent. These items of normal tax law are not classified as tax expenditures. Itemized deductions that are not necessary for the generation of income are considered to be tax expenditures,¹ but only to the extent that they exceed the standard deduction. Most other tax benefits to individual taxpayers are considered tax expenditures.

In defining normal income for businesses, some difficult issues arise. Businesses routinely invest in property and equipment that lasts for a long time. These costs should be depreciated; i.e., the tax deductions for these investments should be spread over the useful life of the investment. The JCT generally considers the Alternative Depreciation System as the method of depreciation most representative of normal tax law. Alternatives

¹ Deductions that are necessary for the generation of income include those for investments and for employee business expenses.

that provide more favorable treatment of capital expenses, including accelerated depreciation, expensing, and investment tax credits, are considered tax expenditures. The JCT also assumes that normal tax law requires the accrual method of accounting, use of the “economic performance” standard for testing whether liabilities are deductible, and requires a general concept of matching income and expenses. Provisions not satisfying these three standards are considered tax expenditures. The JCT considers net operating loss carrybacks and carryforwards to be part of normal tax law.

Provisions in the tax code that generate less favorable treatment than normal tax law (as defined above) are not considered to be tax expenditures. Similarly, the Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT) and passive activity loss rules, which reduce the value of many other tax expenditures, are not considered tax expenditures. The JCT does, however, consider the interaction of AMT and passive loss rules in computing the costs of other tax expenditures.

2. Adoption and Retention of Tax Expenditures

While each tax expenditure has its own set of reasons for coming into existence (many of which will be explored in the next section), a number of policy considerations are common to many tax expenditures.

There are two primary policy motivations for adopting tax expenditures. The first is to move towards a more equitable tax system by providing relief to taxpayers facing a monetary cost due to their circumstances in life. The second is to provide taxpayers incentives to alter their behavior.

In addition to these policy goals, decisions to adopt certain tax expenditures may also be driven by administrative concerns. These concerns may include restrictions imposed by the federal government, the desire to keep state tax law in conformity with federal tax law, and other miscellaneous administrative issues.

Proper analysis of tax expenditure policies must consider their potential adverse effects as well as their desirable effects. The most common concerns arising from the use of tax expenditures are that they may:

- Necessitate an increase in tax rates (or, alternatively, a cut in expenditures).
- Complicate the tax code.
- Induce undesirable behavioral reactions from taxpayers.
- Provide expensive windfalls to some taxpayers without furthering the intended policy goals.
- Reduce policy flexibility.

Finally, a complete analysis of the desirability of a particular tax expenditure requires a consideration of possible policy alternatives for achieving the same goal. These alternatives include:

- Reducing general tax rates.
- Government mandates.
- Direct government regulations.
- Direct expenditures.
- Modifying tax expenditures.

In the balance of this section, we will explore these considerations in more detail.

Policy Motivations

Equity

Many tax expenditures are designed to provide tax relief to taxpayers who face specific and unusual monetary costs. This type of tax expenditure enables tax to be levied on a more accurate measure of a taxpayer's economic well-being. Under certain circumstances, other issues besides the dollar amount of income earned, marital status, number of dependents, and standard deduction must be considered to accurately measure a taxpayer's economic well-being. Tax expenditures of this type are available to any taxpayer whose life circumstances fall into the designated category. One such example is the additional credit for taxpayers (or their spouses) who are blind. The credit for the blind is intended to restore equity by compensating taxpayers for expenses incurred specifically because they are blind.

Behavioral Incentives

Other tax expenditures are designed by the legislature to provide incentives for taxpayers to modify their behavior. This type of expenditure necessarily moves the tax system away from the theoretically desirable goal of neutrality. Neutrality is the concept that a tax system should have as little impact on the allocation of resources as possible. In other words, under a neutral tax system, economic agents should make the same decisions they would make if there were no tax system and their decisions were motivated solely by the incentives provided by the marketplace.

Deviations from neutrality are not necessarily bad policies. Most economists would argue that there are many examples of neutral outcomes that are not optimal. For example, when deciding whether to carpool or drive to work alone, a taxpayer may consider such things as the cost of gas, the wear and tear on their car, the mental stress of driving, the hassle of coordinating their schedule with other commuters, and being dependent on other commuters. It is possible, and perhaps likely, that they will not sufficiently take into account the benefits that they are providing to others who commute along their commute route when they carpool; to wit: one less car. In so doing, it is possible that the decision they reach will not be optimal. They will consider all of the private costs and benefits of carpooling, but will (most likely) insufficiently consider the public costs and benefits. As such, a decision to carpool will be made less often than would be socially optimal. Thus, a credit for carpooling will allow the person who chooses carpooling to reap some of the

social benefit of carpooling. This will increase the likelihood of a decision to carpool. In such a situation, if the net social benefit from carpooling is positive, the fact that the tax system alters private decisions (or violates tax neutrality) is actually good. Policymakers must be careful, however, to ensure both that tax incentives induce desired behaviors and that they do not induce too much of the desired behaviors.²

The effectiveness of behavioral incentives depends on what economists refer to as “price elasticity.” Each tax preference reduces the relative price of the favored activity (e.g., in the above example, the credit slightly lowers the cost of commuting to the taxpayer). Just as some department store sales are more successful than others, a small drop in after-tax prices will sometimes cause many taxpayers to alter their behavior, but other times it will not. The elasticity is the magnitude of the behavioral reaction to a particular change in prices.

Administrative Issues

Federal Preclusion

Some tax expenditures were established by federal mandate. An example of this is the requirement that California exempt interest earned on federal savings bonds from taxable income, if interest earned on state savings bonds is exempt. California does not have the authority to modify tax expenditures imposed by the federal government.

Conformity

Many California tax expenditures are identical to provisions found in federal tax law. Conformity to certain federal tax provisions can reduce complexity by allowing taxpayers to use the same calculations for both their federal and state tax returns. It also reduces administrative costs by enabling California to rely on information exchanges with the IRS to verify substantial portions of Californians’ tax returns in lieu of developing more expensive independent audit capacity.³

Ending conformity between California and federal tax law would be particularly costly for any tax expenditures that take the form of exclusions that are not currently reported on tax forms. For example, both California and the federal government exclude employer contributions to pension plans from employee income. If California eliminated this tax expenditure, employers would need to develop systems for reporting the amount of these contributions made on behalf of each individual taxpayer both to the taxpayer and to the Franchise Tax Board (FTB). FTB would need to educate taxpayers to include this extra information on their California tax returns. FTB would have to modify tax forms to

² In the Carpool Credit example, suppose that we need 10,000 new carpools to relieve congestion and pollution. It would be inefficient to set the credit so high that 50,000 new carpools are formed.

³ Another benefit of conformity, that is psychological rather than economically substantive, is that taxpayers may feel entitled to all deductions and exclusions available in federal tax law. Even if a tax expenditure is not justifiable on policy grounds, taxpayers may feel that it is unfair for state taxable income to be greater than federal taxable income.

include this item in income, and develop an audit system for collecting contribution information from employers and matching this data to individual tax returns.

The costs of ending conformity with federal tax law would be lower for many tax expenditures that involve adjustments to income, such as deductions, that are already reported on tax forms. For example, if California wanted to eliminate the deduction for medical and dental expenses, much of the effort required to eliminate the exclusion of pension income would be avoided. In this case, California would need to modify its tax forms and/or instructions so that taxpayers could back out the medical and dental expense deductions that they claimed on their federal returns. The FTB would also have to implement a relatively simple modification to its audit tools to check that the amount of the medical and dental expense deduction is backed out of California itemized deductions. These costs from eliminating this deduction would be substantially smaller than the costs described above for eliminating an exclusion.

Conformity is not a valid justification for the existence of state tax credits, even those whose calculation conforms to federal law. This is because California could simply eliminate any credit and there would be no increase in compliance costs. When we do adopt a credit that is similar to federal credits, covering the same activities or circumstances, it is good policy for us to adopt the federal calculations. However, there is no reason to argue for the adoption or retention of a credit solely on conformity grounds. Whether a credit should be adopted or retained ought to be decided solely on the credit's policy merits, without considering conformity.

Other Administrative Issues

Conceptually, the income tax base should include many types of imputed income as well as income received through cash transfers. An example is the implicit income from owner-occupied housing. To see why, consider two houses identical in every way, except that the first is a rental and the second is owner-occupied. The owner of the first house provides something of value to the renters. In return, the renters pay rent. This rent is taxable income to the landlord. The occupants of the second house receive the same benefits (the use of an identical house) as the occupants of the first house. Conceptually, the difference between the rent that they should have paid and the rent they actually paid (zero) is a benefit that ought to be included in taxable income. This could be done by calculating the income that the owners of the second house would have earned if someone else were renting that house and included that in their income. As a practical matter, of course, this calculation would be extremely difficult, so we often choose not to tax imputed income. In fact, it would be so difficult that the JCT describes this problem as an "administrative necessity" and does not report it as a tax expenditure. Another area in which administrative practicality plays a large role is capital gains. Conceptually, capital gains taxes should be levied on an accrual, rather than a realization, basis. That is to say, theoretically, taxpayers should include in income the amount by

which their investments appreciate during the tax year.⁴ For many investments, it is difficult to determine the value of this appreciation in years in which the asset is not sold. It is much simpler, therefore, to wait until the asset is sold and tax the entire amount of appreciation since purchase at one time. Since investors will not report all of their gains in any year in which they do not sell all of their assets, this system generates tax expenditures.

Disadvantages of Tax Expenditures

Increases in General Tax Rates

By definition, tax expenditures are deviations from normal tax law that reduce the amount of tax paid by the affected taxpayer. If a government has a fixed level of revenue that it must raise to fund its programs and operations, any revenue forgone through tax expenditures must be raised elsewhere in the tax system. This means that the government must either find a new source of revenue or raise rates for some existing taxes. Raising tax rates generally is bad for the economy because it increases the distortional impact of taxes on economic decision-making. Therefore, tax expenditures should not be adopted unless their benefits outweigh the costs to the economy from compensating tax increases. For example, if we eliminated one large PIT tax expenditure, the mortgage interest deduction, we could lower PIT tax rates by approximately 11 percent across the board and still raise the same amount of revenue. Similarly, if we eliminate the largest corporate tax credit, the R&D Credit, we could lower the corporate tax rate by approximately 11 percent and still raise the same amount of revenue.

Complexity of the Tax Code

Many tax expenditures increase the complexity of the tax code. Each deduction and credit requires its own calculation. The additional computational complexity is exacerbated by interactions with the Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT). The AMT prevents certain taxpayers from using all of their deductions and credits in the current year. Thus, a taxpayer may be required to make not one, but three, new calculations – one for the tax expenditure itself, one for the AMT, and a third in the future tax year in which they apply their carryover AMT credit. In addition to the calculations themselves, many tax expenditures require the generation and retention of copious paperwork to prove their validity at audit. Each provision also necessitates additional training and workload for tax auditors. These administrative considerations could potentially outweigh the benefits of some of the less valuable tax expenditures.

⁴ The justification for this position is derived from the concept that a proper income tax should be levied on Haig-Simons income. Haig-Simons income is defined for a particular time period as all consumption plus any additions to net wealth during that time period. The classic references are H.C. Simons, *Personal Income Taxation*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938); and R.M. Haig, "The Concept of Income: Economic and Legal Aspects," in R.M. Haig, ed., *The Federal Income Tax*, (New York, Columbia University Press, 1921).

Undesirable Behavioral Effects

As was noted above, tax expenditures are often adopted because the Legislature hopes that their incentives will alter the behavior of taxpayers. This runs counter to a general principle of tax policy called neutrality. This tenet holds that inefficient distortions to the economy usually result when different activities face different taxes. In the case of tax expenditures, we know that the Legislature is trying to compensate for what it perceives as a failure of the free market to provide sufficient incentives for certain activities, therefore, these distortions may be justified. It is very difficult to know, however, if a tax expenditure has been calibrated properly for achieving its desired goal. For example, if a tax credit intended to encourage additional investments of a specific type is set too high, the credit may have the effect of diverting investment from other projects that would be more beneficial to the economy. Another possibility is that a tax expenditure may be adopted on equity grounds, to offset some cost peculiar to a particular group of taxpayers, but it may also induce behavioral changes. For example, the renter's credit was designed to offset the perceived inequities in tax treatment between renters and homeowners. However, in so doing, the renter's credit actually offers renters an incentive to continue renting their home rather than buying it. As a result, this credit undermines the mortgage interest deduction and other tax expenditures that were designed specifically to encourage home ownership.

Windfalls

Tax expenditures are a very blunt policy instrument. They are available to broadly defined groups of taxpayers. For this reason, they often provide taxpayers generous rewards without furthering the policy goals for which they were intended. These windfalls are most noticeable with tax expenditures whose primary motive is to provide behavioral incentives. For example, Enterprise Zone (EZ) Credits may be claimed by taxpayers who would have operated their businesses in the EZs, even in the absence of the credits, not just by those who expanded or relocated their businesses in response to the credit.

The presence of windfalls can dramatically increase the costs of a tax expenditure relative to its benefits. For example, suppose that an investment credit of 5 percent induces a 10 percent increase in private investments. A firm that previously invested \$100 now invests \$110. The firm claims a credit of \$5.50 ($\110×5 percent). The credit cost the government 55 percent of the increase in investment ($\$5.50$ credit / $\$10$ increase in investment), not the 5 percent nominal value of the credit. In this example, policymakers should only adopt such a credit if the positive externalities generated from the increased investment are worth at least 55 percent of the investment.

Reduced Policy Flexibility

We have argued above that tax expenditures are analogous to direct government expenditures. However, the two types of expenditures are treated differently under the Constitution of the State of California. If the Legislature decides that a direct expenditure has not worked out as planned, or has become obsolete, it may be amended or revoked with a simple majority vote. By contrast, it requires a two-thirds vote of the Legislature to undo a failed or obsolete tax expenditure. This supermajority requirement may make it more difficult to amend or abandon tax expenditures that fail to accomplish their policy goals.

Alternatives to Tax Expenditures

There are a variety of other policy instruments available for achieving the policy goals underlying various tax incentives. The next section of this report discusses a number of relevant policy alternatives for specific tax expenditures. Here we describe the broad categories into which these alternatives may be classified.

One alternative that may be considered for any tax expenditure whose goal is to improve the economy in general would be to eliminate the tax expenditure and instead reduce tax rates.

For tax expenditures aimed at spurring investment in specific activities, industries, or geographic locations, alternatives include direct government loans, direct government loan guarantees, or rate subsidies supporting the desired class of projects.

Some policy objectives can be achieved through government mandates, requiring businesses to participate in achieving certain policy goals. For example, the Low-Income Housing Credit could be replaced with requirements that lenders or developers divert a portion of their economic activity to the low-income market.

Many tax expenditures could be replaced with direct government regulations. This is particularly true for tax expenditures that aim to encourage taxpayers to meet certain environmental objectives. For example, the government could strictly limit the amount of rice straw that could be burnt each year, rather than encourage alternative uses for rice straw through the Rice Straw Credit.

Almost any tax expenditure program could simply be replaced with a direct expenditure program. This is most obvious in the case of credits. For example, instead of offering a Child Adoption Expense Credit, California could make direct payments, equivalent to the tax savings available under the credit, to individuals who adopt children that are in the custody of a government agency. Replacing nonrefundable credits with a direct expenditure program would likely increase costs to the state. Costs would increase by the amount of credits that taxpayers were unable to apply because they had no remaining tax liability to offset.

Other forms of tax expenditures can also be replaced with direct expenditures, but may be more difficult to administer. For example, the itemized deduction for medical and dental expenses in excess of 7.5 percent of Adjusted Gross Income (AGI) could be replaced with direct payments to individuals with these expenses. The administrative problem is that the value of this deduction may vary across taxpayers, even if the amount of their deduction is the same. Suppose two taxpayers are each entitled to a deduction of \$2,000 for these expenses. Taxpayer A is in the 6 percent marginal tax bracket, so her tax savings is \$120. Taxpayer B is in the 4 percent tax bracket, so he saves \$80. Any direct expenditure that provides the same benefit to these two individuals (on the grounds that they had identical qualifying expenses) would result in a redistribution of income relative to the current deduction. A program that attempted to replicate the impact of the deduction by granting different benefits to taxpayers at different income levels could be more difficult to administer.

Tax expenditures may also be easier to administer than direct expenditures simply because the bureaucratic structure of FTB is already in place. Creating a new agency or a new program within an existing agency to administer a new direct expenditure program could be less efficient than using the existing tax expenditure apparatus.

Another general administrative problem with direct expenditures is that losses from fraud may be greater with direct expenditures than with tax expenditures (other than refundable credits). This is because the number of fraudulent claims for a tax expenditure is limited to the number of taxpayers who have tax to reduce. With direct expenditures, on the other hand, people without tax to reduce can apply fraudulently for the benefit, and individuals can more easily submit multiple claims for the same benefit.

Finally, we note that some tax expenditures could be altered to more precisely achieve their policy goals at lower cost. For example, if the primary goal of the mortgage interest deduction is to increase the percentage of taxpayers who own their own home, it might make more sense to give a large tax credit to taxpayers who are purchasing their first home, rather than the current deduction that is most valuable to taxpayers who already own homes, but are moving to much bigger and more expensive ones.

3. Conceptual Summary

In general, the best tax systems apply low tax rates to a broad tax base. However, some public policy objectives can be achieved by violating this principle. When elements of the tax base receive preferential treatment, we refer to the treatment as a tax expenditure. The most common types of tax expenditures are:

- Exclusions of certain types of income from tax.
- Deductions from income.
- Tax credits.

Reasons for granting tax expenditures include:

- The desire to offset monetary costs faced by certain classes of taxpayers.
- The desire to provide incentives to alter taxpayer behavior.
- Federal limitation on state tax systems.
- Conformity issues.
- Administrative simplicity.

Adverse consequences of tax expenditures include:

- Higher tax rates on income not receiving preferential treatment.
- Increases in the complexity of the tax code.
- Undesirable behavioral responses by taxpayers taking advantage of preferential treatments.
- Windfall payments from the government to taxpayers who would have undertaken desired activities even in the absence of tax incentives.
- Reduced policy flexibility.

There are potentially many good reasons for using tax expenditures within a tax system. However, policymakers should give careful thought to the reasons why the tax expenditure is needed, and the potential adverse consequences of adopting or retaining the tax expenditure. The pros and cons of each tax expenditure should be weighed as carefully as the pros and cons of any regular government expenditure program.

Section II: Analysis of Tax Expenditures

This section provides more in-depth analysis of many of the tax expenditures that are currently part of California income tax law.

The analysis below presents estimates of each tax expenditure's revenue cost and the number of taxpayers who benefit from them. For several, more significant, tax expenditures we also present a distributional analysis of the taxpayers claiming the tax expenditure.

Tax expenditure estimates are more reliable for some expenditure items than for others. The most reliable estimates are for credits. For these tax expenditures, we present actual amounts of credit claimed in 2005. Estimates for deductions are also generally reliable, since deductions must be reported on tax returns. Since the amount of deduction claimed by each taxpayer is known, we can calculate, for each taxpayer in our statistical sample, how much tax they would have owed if the deduction were not available. The revenue effects of exclusions and exemptions, on the other hand, are very difficult to estimate. We often do not have data on the actual amount of potential income that taxpayers are not required to report, so we cannot simulate the effects of these tax expenditures directly from tax data. As a result, these estimates are less reliable.

The estimates presented below do not consider any changes that might occur in the overall performance of the California economy if the tax expenditure were removed.

Tax expenditure estimates are not the same as estimates of the revenue impact of repealing a tax expenditure item. Of course, for many expenditure items the difference between these two estimates will be minimal or even nil. For example, the estimates of the senior exemption would be the same for a tax expenditure estimate and for a repeal revenue estimate. For other tax expenditures, however, there can be dramatic differences between the expenditure estimate and the repeal revenue estimate.⁵

One major source of differences between expenditure and repeal revenue estimates is the assumption that there are no interactions between tax expenditures. This assumption is consistent with the way government expenditures are typically presented. For example, when presenting the budget-year cost of the California State University (CSU) system, the Governor's Budget only considers the actual amount spent on the university system. It does not consider the fact that, if the CSU system were eliminated, the community college system would face greater costs because of higher enrollment. Offsets that would arise if a particular expenditure item were eliminated are not considered in the budgeting for expenditure items.⁶

Where interactions between tax expenditures exist, the actual revenue impact of eliminating a single tax expenditure item may differ from the cost reported below. The direction of the bias in the estimates presented below will depend on whether the expenditures are complements or substitutes. Complementary tax expenditures increase each other's value. For example, many analysts believe that if the mortgage interest deduction were eliminated, many homes would decrease in value. A drop in home prices would reduce the property taxes owed on the houses, and, in turn, the amount of property tax deductions for income tax purposes. Therefore, the actual revenue impact of removing the mortgage deduction would be equal to the direct impact estimated for that tax expenditure, plus the impact of the resulting reduction in tax expenditures for property tax deductions.

When tax expenditures are substitutes, the revenue effects of eliminating a single expenditure will likely be less than the estimates presented below. For example, if the exclusion of earnings from Section 529 education plans were eliminated, much of the money in these plans would likely be diverted to Coverdell Education Individual Savings Accounts. The actual revenue effect of eliminating the Section 529 tax expenditure would

⁵ Note that, for many types of tax expenditures, revenue estimates of tax expenditure repeals are more reliable than are revenue estimates for the introduction of new tax expenditures. This is because the current tax expenditure includes information on many of the behavioral responses that vex revenue estimators. For example, to do a revenue estimate for the introduction of a new manufacturer's investment credit, the estimator must (among other things) estimate the amount of new investment in manufacturing that will only occur because of the presence of the credit. This is not an issue for estimating the effect of repealing such a credit, because the current credit totals include both credits claimed for investments that would have occurred anyway and credits claimed for new investments that would not have occurred without the credit.

⁶ These offsetting costs would likely be considered if there were a legislative proposal to eliminate the CSU system.

then be equal to the cost estimated below, minus the resulting increase in the cost of the Coverdell tax expenditure.

Another cause of differences between expenditure estimates and repeal revenue estimates is that some tax expenditures accumulate over time. For example, the estimate for the basis step-up for inherited capital gains will differ dramatically between a tax expenditure estimate and a legislative repeal estimate. The reason is that if the basis step-up were repealed, the law change would only apply to those assets inherited after the legislation's effective date. If property is inherited, it may be sold the year it is inherited, the next year, the year after that, or any other year after that (or potentially never). Thus, in the first year, the repeal would be effective only for the inherited assets that were inherited in that year and sold in that year. In the second year for which the repeal is effective, both assets inherited and sold in that year, and assets inherited in the prior year and sold in that year would be affected. Therefore, while in the first year only one "vintage" of inherited assets will be affected, in the second year two "vintages" of inherited assets will be affected.⁷ In each subsequent year, an additional vintage of inherited assets will be added to the group of affected assets. Thus, the revenue estimate for repeal would show steady growth over the first several years. For the tax expenditure concept, however, we would estimate the impact if all inherited property that was sold in a particular year did not have the basis step-up, regardless of when it was inherited. Thus, our tax expenditure estimate of the basis step-up is approximately \$3 billion, while the estimated revenue gain from repeal of the basis step-up is only \$100 million in the first year.

Following the revenue estimate for each tax expenditure is an overview of policy considerations that may be relevant to that tax expenditure. This overview includes a brief summary of the intent of the tax expenditure, some discussion of the conditions under which the tax expenditure should be viewed as a successful policy tool and, where appropriate, a discussion of potential policy alternatives for achieving the tax expenditure's policy goal.

NONCONFORMITY TAX EXPENDITURE ITEMS

1. Exclusion of Social Security Benefits

Description:

This provides an exclusion from gross income for payments received from Social Security.

Amount:

The amount of Social Security income that was reported on federal income tax returns that was excluded from California PIT returns in tax year 2005 was \$14.4 billion. However, a large portion of Social Security income, particularly for low and middle-income taxpayers, is also excluded from federal income tax returns. The total amount of Social Security income excluded from PIT returns is unknown. We estimate the tax

⁷ Vintage, in this sense, refers to all the assets inherited in a particular year.

impact of this exclusion of Social Security income that is reported on federal tax returns to be \$872 million. We estimate the total impact of the exclusion of Social Security income to be about \$1.6 billion in tax year 2005.

Number of Tax Returns Affected:

In tax year 2005, 1.4 million PIT returns excluded Social Security income that had been reported on their federal tax returns. The number of taxpayers who had Social Security income but were not required to report it on either their federal or California returns is not known.

Distribution:

Impact of Exclusion of that Portion of Social Security Income that is Reported on Federal Tax Returns: 2005			
Adjusted Gross Income Class	Number of Returns Reporting Exclusion (Thousands)	Amount of Exclusion Reported (Millions)	Tax Impact of Exclusion (Millions)
Less Than \$10,000	11.3	\$86.6	\$1
\$10,000 to \$19,999	57.5	\$134.3	\$2
\$20,000 to \$49,999	637.9	\$4,522.6	\$187
\$50,000 to \$99,999	393.4	\$5,314.7	\$347
\$100,000 to \$199,999	163.7	\$2,519.0	\$205
More Than \$199,999	101.8	\$1,792.2	\$130
Total	1,365.6	\$14,369.4	\$872

Source: 2005 Personal Income Tax Sample and micro-simulation model
Detail may not add to total due to rounding.

Discussion:

Reducing the tax liability of Social Security recipients is the primary goal of this exclusion. The exclusion is successful in achieving this purpose.

Social Security is a vehicle for two types of income flows; pension savings and poverty relief. When Social Security first came into existence, the poverty rate for seniors was substantially higher than the overall poverty rate in this country. One goal of the Social Security system is to ensure a minimum level of income support for all participants. To achieve this goal, Social Security payments are more generous than contributions for many low-income participants. To the extent that Social Security payments represent poverty relief, it makes sense to exclude these payments from income, just as other types of welfare payments are excluded from income.

Social Security payments also contain a pension plan component that should not be viewed as poverty relief, but rather as a return on contributions invested in the Social Security system. Appropriate tax policy would treat the pension plan component of Social Security payments the same as other pension income. The comparison between Social Security and other pension plans is complicated by the split contribution system used by Social Security. Some Social Security contributions are made by employers and are not taxed. Employees make other contributions from after-tax income. It would,

therefore, be appropriate to exclude from income benefits equal to the amount of contributions that have already been taxed. Other Social Security benefits ought to be included in income, however. Since they are not, the exclusion of Social Security from AGI has a negative impact on horizontal equity. Consider two taxpayers, both receiving \$40,000 this year. One earns \$40,000 in investment interest. The other earns \$20,000 in interest and receives \$20,000 from Social Security. With California's current treatment of Social Security benefits, the first taxpayer will have to pay tax on the entire \$40,000 of interest, while the other taxpayer will only pay tax on the \$20,000 of interest received.

One potential problem that is eliminated by this exclusion is that the taxation of Social Security benefits may dissuade some recipients from seeking or retaining employment. This is because the inclusion of social security benefits would push employed recipients into higher marginal tax brackets, reducing the incentive for them to work.

2. Dependent Exemption Credit in Excess of Personal Exemption Credit

Description:

This program allows taxpayers a nonrefundable credit for each of their dependents. In 2008, the credit was \$309 per dependent. Using the definition of tax expenditure discussed in Section 1, only the part of the dependent exemption credit that is greater than the personal exemption credit is considered a tax expenditure. In 2008, the personal exemption credit was \$99. The credit phases out for taxpayers whose federal AGI reaches certain thresholds. In 2008, the AGI thresholds were \$317,613 for joint filers, \$238,111 for heads of household, and \$158,804 for married filing separately. The phase-out provisions regarding the dependent exemption credit for high-income taxpayers, and the requirements for nonresident taxpayers are the same as those for the personal exemption credit.

Amount:

In tax year 2005, taxpayers claimed \$2.9 billion in dependent credits above the personal exemption credit amount lowering their taxes by \$1.2 billion.

Number of Tax Returns Affected:

In tax year 2005, the additional dependent credit was reported on 6.0 million PIT returns.

Distribution:

Amount of Dependent Exemption Credit Greater than the Personal Exemption Credit: 2005		
Adjusted Gross Income Class	Number of Returns Reporting Excess Credit (Thousands of Returns)	Amount of Excess Credit Used (Millions of Dollars)
Less Than \$10,000	522.8	\$4
\$10,000 to \$19,999	935.2	\$50
\$20,000 to \$49,999	2026.9	\$398
\$50,000 to \$99,999	1442.8	\$450
\$100,000 to \$199,999	750.6	\$242
More Than \$199,999	274.5	\$59
Total	5953.0	\$1,203

Source: 2005 Personal Income Tax Sample and micro-simulation model
Detail may not add to total due to rounding.

Discussion:

The program's purpose is to reduce the tax liability of taxpayers with dependents. The rationale for this is that the financial responsibilities incurred by taxpayers with dependents reduce the taxpayer's ability to pay taxes. Prior to 1998, the dependent exemption credit was equal to the personal exemption credit. The credit was increased to more accurately reflect the financial impact dependents have on a taxpayer's ability to pay taxes. It is unknown whether the value of the dependent exemption credit that exceeds the personal exemption credit properly compensates taxpayers for the increased financial responsibilities of dependents.

The federal government offers a dependent deduction rather than a credit. Because of California's highly progressive tax rate structure, a credit provides more tax benefit than a deduction to lower-income taxpayers.

The dependent exemption credit is successful in reducing the tax liability of taxpayers with dependents.

3. Research and Development (R&D) Expenses Credit

Description:

This provision allows taxpayers to claim a portion of their incremental R&D expenses as a credit. Incremental expenses are calculated as increases in the ratio of a taxpayer's current-year R&D expenses to gross sales relative to a four-year base period. The credit is equal to 15 percent of qualified incremental R&D expenses, and 25 percent of qualified incremental "basic" R&D expenses. *Basic R&D* is "research conducted at qualified universities or scientific research organizations." Since 1998, California has allowed taxpayers to elect an alternative formula for calculating their R&D credit. This alternative amount is calculated as a percentage of the Federal Alternative Incremental Credit amount. Once made, the alternative formula election is binding for all future years.

Amount:

In tax year 2005, the amount of credits applied was \$55 million under PIT₅ and \$952 million under the Corporate Tax.

Number of Tax Returns Affected:

In tax year 2005, credits were applied on 3,274 PIT returns and 1,823 Corporate Tax returns.

Distributional Analysis:

The tables below present information on the distribution of R&D credits by size of gross receipts and by industry. Although firms with gross receipts greater than \$1 billion represent 8 percent of returns that claim the R&D credit, they report 78 percent of total credit claimed. Forty-nine percent of returns claiming R&D credits come from the manufacturing sector. These returns account for 74 percent of the R&D credit applied. Within this sector, electronic and electrical equipment claimed the largest amount of R&D credit, accounting for just over 13 percent of returns, but 41 percent of R&D credit applied.

Distribution of (Corp) Research and Development Credit Used by Size of Gross Receipts: 2005				
Size of Gross Receipts	Returns and Credit		Percent of Total	
	Returns	Credit Applied (Millions)	Returns	Credit Applied
Below \$10 million	781	\$13	43%	1%
\$10 - \$ 50 million	496	\$18	27%	2%
\$50 - \$100 million	117	\$13	6%	1%
\$100 - \$500 million	143	\$68	8%	7%
\$500 million - \$1 billion	49	\$90	3%	10%
Above \$1 billion	147	\$747	8%	78%
Unknown	91	\$3	5%	0%
Total	1,823	\$952	100%	100%

Source: Business Entities Tax System and Corporate Return Samples

Detail may not add to total due to rounding.

Research and Development (Corp) Credits Applied by Industrial Subsector: 2005				
Industrial Subsector	Returns and Credit		Percent of Total	
	Returns	Credit Applied (Millions)	Returns	Credit Applied
Food and Kindred Products	17	\$2	1%	0%
Chemicals and Allied Products	85	\$7	5%	1%
Pharmaceuticals	31	\$193	2%	20%
Electrical and Electronic Equipment	243	\$388	13%	41%
Other Manufacturing	514	\$112	28%	12%
Other	933	\$249	51%	26%
Total	1,823	\$952	100%	100%

Source: Business Entities Tax System and Corporate Return Samples
Detail may not add to total due to rounding.

Discussion:

The California R&D credit is a credit that normally is taken in conjunction with the Federal Research Credit. The calculation to determine the amount of creditable California research expenses generally conforms to the federal calculation with one exception; the California credit only applies to research activities conducted in California.

At the federal level, there are two reasons to encourage R&D. The first is that, without extra incentives, industry will typically do less R&D work than would be optimal for society. This is because R&D activity often produces “positive externalities,” i.e., benefits to people other than the person doing the R&D. The federal R&D credit reduces the after-tax cost of R&D investments, which should lead to an increase in R&D activity. Since state R&D credits also reduce the after-tax cost of R&D, they too will induce an increase in the overall level of R&D spending. The federal R&D credit’s second purpose is to encourage taxpayers to conduct R&D in the United States, rather than in another country.

Since the structure of the California R&D credit generally conforms to that of the federal credit, the California credit will produce both of these same effects. It will contribute to an overall increase in R&D activity, and it will encourage R&D activity to be undertaken in California rather than elsewhere. Because California’s contribution to total R&D spending is smaller than the federal government’s contribution, the first effect -- global increases in R&D activity -- is somewhat less important to state policy than to federal policy. The second effect -- regional competition -- is a relatively more important motivator for state policy. This is because it may be easier for some R&D firms to move their activity to another state than it would be for them to move it to another country, and many states besides California offer R&D credit. Therefore, a California credit may be necessary for the state to remain competitive with other states in attracting and maintaining research and development business activity.

Both effects of the California R&D credit, the increase in the overall amount of R&D activity, and the increase in the proportion of this activity that takes place in California, must be considered in evaluating the success of the California R&D credit. The desirability of the increase in overall R&D activity is dependent on the level of the federal R&D credit (and credits offered by other states and countries). If the federal credit is too low, the added R&D incentives provided by states collectively could generate productive additional R&D activity. Alternatively, if the federal credit has already induced optimal levels of R&D, any increases in overall R&D spending induced by additional state credits will be inefficient and hurt overall economic performance. It is not known whether the federal R&D credit is currently set at the optimal level.

The R&D credit may be viewed as successfully maintaining the competitiveness of the California R&D industry only if R&D activity is undertaken in California that would not have been undertaken here in the absence of the credit. The amount of California R&D activity that would not have taken place in California in the absence of the credit is unknown. Credits granted for R&D that would have occurred even in the absence of the credit may be considered a windfall.

There are two possible benefits to attracting the R&D business to California. The first is the addition of the R&D jobs themselves. If this were the only benefit, the R&D industry should be singled out for this special benefit only if jobs in this industry are substantially more desirable than jobs in other industries in the state. The second potential benefit from bringing R&D to California is that other California businesses may be able to adopt innovations developed locally more rapidly than they can adopt innovations developed elsewhere. If this is the case, many California businesses, not just those receiving this credit, will gain an advantage over their rivals in other states. This advantage is not a result of being able to obtain technological information more quickly. Given the global communications network, information can be transported across continents relatively quickly and without cost. The advantage to California may come through something economists call *economies of agglomeration*. *Economies of agglomeration* are defined as “a reduction in production costs that results when firms in the same or related industries locate near one another.”

Thus, for example, if the R&D credit encourages some pharmaceutical companies to locate their research facilities in California, that will, likewise, encourage the growth of pharmaceutical research support firms (such as material suppliers, pharmaceutical manufacturers, universities doing biological and chemical research, chemical engineers, etc.) to be attracted to that area. Subsequently, with the growth of the support industries, other pharmaceutical firms will be attracted to the area. There are clearly many agglomeration economies within California (high-technology in Silicon Valley and motion pictures in Hollywood are two obvious examples). However, many factors contribute to the development and growth of agglomeration economies. Because of the complexity of agglomeration economies, the extent to which the California R&D credit has actually encouraged the development or growth of any agglomeration economies is not known.

We also note that less than one-fourth of this credit is actually available to reduce tax in the year that it is generated. The inability to fully use the credit (because there is insufficient tax to offset) undoubtedly reduces the incentive provided by the existence of the credit.

4. Water's-Edge Election

Description:

Qualified corporations may elect to file on a water's-edge basis. This election allows unitary multinational corporations to compute income attributable to California based on domestic combined reporting rather than worldwide combined reporting. Under the water's-edge provision, a business may elect to compute its California tax by reference to only the income and factors of a limited number of entities. In general, these entities include United States incorporated entities, the United States activities of foreign incorporated entities, and the activities of various foreign entities that are included in the federal consolidated return. The election is generally for a seven-year period.

Amount:

For tax year 2005, we estimate the tax revenue loss due to this legislation to be \$621 million.

Number of Tax Returns Affected:

In the 2005 tax year, approximately 9,280 corporations elected to file on a water's-edge combined report basis. Of these, about 5,010 were apportioning corporations and the rest were non-apportioning. There are about 61,932 apportioning corporations. It is not known how many of these have foreign operations.

Distributional Analysis:

FTB data indicate that multinational corporations of various industry and size elected to file their tax returns on a water's-edge basis. Large corporations, however, benefit the most from this program. In 2005, corporations with gross receipts greater than \$1 billion accounted for only 6 percent of the water's-edge returns. It is estimated, however, that 75 percent of the water's-edge tax benefit goes to these same corporations.

Discussion:

The worldwide unitary method is the standard method used by California to estimate the income earned in California by multistate and multinational corporations. Under this method, corporations combine their income from all operations and apportion that income to California using a formula that is based upon the portion of a corporation's worldwide sales, property, and payroll that are attributable to California. As an alternative, California allows corporations to elect water's-edge. The water's-edge method generally mirrors the worldwide method, but excludes foreign corporations; i.e., it considers only income from United States operations, and it apportions this income according to the portion of a corporation's United States sales, property and payroll that are attributable to California.

Corporations choose to elect water's-edge for a variety of reasons. Some choose water's-edge because it reduces their tax liability, others because it reduces filing complexity, and others – this group is largely composed of foreign parents – because they do not want to provide financial detail on their foreign operations to California.

The water's-edge provisions were enacted in response to concerns that the worldwide combined reporting accounting method may improperly attribute some income of multinational corporate groups to California. Worldwide combined reporting was ruled to be constitutionally permissible by the United States Supreme Court in 1983 (*Container Corporation of America v. Franchise Tax Board*, 463 U.S. 159) for United States-based businesses, and in 1994 to non-United States-based businesses (*Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Board*, 512 US 289).

Individual corporations often have very different tax liabilities under the two reporting methods. Some will owe more under worldwide combination than under water's-edge, and others will owe less. Under the elective system, many corporations will choose whichever method reduces their tax liability. The total tax collected under the elective system will, therefore, be less than would be collected under either pure system. It is the election aspect of the water's-edge election that generates a tax expenditure. If all California corporations were required to use the same filing method, regardless of whether worldwide combination or water's edge was chosen as the method, we would not consider it to be a tax expenditure.

5. Special Tax Treatments for Economically Depressed Areas

California has several economic incentives designed to improve the economic situation of particular types of individuals and particular areas of the state. These programs include:

- Enterprise Zones (EZs).
- Targeted Tax Areas (TTAs).
- Manufacturing Enhancement Areas (MEAs).
- Local Agency Military Base Recovery Areas (LAMBRAs).

Because many of the incentives available are the same for each of the area types listed above, we have consolidated the discussion of the main benefits available in these areas. There are five tax expenditures available:

- A hiring credit for employers of qualified employees.
- A credit for sales tax paid on certain investments.
- A credit for enterprise zone employees for qualified wages paid to them.
- A business expense deduction.
- A deduction for interest received on loans to businesses in these areas.

Of these benefits, only the hiring credit is available in MEAs.⁸

⁸ There is also a more generous treatment of Net Operating Losses allowed for businesses active in zones. However, Net Operating Loss treatment is not considered a tax expenditure and so is not considered here.

Employer Credits – Hiring Credit and Sales and Use Tax Credit

Description:

Most of the designated areas provide both a hiring credit and a credit for sales and use tax payments. These two credits will be discussed in combination here, as the data are not generally available for the two credits separately.

Taxpayers can claim a credit for a portion of the wages paid to qualified "disadvantaged individuals" employed in a designated area. Generally, qualified *disadvantaged individuals* are "those who were unemployed or economically disadvantaged prior to the date of hiring." The available tax credit is 50 percent of the wages paid during the first year, 40 percent for the second year, 30 percent for the third year, 20 percent for the fourth year, and 10 percent for the fifth year. The amount of creditable wages is limited to 150 percent of the minimum wage per employee (202 percent for certain workers in the Long Beach EZ). Credit claimed under this program is limited to the tax attributable to income from the designated area.

Employers in economically depressed areas can receive an income tax credit for the amount of sales and use taxes paid on certain purchases of machinery or parts. Credit is limited to the tax on income attributable to the depressed area.

Amount:

In tax year 2005, credits of \$382 million were claimed on Corporate Tax returns and \$146 million in credits were claimed on PIT returns.

Number of Tax Returns Affected:

In tax year 2005, 3,506 Corporate Tax returns and 7,780 PIT returns claimed these credits.

Discussion:

The purpose of the hiring credit is twofold. It is intended to encourage both business activity in designated, depressed areas of the state and also employment for designated classes of individuals.

This program will be considered successful if it creates new jobs. If the program moves jobs from other parts of California into the economically depressed area, it may be considered successful if either 1) policymakers view jobs in depressed areas as more valuable than jobs in other parts of the state, or 2) the spillover benefits to the economy from job creation are greater in depressed areas than in other parts of the state. For any jobs that would have been created irrespective of this credit, this provision represents a windfall gain to the taxpayer. We have no way of knowing this credit's effect on the relative proportions of jobs that would have been created in the depressed area anyway, the number that would have been created elsewhere in the state, or the number that would not have been created at all.

The purpose of the sales and use tax credit is to stimulate economic activity in depressed areas by lowering the cost of capital.

Similarly to the hiring credit, this program will be considered successful if it generates new business activity. If the program simply moves business investments from other parts of California into the economically depressed area, it may be considered successful if either 1) policymakers view investment in depressed areas as more valuable than investment in other parts of the state, or 2) the spillover benefits to the economy from investment are greater in depressed areas than in other parts of the state. For any investments that would have been made anyhow, this provision represents a windfall gain to the taxpayer. We have no way of knowing the effect of this credit on the relative proportions of investments that would have been created in the depressed area anyway, the number that would have been created elsewhere in the state, or the number that would not have been created at all.

Credit for Enterprise Zone Employees for Qualified Wages

Description:

Enterprise Zone employees can receive an income tax credit for five percent of their qualified wages, as defined by IRC Section 3306 (b), up to a maximum of 150 percent of the minimum wage. The credit is reduced by nine cents for each \$1 in wages in excess of qualified wages. The credit is nonrefundable, and unused portions may not be carried forward.

Amount:

In tax year 2005, \$0.11 million of this credit was claimed on PIT returns.

Number of Tax Returns Affected:

In tax year 2005, this credit was claimed on 491 PIT returns.

Discussion:

This credit's primary purpose is to stimulate economic activity by subsidizing wages. The presence of this credit enables workers to accept lower base wages. This, in turn, lowers businesses' operating costs, which may lead to increased economic activity.

This program will be considered successful if it creates new jobs. If the program simply moves jobs from other parts of California into the economically depressed area, it may be considered successful if either 1) policymakers view jobs in depressed areas as more valuable than jobs in other parts of the state, or 2) the spillover benefits to the economy from job creation are greater in depressed areas than in other parts of the state. For any jobs that would have been created anyhow, this provision represents a windfall gain either to the employee or to the employer. The windfall accrues to the employer if the worker's base wage is lowered by the amount of the credit. Windfall accrues to the employee if wages do not drop that far (which will happen if the employee would have worked for the minimum wage even without this credit). The number of affected jobs that would have been created even without the credit is not known.

Interest from Loans to Businesses in Economically Depressed Areas

Description:

This provision allows taxpayers to exclude from their gross income the net interest received from loans to businesses located in economically depressed areas.

Amount:

We estimate that, in tax year 2005, this program resulted in a Corporation Tax revenue loss of \$38 million. This estimate is based on \$490 million of deductions claimed by corporate taxpayers. The data to determine the revenue impact or the amount of deductions claimed by PIT returns are not available.

Number of Tax Returns Affected:

In tax year 2005, 159 Corporate Tax returns reported this deduction. The number of PIT returns with this deduction is not available.

Discussion:

This credit's purpose is to stimulate economic activity in depressed areas by lowering the cost of capital.

This program will be considered successful if it generates new business activity. If the program simply moves business investments from other parts of California into the economically depressed area, it may be considered successful if either 1) policymakers view investment in depressed areas as more valuable than investment in other parts of the state, or 2) the spillover benefits to the economy from investment are greater in depressed areas than in other parts of the state. For any investments that would have been made anyhow, this provision represents a windfall gain to the taxpayer. The relative proportions of investments that would have been created in the depressed area anyway, would have been created elsewhere in the state, or would not have been created at all are not known.

Business Expense Deduction for Activities within Economically Depressed Areas

Description:

Businesses located in economically depressed areas are allowed to expense a portion of their costs of business equipment beyond normal Internal Revenue Code Section 179 expensing limits. Depending on the number of years that a zone has been designated, businesses are allowed larger expensing limits than generally allowed under state PIT and Corporation Tax Laws.

Amount:

In tax year 2005, we estimate that this program resulted in a revenue loss of \$0.2 million. This estimate is based on \$6 million of deductions claimed by corporate taxpayers. The data to determine the revenue impact or the amount of deductions claimed by PIT returns are not available.

Number of Tax Returns Affected:

In tax year 2005, 316 Corporate Tax returns reported this deduction. Data on the number of PIT returns claiming this deduction are not available.

Discussion:

This deduction's primary purpose is to stimulate economic activity by allowing accelerated deductions related to capital equipment. The presence of this provision increases the rate of return on capital equipment in economically depressed areas by accelerating the deductions that can be made against the costs of the equipment. This increase in the rate of return can encourage businesses to invest beyond a level at which they would normally invest.

This program will be considered successful if it encourages new investment in the economically depressed area. If the program simply moves investment from other parts of California into the economically depressed area, it may be considered successful if either 1) policymakers view investments (or, more generally, economic activity) in depressed areas as more valuable than investments in other parts of the state, or 2) the spillover benefits to the economy from additional investment are greater in depressed areas than in other parts of the state. For any investment that would have taken place anyhow, this provision represents a windfall gain to the business. The amount of investment that would have taken place even without this program is not known.

6. Double-Weighted Sales Apportionment Formula

Description:

Corporations with income derived from sources both within and outside California must apportion income using a formula that takes into account payroll, property, and sales factors. Prior to January 1, 1993, California applied a 3-factor formula in which the payroll, property, and sales factors were equally weighted. After January 1, 1993, California adopted a formula in which the sales factor is double-weighted. Corporations engaged in qualified agricultural, extractive, and financial business activities are exempt from the double-weighted sales formula, and must continue using the equally weighted 3-factor formula to apportion their worldwide income.

Amount:

The revenue loss from this program exhibits substantial year-to-year variation. We estimate the average annual revenue loss over tax years 2003 - 2005 to be \$217 million.

Number of Tax Returns Affected:

In the tax years 2005, there were 61,932 Corporate Tax returns that apportioned their worldwide income to California. About 892 corporate returns used the 3-factor apportionment formula. The remaining 61,040 corporate returns used the double-weighted sales apportionment formula.

Distributional Analysis:

This program does not affect corporations in the agricultural, extractive, and financial industries. Therefore, there is no tax impact. Of the remaining corporations, those in manufacturing and services are most affected by this program. Manufacturing corporations accounted for 21 percent of all apportioning returns, but enjoyed 55 percent of this program's total benefit over the years 2002 through 2005. Corporations in the services sector accounted for 35 percent of all apportioning returns, but enjoyed only 10 percent of the total benefit.

Distribution of Impact of Double-Weighted Sales Factor by Size of Gross Receipts: Average 2003-2005				
Size of Gross Receipts	Returns and Tax Impact		Percent of Total	
	Returns	Tax Impact (Millions)	Returns	Tax Impact
Below \$10 million	23,378	-\$2	38%	-1%
\$10 - \$ 50 million	17,918	\$1	29%	0%
\$50 - \$100 million	4,318	\$2	7%	1%
\$100 - \$500 million	8,264	\$11	13%	5%
\$500 million - \$1 billion	1,524	\$11	2%	5%
Above \$1 billion	1,757	\$190	3%	88%
Unknown	4,773	\$4	8%	2%
Total	61,932	\$217	100%	100%

Source: 2003-05 Corporate Return Samples
Detail may not add to total due to rounding.

Distribution of Impact of Double-Weighted Sales Factor by Industrial Subsector: Average 2003-2005				
Industrial Subsector	Returns and Tax Impact		Percent of Total	
	Returns	Tax Impact (Millions)	Returns	Tax Impact
Agriculture/Mining/Finance	892	\$0	1%	0%
Construction	3,073	-\$1	5%	-1%
Manufacture	12,913	\$119	21%	55%
Trade	12,490	\$7	20%	3%
Services	21,381	\$21	35%	10%
Real Estate	3,021	-\$3	5%	-1%
Transportation, Communications and Utilities	2,021	\$14	3%	7%
Other	6,141	\$60	10%	28%
Total	61,932	\$217	100%	100%

Source: 2003-2005 Corporate Return Samples
Detail may not add to total due to rounding.

Discussion:

The Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purpose Act (UDITPA) provides for the use of an equally weighted, 3-factor formula to apportion income between states. At one time, over half the states subscribed to the UDITPA formula. Under the Multistate Tax Compact, taxpayers can elect to use the UDITPA formula or the state's formula to assign income. In the last decade, many states have switched to an apportionment formula that uses the traditional three factors (tangible property, payroll, and sales), but weights the sales factor at least twice the value of the other two factors.

The purpose of the double-weighted sales factor is to encourage businesses to locate productive activities in California. It does this by reducing taxes for corporations whose payroll and property factors are larger than their sales factors and increasing taxes for corporations whose sales factors are larger than the other two. Thus, it provides an incentive for firms to produce goods and services in California and sell them elsewhere. This incentive could result in increased investment or employment in California.

On the one hand, higher taxes for businesses with large sales factors may result in either higher consumer prices or in reduced availability of certain goods and services in California.

On the other hand, the double-weighted sales factor increases the tax corporations must pay when they sell goods or services in California. Corporations view this tax increase as an increase in production costs and will often pass the costs through to consumers in the form of higher consumer prices. In extreme cases, where corporations are unable to pass along these costs, they may choose not to make certain goods and services available in California.

This program could be considered successful if the benefits from induced increases in investment and employment in California outweigh any additional costs to California consumers. It is not known how much investment or employment currently located in California would have occurred in the absence of this program. Nor is it known if this program has affected either consumer prices or the availability of goods in California.

7. Child and Dependent Care Expenses Credit

Description:

This credit is equal to a percentage of a parallel federal credit for taxpayers with dependents who pay for child or dependent care in order to work. The credit applies to up to \$3,000 in expenses for one child or \$6,000 in expenses for two or more children. The California credit is calculated as a percentage of federal qualified expenses. This percentage decreases as income increases and is eliminated for taxpayers with AGI greater than \$100,000. The maximum available credit is \$575 for families with one child and \$1,050 for families with 2 or more children. This credit is refundable; thus, it is available even to Californians with little or no tax liability.

Amount:

In tax year 2005, taxpayers claimed \$180 million in child and dependent credits, lowering their taxes by \$53 million. The remaining amount, \$127 million, was refunded to taxpayers.

Number of Tax Returns Affected:

In tax year 2005, the credits were applied on 593,610 PIT returns.

Distribution of the Credit:

Child and Dependent Care Refundable Credit: 2005		
Adjusted Gross Income Class	Number of Returns Reporting Credit (Thousands)	Amount of Credit Claimed (Millions)
Less Than \$10,000	20.1	\$7.5
\$10,000 to \$19,999	60.2	\$27.7
\$20,000 to \$49,999	258.4	\$87.8
\$50,000 to \$99,999	253.5	\$57.0
\$100,000 to \$199,999	1.5	\$0.3
Total	593.6	180.3

Source: 2005 Return Merge
Detail may not add to total due to rounding.

Discussion:

This credit's purpose is to defray child or dependent care expenses incurred by taxpayers in order to maintain or seek employment. This credit provides this relief by offsetting a portion of the cost of childcare for working taxpayers. Childcare expenses are a necessary part of working for many people. After subtracting out the childcare expenses, an employee who has childcare expenses has less income remaining than does another employee who earns the same salary. The Child and Dependent Care Credit is intended to make the tax burden of employees with the childcare expenses reflective of their net (after childcare expenses) rather than gross pay.

This credit successfully achieves its goal of assisting workers with their child and dependent care costs.

This credit could potentially induce two types of behavioral changes in taxpayers. The first is that some taxpayers who would not have chosen to seek employment if they had to bear the full burden of their child or dependent care expenses may now choose to seek employment. The other is that some working taxpayers who, if the credit did not exist, would have made informal arrangements for child or dependent care, may now choose paid child or dependent care.

8. Exclusion of Interest on Federal Government Obligations

Description:

Interest earned on debt issued by the federal government is exempt from income tax.

Amount:

In tax year 2005, the amount of federal obligation interest excluded from PIT returns was \$3.3 billion. The tax impact of this exclusion was \$167 million.

Number of Tax Returns Affected:

In tax year 2005, this exclusion was reported on 351,237 PIT returns.

Distribution:

Impact of Exclusion of Federal Obligation Interest: 2005			
Adjusted Gross Income Class	Number of Returns Reporting Exclusion (Thousands)	Amount of Exclusion Claimed (Millions)	Tax Impact of Exclusion (Millions)
Less Than \$10,000	35.2	\$177.2	\$3
\$10,000 to \$19,999	30.1	\$105.4	\$3
\$20,000 to \$49,999	72.2	\$233.6	\$12
\$50,000 to \$99,999	73.1	\$206.0	\$15
\$100,000 to \$199,999	60.2	\$244.4	\$19
More Than \$199,999	80.4	\$2,311.3	\$115
Total	351.2	\$3,277.9	\$167

Source: 2005 Personal Income Tax Sample and micro-simulation model
Detail may not add to total due to rounding.

Discussion:

Federal statute prohibits states from imposing an income tax on interest income from federal debt obligations if interest on state obligations is exempt.

9. Exclusion of Unemployment Insurance Benefits

Description:

This provides an exclusion from gross income for benefits received under the state's unemployment insurance program. Privately-provided unemployment benefits are not taxable up to the amount of prior contributions, but benefits that exceed prior contributions are taxable. By contrast, government-provided unemployment benefits are not taxable, whether they exceed previous contributions or not.

Amount:

In tax year 2005, the amount of unemployment income excluded from PIT returns was \$3,711 million. The tax impact of this exclusion was \$121 million.

Number of Tax Returns Affected:

In tax year 2005, this exclusion affected 955,000 PIT returns.

Distribution:

Impact of Exclusion of Unemployment Compensation: 2005			
Adjusted Gross Income Class	Number of Returns Reporting Exclusion (Thousands)	Amount of Exclusion Claimed (Millions)	Tax Impact of Exclusion (Millions)
Less Than \$10,000	144.2	\$558.1	\$1
\$10,000 to \$19,999	192.4	\$724.1	\$7
\$20,000 to \$49,999	317.3	\$1,229.6	\$33
\$50,000 to \$99,999	207.3	\$776.5	\$46
\$100,000 to \$199,999	75.5	\$329.4	\$27
More Than \$199,999	18.8	\$93.5	\$7
Total	955.3	\$3,711.3	\$121

Source: 2005 Personal Income Tax Sample and micro-simulation model
Detail may not add to total due to rounding

Discussion:

The goal of this program is to reduce the taxes paid by taxpayers who have lost their job and have received unemployment benefits. Paying taxes on such benefits creates an additional financial burden for the unemployed at a time when they are already suffering financially as a result of a reduction in income.

The exclusion of unemployment benefits from AGI has a negative impact on horizontal equity. Consider two families, both receiving \$40,000 this year. One earns \$40,000 in wages. The other has one employed spouse who earns \$30,000 and another who is unemployed and receives unemployment compensation of \$10,000 per year. With California's current treatment of unemployment benefits, the first family will pay tax on the full amount of \$40,000 of wages, while the other family will only pay tax on the \$30,000 of earned income. Another concern is that this program may create a disincentive for certain unemployed persons to seek jobs, since it reduces the after-tax cost of their unemployment. This incentive may be more relevant for unemployed spouses of moderate-to-high-income taxpayers, since their need for employment may not be that urgent as compared to those of lower-income individuals.

A macroeconomic benefit of this exemption is that it acts as a built-in stabilizer for the economy during times of high unemployment. As unemployment increases and the share of personal income made up by unemployment compensation increases, the effective tax rate on personal income will fall. The expenditure of these benefits by their recipients will tend to encourage economic growth.

It is not clear why privately provided and government-provided unemployment compensation should receive different tax treatment.

10. Senior Exemption Credit

Description:

This program provides taxpayers over age 65 with an additional personal exemption credit. The credit is indexed annually for inflation. In 2008, the credit was \$99 or \$198 for joint filers if both were over age 65.

Amount

In tax year 2005, taxpayers claimed \$211 million in senior exemption credits, lowering their taxes by about \$118 million.

Number of Tax Returns Affected:

In tax year 2005, this credit was reported on 1.8 million PIT returns.

Distribution:

Senior Exemption Credit: 2005		
Adjusted Gross Income Class	Number of Returns Reporting Credit (Thousands of Returns)	Amount of Credit Claimed (Millions of Dollars)
Less Than \$10,000	280.2	\$0.0
\$10,000 to \$19,999	340.5	\$5.3
\$20,000 to \$49,999	632.4	\$45.3
\$50,000 to \$99,999	335.5	\$40.9
\$100,000 to \$199,999	144.3	\$16.9
More Than \$199,999	83.6	\$9.5
Total	1816.4	\$117.8

Source: 2005 Personal Income Tax Sample and micro-simulation model

Detail may not add to total due to rounding.

Discussion:

This credit provides hardship relief on the grounds that taxpayers over age 65 are believed to have higher medical and personal costs relative to income than other taxpayers. This credit is similar to a provision of federal law that allows an additional deduction from adjusted gross income for this group of taxpayers. The amount of the federal deduction for 2008 was \$1,350 for single filers and \$2,100 for joint filers, both of whom are over age 65.

This credit is effective in reducing the tax liability of taxpayers over age 65.

This credit is available to all taxpayers over age 65, even if they have no extraordinary expenses. To the extent that this credit is intended to offset medical expenses, it may be unnecessary in light of other available benefits, including the itemized deduction for medical expenses and direct government expenditures and provisions for medical care for

the elderly.⁹ Furthermore, other, non-elderly, taxpayers can also face circumstances in which they have higher medical or other personal costs. If the credit were intended to offset certain medical and other personal costs, it would be more equitable and more efficient to target the credit to all those who face these higher costs, regardless of whether or not they are elderly. However, it is possible that the costs of targeting the credit with greater specificity could outweigh any equity and efficiency benefits that would accrue.

11. Renter's Credit

Description:

This program provides for a credit to low-income taxpayers who rent their primary residence. The amount of the credit is \$60 for single filers with income no more than \$34,936 in 2008, and \$120 for joint filers with income not exceeding \$69,872 in 2008. Since 1999, the credit has been nonrefundable.

Amount:

In tax year 2005, taxpayers claimed \$97 million in credits, reducing their taxes by \$86 million.

Number of Tax Returns Affected:

In tax year 2005, credits were applied on 1.4 million PIT returns.

Distribution:

Renter's Credit: 2005		
Adjusted Gross Income Class	Number of Returns (Thousands)	Amount of Credit Reported (Millions)
Less Than \$10,000	27.1	\$0.8
\$10,000 to \$19,999	420.9	\$21.2
\$20,000 to \$49,999	761.0	\$57.7
\$50,000 to \$69,999	144.0	\$16.9
More Than \$69,999	0.0	\$0.0
Total	1,353.0	\$96.7

Source: 2005 Personal Income Tax Merge File
Detail may not add to total due to rounding.

Discussion:

The intent of this credit is to counteract a perceived inequity between renters and homeowners. The credit was originally enacted in 1972 as part of a comprehensive property tax reform program. That program allowed for an increase in the Homeowner's Property Tax Exemption Credit that reduces the property tax on owner-occupied property. In contrast, rental property is not eligible for the homeowner's exemption. The

⁹ It could be argued that the itemized deduction for medical expenses is not useful for many elderly taxpayers: either because they do not itemize, or because taxpayers are only allowed to deduct medical expenses greater than 7.5% of AGI. While this is true for elderly taxpayers, it is also true for many nonelderly taxpayers. This point, thus, argues for a more specific credit for all taxpayers with medical expenses, rather than a generic credit for all elderly taxpayers.

Renter's Credit was intended to equalize property taxes between renters and homeowners by providing a benefit directly to the renter. This credit was increased significantly in 1979 shortly after the approval of Proposition 13, *Property Tax Limitation*. It was thought that owners of real property were receiving a benefit from Proposition 13, but that renters received no benefit.

The extent to which this credit realizes its objective depends on both the nature of the homeowner's benefit it is intended to parallel and on conditions in the rental market. The credit is more likely to be justifiable if it is intended to be the renter's counterpart to the homeowner's exemption than if it is intended as an expansion of Proposition 13. This is because rental property does benefit from Proposition 13. If the rental market is favorable to renters, landlords may be forced by the market to pass their Proposition 13 savings to renters by lowering rents. In this case, the Renter's Credit is unnecessary. Since rental property is not eligible for the homeowner's exemption there is no savings to pass along. Therefore, the credit may be justified as matching the homeowner's exemption.

This credit may also fail to achieve its objective if conditions in the rental market are favorable to landlords. This is because, under these market conditions, landlords may be able to increase rents by an amount equal to the Renter's Credit, leaving no benefit to the renters.

Two other aspects of this credit may be worth noting. One is that the benefits from the homeowner's exemption and Proposition 13 are the same, regardless of the taxpayer's filing status. It is not clear why, if the Renter's Credit is intended to mimic these provisions, the credit is twice as large for joint filers as for single filers. The second interesting policy note is that this credit, by helping renters, offers an inducement to rent. Although relatively small, this inducement works against the numerous government policies encouraging people to purchase houses rather than rent.

12. Exclusion of Nonresident Military Pay

Description:

Nonresident military pay is exempt from state income taxes.

Amount:

It is estimated that tax impact of this exclusion is \$64 million annually based on approximately 131,000 nonresident military personnel in California.

Number of Tax Returns Affected:

The number of taxpayers excluding pay under this provision is not known because taxpayers are not required to identify themselves as taking this exclusion.

Discussion:

States are prohibited by federal statute from taxing nonresident military pay. Also, if the nonresident has California source income, military pay is excluded from the calculation of taxes owed on the California source income. Of the \$64 million in tax impact

estimated above, approximately \$54 million is due directly to the exclusion of military pay, and the other \$10 million is due to reduced tax rates on the taxpayers' California source income.

13. Exclusion of State Lottery Winnings

Description:

Under this provision, winnings from the California State Lottery are exempt from gross income.

Amount:

In tax year 2005, the amount of exempt income was approximately \$572 million. We estimate the tax impact of that exclusion at \$44 million.

Number of Tax Returns Affected:

In tax year 2005, 8,400 California PIT returns reported lottery income on their federal tax returns and excluded the income from their PIT returns.

Distribution:

Impact of Exclusion of Lottery Winnings: 2005			
Adjusted Gross Income Class	Number of Returns Reporting Exclusion (Thousands)	Amount of Exclusion Reported (Millions)	Tax Impact of Exclusion (Millions)
Less Than \$10,000	0.4	\$123.9	\$5.4
\$10,000 to \$19,999	0.4	\$36.7	\$2.7
\$20,000 to \$49,999	3.5	\$88.1	\$7.2
\$50,000 to \$99,999	2.7	\$144.3	\$12.9
\$100,000 to \$199,999	1.2	\$108.5	\$9.8
More Than \$199,999	0.2	\$70.7	\$6.5
Total	8.4	\$572.3	\$44.4

Source: 2005 Personal Income Tax Sample and micro-simulation model
Detail may not add to total due to rounding.

Discussion:

Proposition 37, the California State Lottery Act of 1984, established the California State Lottery. The Act prohibits California from taxing winnings from the California State Lottery. This exemption differs from both federal tax treatment of lottery winnings and from California treatment of other gambling winnings. State lottery winnings are subject to federal income taxation, to the extent that they exceed lottery-wagering losses. Gambling winnings other than lottery winnings are subject to both state and federal income taxation, to the extent that they exceed gambling losses.

The purpose of this exemption is to encourage sales of California State Lottery tickets. This is considered desirable because a portion (34 percent) of lottery sales is used to fund

education programs. Lottery proceeds account for only 2 percent of education expenditures, however.

To be considered effective, this exemption must increase lottery sales by at least three times the amount of forgone revenue. This is because only one-third of the revenue from lottery sales goes to education programs. The rest goes to prizes and administrative expenses. Therefore, the loss of funds to education programs will be only one-third of the decrease in lottery sales attributable to making them taxable. By contrast, in the absence of this exemption, all of the revenue raised from taxes on lottery income could be directed to education. The extent to which lottery sales might decrease if this exemption were removed is not known.

Additionally, it is not clear whether the funds that are contributed to public education from the lottery ultimately affect the amount of money spent on education. Although lottery funds are earmarked for education, there is nothing to keep those who are setting education funding levels from considering the earmarked funds as part of the total funding level. That is, if the State Legislature decides that the appropriate amount of money to devote to public education is \$28 billion, and it knows that \$1 billion is earmarked from the lottery, it can just adjust the contribution from the General Fund to \$27 billion. However, with the 1988 adoption of Proposition 98, *School Funding for Instructional Improvement & Accountability*, it could become more difficult to shift lottery funds from education to other uses. Proposition 98 set minimum funding levels for education, independent of lottery funds. Thus, if Proposition 98 funding limits are binding (that is, if the state is not funding education above the minimum levels specified by Proposition 98), the lottery funds would truly be augmenting the state's funding of education. However, when the state is contributing more to education than is required by the Proposition 98 minimums, it is possible and, one might argue, reasonable for legislators to consider the amount contributed by the lottery when determining the General Fund contribution to public education.

14. Low-Income Housing Credit

Description:

This is a tax credit provided for a portion of the costs of investing in qualified low-income rental housing. The aggregate amount of the credit is capped, and the California Tax Credit Allocation Committee allocates specific credits to applicants. Credits are allocated to developers who, in turn, sell them to investors in exchange for project funding. All projects receiving the California credit must also receive the parallel federal credit.

Amount:

In tax year 2005, the amount of credits applied was \$43 million.

Number of Tax Returns Affected:

In tax year 2005, the credit was applied on 615 PIT returns and 45 Corporation Tax returns.

Distribution:

Low-Income Rental Housing Expenses Credit (PIT): 2005		
Adjusted Gross Income Class	Number of Returns	Amount (Thousands)
Less Than \$10,000	13	\$0.8
\$10,000 to \$19,999	24	\$3.1
\$20,000 to \$49,999	147	\$50.3
\$50,000 to \$99,999	200	\$160.0
\$100,000 to \$199,999	104	\$125.8
\$200,000 to \$499,999	86	\$82.5
\$500,000 to \$999,999	23	\$59.2
More Than \$999,999	18	\$411.4
Total	615	\$893.2

Source: 2005 PIT Return Merge File
Detail may not add to total due to rounding.

Distribution of Low-Income Rental Housing Expenses Credit Applied by Corporations by Industry 2005				
	Returns and Credit		Percent of Total	
	Returns	Credit Applied (Millions)	Returns	Credit Applied
Finance and Insurance	32	\$37.1	71.1%	89%
Real Estate	5	\$0.02	11.1%	0%
Other	8	\$4.6	17.8%	11%
Total	45	\$41.7	100%	100%

Source: 2005 Business Entity Tax System extract
Detail may not add to total due to rounding.

Discussion:

This credit's purpose is to increase the supply of affordable rental housing units available to low-income California households. It encourages production of affordable rental housing by subsidizing investments in qualified projects.

This program supplements a parallel federal tax credit. Under the federal program, the amount of money available for each state is capped at the same per capita funding level (\$1.75 per state resident in 2002, adjusted for inflation beginning in 2003). California elected to supplement this credit, because the costs of housing in California are higher than the national average.

The program can be considered successful if it leads to increased production of affordable rental housing. For qualified units that would have been constructed even in the absence of this credit, the credit is a windfall. The proportion of qualified units that would not have been constructed in the absence of this credit is not known.

Policy alternatives to this credit could include vouchers that low-income households could use toward making rental payments for housing priced at market levels or alternative tax benefits to developers, such as expensing of costs for building qualified low-income housing units.

15. Exclusion of Capital Gains on Small Business Stock

Description:

This program excludes from taxable income of PIT taxpayers 50 percent of the gains from the sale of qualified small business stock. For a married couple filing a joint return, the exclusion amount is limited to the greater of either \$10 million or ten times the stock's basis. The limit is smaller for singles and married couples filing separate returns. This exclusion generally conforms to a similar federal exclusion. For California purposes 80 percent of the corporation's payroll must be attributable to California, and during the holding period, 80 percent of the corporation's assets have to be used in the active conduct of a trade or business in California.

Amount:

We estimate that this program cost the state \$21 million in 2005.

Number of Tax Returns Affected:

The number of PIT taxpayers excluding gains under this provision is not known because taxpayers are not required to identify themselves as taking this exclusion.

Discussion:

This program's purpose is to encourage long-term investment in new and small California C corporations in the manufacturing sector.

There is a widespread belief that small businesses in general, and certain industries in particular, need extra support from the government. The reasoning underlying this belief is not always clear, however. Some argue that small businesses and industries face a capital shortage due to insufficient or inaccurate information, or an aversion to perceived high-risk ventures. Thus, investors may be reluctant to invest in small businesses, or may require greater rates of return, because they do not have sufficient information regarding the credit-worthiness of businesses with no established track record. Others argue simply that a subsidy is necessary for small business start-ups and expansions to be viable. And some supporters take the view that small businesses are worthy of special support, perhaps because they may be more labor intensive than larger businesses, or because small businesses tend to be a substantial source of product development and innovation.

Economists differ, and empirical evidence is inconclusive, regarding the validity of some of the claims regarding the positive aspects of small business activities or the existence of capital shortage for this sector. Even if the justifications given for the program are accurate, alternative ways may exist to assist small business enterprise.

This program can be considered successful if it increases the number of successful new California firms. It is counterproductive if this incentive attracts new investment to these industries but the newly formed concerns fail. For exclusions claimed by firms that would have succeeded even in the absence of this tax break, the exclusion is a windfall. The number of existing businesses that would have failed without this exclusion is not known.

Other policy approaches might be better suited for assisting small businesses. Since this benefit can be claimed only after a business has succeeded for at least five years, it seems unlikely to have a substantial impact on the liquidity of newly formed businesses. Direct loan guarantees or subsidies would be much more likely to induce new business formation. It is also unclear why owners of small C corporations should receive more favorable tax treatment than owners of other small businesses.

16. Casualty Loss Deduction

Description:

This program allows taxpayers to deduct from gross income qualified *casualty losses* for which they were not compensated by insurance or other means. *Casualty losses* are “losses caused by sudden, unexpected, or unusual events, such as floods, fire, storms, earthquakes, vandalism, theft, etc.” Casualty losses are limited to nonbusiness losses that are greater than \$100 per loss, and to cases where the sum of all casualty losses during a particular year is greater than 10 percent of federal adjusted gross income.

Amount:

In tax year 2005, PIT taxpayers claimed \$230 million in casualty loss deductions, lowering their taxes by about \$17 million. The size of this tax expenditure, and the number of taxpayers affected by this tax expenditure, can vary significantly from year to year depending on the number and severity of disasters in California in any year.

Number of Tax Returns Affected:

In tax year 2005, 23,288 PIT taxpayers claimed casualty loss deductions.

Distribution:

Impact of Casualty Loss Deduction: 2005			
Adjusted Gross Income Class	Number of Returns Reporting Deduction (Thousands)	Amount of Deduction Claimed (Millions)	Tax Impact of Deduction (Millions)
Less Than \$10,000	0.9	\$11.1	\$0
\$10,000 to \$19,999	5.4	\$42.4	\$0
\$20,000 to \$49,999	4.3	\$102.1	\$0
\$50,000 to \$99,999	7.9	\$172.5	\$4
\$100,000 to \$199,999	3.2	\$93.6	\$5
More Than \$199,999	1.8	\$148.3	\$8
Total	23.5	\$570.0	17

Source: 2005 Personal Income Tax Sample and micro-simulation model.
Detail may not add to total due to rounding.

Discussion:

This program is designed to provide tax relief to taxpayers who face sudden, unexpected, or unusually large losses. The rationale for this program is that taxpayers who suffer a large loss should, for equity considerations, be allowed to reduce their taxable income by the amount of the loss. For example, if there are two taxpayers who earned \$100,000 and one taxpayer suffered a \$40,000 casualty loss due to a flood, while the other did not, equity considerations would suggest that the taxpayer with the loss should pay less tax. This program is effective at reducing the tax liability for taxpayers who claim the deduction, as long as they have sufficient income to offset. However, its effectiveness is limited to the extent that only taxpayers who itemize their deductions can get any benefit. Additionally, if a taxpayer's loss is larger than his income, he does not get any benefit from the loss in the current year, and the excess loss does not generate a carry forward loss that can be used in subsequent years.

An additional concern with this deduction is that, by providing relief to uninsured or underinsured losses, government indirectly discourages the purchases of home and property insurance.

Policy alternatives include providing direct relief assistance or emergency loans, or subsidizing relief organizations that perform these services.

17. Credit Union Treatment

Description:

Credit unions are exempt from state income and franchise tax. Since credit unions are nonprofit, membership organizations, only their “nonmember” income (items such as investment income on excess/surplus deposits or miscellaneous sources of income, such as ATM fees charged to nonmembers) would be taxed in the absence of this exemption.

Amount:

We estimate the revenue cost of the state-chartered credit unions exemption to be approximately \$10 million per year.

Number of Tax Returns Affected:

In 2006, there were 206 state-chartered credit unions and 342 federally-chartered credit unions in California.

Discussion:

This tax exemption’s purpose is to provide financial relief to institutions that provide low-cost financial and other services to their members.

There are two types of credit unions, state-chartered and federally chartered. The federal government prohibits California from taxing federally-chartered credit unions, which are also exempt from federal income tax. Extending this exemption to state-chartered credit unions places them in the same position as federally-chartered credit unions. In the absence of this exemption, some state-chartered credit unions may have opted to change their charter to federal to obtain the tax-exempt status.

To be considered successful, this provision must either increase the number of credit unions or enable these institutions to increase their banking activities. It is not known whether any of these institutions would not exist or would have curtailed their activities in the absence of this exemption.

Originally, credit union membership and business activities were narrowly limited. Over time, however, the number of credit union members and the scope of credit union activity have greatly expanded. This expansion has increased the frequency with which credit unions compete directly with commercial financial institutions. The tax advantages accruing to credit unions may enable them to attract some customers from commercial financial institutions.

18. Limited Partnership Investment Source Rules

Description:

This program exempts from tax the dividends, interest, or gains and losses from qualified investment securities of members of limited partnerships, if the members reside outside California and their only contact with this state is through a security dealer, broker, or an investment advisor located in the state. Qualified investment securities include, but are not limited to, stocks, bonds, and mortgage-based or asset-backed securities.

Amount:

We estimate this program to cost the state \$10 million per year.

Discussion:

The purpose of this provision is to encourage nonresident investors to use California investment services. Prior to passage of this exemption, nonresident members of limited partnerships were deemed “doing business” in California, and were taxed on their security investment income if the investments had been made through a California dealer or broker. The securities industry argued that these tax rules placed the California investment services industry in a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis their competitors in states that granted this exemption.

This provision can be considered successful if it increases the amount of nonresident security investments made through California brokers, and if the economic value to California of these investments exceeds the value of the forgone revenue. It is not known how much current investment qualifying for this exemption would have taken place elsewhere if this exemption did not exist.

19. Natural Heritage Preservation Credit

Description:

The Natural Heritage Preservation Tax Credit provides a nonrefundable credit to taxpayers who donate property for conservation purposes. The amount of the tax credit equals 55 percent of the fair market value of the donated real property. The California Wildlife Conservation Board must approve property donations. Total credits are limited to \$100 million and were available for fiscal years 2001-2002, 2005-2006, and 2007-2008. Of the \$100 million authorized, only \$48.6 million had been allocated when allocation authority expired on July 1, 2008.

Amount:

In tax year 2005, the amount of credits applied was \$6.5 million.

Number of Tax Returns Affected:

In tax year 2005, credits were applied on 41 tax returns.

Discussion:

This program’s purpose is to encourage donations of qualified property for permanent preservation.

To be considered successful, this credit must induce preservation of land that would have been developed absent this credit. Any credits granted for land that would never have been developed anyway are a windfall to the recipient. It is unknown if any credited lands would have been developed in the absence of this credit.

Policy alternatives could include: purchasing lands for conservation directly, increasing zoning restrictions on development, or increasing the costs of development through increased regulatory burdens on development techniques or environmental impacts.

20. Employer Childcare Credits

Description:

California provides two credits for employers that provide childcare services for their employees. The Employer's Credit for Contributions to Care Plans is equal to 30 percent of the costs paid or incurred for payment to a qualified care plan for employees' dependents under age 12. This credit is limited to \$360 for each contribution. The Employer's Credit for Childcare Services is a 30 percent credit for startup expenses of establishing a childcare program in California, constructing a childcare facility, or costs for childcare information and referral services. This credit is limited to \$50,000 per year. Taxpayers must reduce their cost basis in facilities by the amount of credit claimed, or they may opt to claim depreciation. This credit is scheduled to sunset for taxable years beginning on or after January 1, 2012.

Amount:

In tax year 2005, the amount of credits applied was \$2.8 million.

Number of Tax Returns Affected:

In tax year 2005, credits were applied on 4,733 PIT returns and 103 Corporation Tax returns.

Distribution:

Employer Childcare Credit (PIT) 2005		
Adjusted Gross Income Class	Number of Returns	Credit Reported (Thousands)
Less Than \$10,000	*	*
\$10,000 to \$19,999	13	\$1.1
\$20,000 to \$49,999	240	\$51.9
\$50,000 to \$99,999	1,653	\$598.5
\$100,000 to \$199,999	1,740	\$809.0
\$200,000 to \$499,999	746	\$345.9
\$500,000 to \$999,999	180	\$57.3
More Than \$999,999	158	\$111.1
Total	4,733	\$1,975.2

Source: 2005 PIT Return Merge File

Detail may not add to total due to rounding.

Employer Childcare Credit Applied (Corp) by Industry 2005				
Industry	Returns and Credit		Percent of Total	
	Returns	Credit Applied (Thousands)	Returns	Credit Applied
Manufacturing	15	\$378.0	15%	44%
Wholesale & Retail	9	\$47.5	9%	6%
Professional Services	32	\$48.2	32%	6%
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate	20	\$216.5	20%	25%
Health Care	8	\$1.2	8%	0%
Other	15	\$161.8	15%	19%
Total	99	\$853.3	100%	100%

Source: 2005 Business Entity Tax System extract
Detail may not add to total due to rounding.

Discussion:

The purpose of these credits is to increase the access to childcare for workers. This is accomplished by encouraging employers to subsidize childcare for their employees. The Employer's Credit for Contributions to Care Plan encourages employers to directly subsidize their employees' childcare costs. The Employer's Credit for Childcare Services provides an indirect subsidy by encouraging the construction of new childcare facilities. Construction of worksite childcare facilities may provide additional benefits to workers in that such childcare may be more conveniently accessed than offsite childcare.

There are two alternative possible justifications for the existence of these credits. By increasing the availability or decreasing the cost of childcare, some individuals may be more apt to seek and accept employment with these employers. Consequently, employers that offer onsite or subsidized childcare may experience reduced turnover. Under this rationale, the program would be considered successful if it increases employment of workers who require childcare in order to work. A windfall is present to the extent that employees would have found childcare in the absence of these subsidies, or to the extent that employers would still have constructed childcare facilities, or would have contributed as much to childcare in the absence of these credits. The number of childcare facilities that would not have been built in the absence of the construction credit, and the level of employer contributions to childcare plans in the absence of these credits are not known.

Alternatively, these credits may be viewed as restoring equity between taxpayers who must pay childcare expenses in order to be employed and those who do not have to. To achieve this goal, they do not need to increase the availability of childcare or the number of workers using childcare; they help further this goal if they lower the cost of childcare for employees. They are still a windfall to the extent that employers would have contributed to childcare in the absence of these credits.

It should also be noted that, if employers fund their increased contributions to childcare by reducing other forms of employee compensation, the credits may result in wealth being redistributed from employees without children in subsidized care to employees with children in subsidized care, rather than a net increase in employee welfare. While it

may be reasonable for the government to attempt to achieve equity between taxpayers by providing tax relief for those with employment-related childcare expenses, it is not clear why the government should encourage employers to favor one group of employees (those with childcare expenses) over other groups.

21. Child Adoption Expenses Credit

Description:

Under this program, a taxpayer is allowed a credit equal to 50 percent of the specified costs paid or incurred to adopt a United States citizen or legal resident minor child who was in the custody of a state or county public agency. The costs must be directly related to adoption to qualify for the credit. The eligible costs include such items as the travel expenses related to adoption and fees paid to adoption agencies and the Department of Social Services. The credit is limited to \$2,500 per child. Unused credits may be carried over to following years until used.

Amount:

In tax year 2005, the amount of credits applied was \$2 million.

Number of Tax Returns Affected:

In tax year 2005, credits were applied on 1,777 PIT returns.

Distribution:

Child Adoption Expense Credit: 2005		
Adjusted Gross Income Class	Number of Returns	Amount Reported (Thousands)
Less Than \$10,000	11	\$1.8
\$10,000 to \$19,999	5	\$2.0
\$20,000 to \$49,999	150	\$36.6
\$50,000 to \$99,999	958	\$764.1
\$100,000 to \$199,999	556	\$964.2
More Than \$199,999	97	\$244.1
Total	1,777	\$2,012.7

Source: 2005 PIT Return Merge File
Detail may not add to total due to rounding.

Discussion:

This credit's primary purpose is to encourage the adoption of children who are in the custody of a government agency. Adoption reduces the costs to the state of caring for the adopted children, and usually provides adopted children a healthier and more stable environment in which to live. The program can be considered successful if it leads to an increase in the number of such adoptions. The number of adoptions that would not have occurred in the absence of this credit is unknown. This credit's secondary purpose is to provide relief for the hardships created by adoption procedure expenses. The credit is

effective in achieving this purpose, except for those who adopt children who are not wards of the state.

The federal government provides a similar adoption credit.

22. Blind Exemption Credit

Description:

This program allows a taxpayer to claim an additional personal exemption tax credit if either the taxpayer or the taxpayer's spouse is blind (two credits may be claimed if both are blind). The amount of this credit (which is indexed annually for inflation based on the California Consumer Price Index) was \$99 in 2008.

Amount:

In tax year 2005, taxpayers claimed \$2.3 million in senior exemption credits, lowering their taxes by about \$1.4 million.

Number of Tax Returns Affected:

In tax year 2005, 25,468 PIT returns reported this credit.

Distribution:

Blind Exemption Credit: 2005		
Adjusted Gross Income Class	Number of Returns	Amount Reported (Thousands)
Less Than \$10,000	3,212	\$0.0
\$10,000 to \$19,999	4,108	\$52.0
\$20,000 to \$49,999	8,311	\$459.2
\$50,000 to \$99,999	5,629	\$495.3
\$100,000 to \$199,999	3,653	\$301.7
More Than \$199,999	556	\$43.5
Total	25,468	\$1,351.7

Source: 2005 Personal Income Tax Sample and AGIC table.

Detail may not add to total due to rounding.

Discussion:

This exemption is intended to compensate taxpayers who have increased expenses because they are blind.

Federal law provides an additional deduction from Adjusted Gross Income (AGI) for blind taxpayers who do not itemize their deductions. In 2007, the amount of this deduction is \$1,300 for married taxpayers (whether filing separately or jointly) and surviving spouses and \$2,100 for single taxpayers and head of household filers. The federal deduction is more consistent with the concept that income spent on blindness-related expenses should not be considered in calculating an individual's ability to pay

taxes. Because of California's highly progressive tax rate structure, a credit provides more tax benefit than a deduction to lower-income taxpayers.

This credit is effective at reducing the tax liability of blind taxpayers. It is unclear why the Legislature believes that the blind require more assistance than do taxpayers with other types of disabilities, or why a taxpayer should receive the credit if their spouse is blind, but not if another dependent is blind. As with all similar credits, a direct expenditure program to benefit the blind would be an alternative to this credit.

23. Enhanced Oil Recovery Costs Credit

Description:

Certain independent oil producers are allowed a nonrefundable credit equal to 5 percent of the qualified enhanced oil recovery costs for projects located in California. Taxpayers who are retailers of oil or natural gas or who are refiners of crude oil whose daily output exceeds 50,000 barrels are not eligible for the credit. Except for the geographic limitation, the California credit is generally available for the same activities as the parallel federal 15 percent credit. The credit is unavailable if the price of domestic crude oil increases above a specified threshold. The threshold price was \$66.52 per barrel in 2007, and grows with inflation. The credit was in effect in 2005, but not in 2006 or 2007.

Amount:

In tax year 2005, the amount of credits applied was \$2 million.

Number of Tax Returns Affected:

In tax year 2005, credits were applied on 136 PIT returns and 21 Corporation Tax returns.

Discussion:

The primary purpose of this credit is to increase the use of qualified oil and gas recovery technologies. In general, these technologies are more expensive than other oil and gas technologies, but increase the amount of oil and gas produced by a particular oil and gas field. One benefit of this increased production is a decreased reliance on oil and gas imports. A secondary purpose of this credit is to provide independent producers a competitive advantage relative to integrated oil and gas companies.

The increased use of these technologies is only desirable if free market incentives plus the 15 percent federal credit are insufficient to induce use of the optimal amount of these technologies. For this to be the case, enhanced recovery must produce *externalities*, "benefits to society that cannot be captured by the business that generates them." The externality that may arise in this case comes from a reduction in the importation of foreign oil. Foreign oil dependency (particularly with foreign sources that are politically unstable or unsavory) increases the risk of dramatic fluctuations in the supply and the price of oil. These fluctuations may be very damaging to the economy. They may also induce dangerous foreign policy entanglements.

The purpose of this credit will be achieved if the credit induces increased use of qualified recovery technologies. Credits claimed for recovery operations that would have been undertaken even in the absence of this credit are windfalls. The amount of qualified activity that would not have been undertaken in the absence of this credit is not known. Since the externalities justifying this credit are national rather than specific to California, it is not clear why California should be offering this credit.

The second purpose will be achieved if it increases the market share of independent oil and gas recovery firms. While it is clear that this credit offers the independent firms a competitive advantage in this area, it is not known if market shares would be different in the absence of this credit. Nor is it obvious why California would want to increase independent producers' share of the oil recovery industry.

States often provide add-on credits to federal credits in order to encourage businesses to locate activity in their state rather than another state. Because existing oil and gas fields cannot be moved to another state, however, this credit seems unlikely to reap any benefits of this sort.

24. Joint Custody Head of Household Credit

Description:

This credit is for divorced or separated individuals who incur significant costs to maintain a home for a dependent for part of the year. The other custodial individual who provides the principal residence for the same dependent qualifies for the head of household filing status and therefore, would not qualify for this credit.

The amount of the credit is the lesser of 30 percent of a taxpayer's net tax or a maximum amount determined annually (\$393 in 2008). To qualify for the credit, a taxpayer must:

- Provide at least 50 percent of the cost of maintaining the dependent's principal residence for at least 146 days but no more than 219 days of the tax year.
- Either:
 - (1) Be divorced or legally separated from the child's other parent and use the single filing status.
 - (2) Live apart from their spouse and file under married filing separately status.

A taxpayer who maintains the principal residence of the dependent for more than 219 days a year qualifies for the head of household status that is more advantageous.

Amount:

In tax year 2005, the amount of credits applied was \$0.9 million.

Number of Tax Returns Affected:

In tax year 2005, credits were applied on 3,670 PIT returns.

Distribution:

Joint Custody Head of Household Credit: 2005		
Adjusted Gross Income Class	Number of Returns	Amount (Thousands of Dollars)
Less Than \$10,000	55	\$6.0
\$10,000 to \$19,999	308	\$13.6
\$20,000 to \$49,999	1,638	\$341.4
\$50,000 to \$99,999	1,261	\$422.5
\$100,000 to \$199,999	324	\$111.9
More Than \$199,999	80	\$27.6
Total	3,666	\$923.0

Source: 2005 PIT Return Merge File
Detail may not add to total due to rounding.

Discussion:

The intent of the tax credit is to provide financial relief to taxpayers who are divorced or separated, have custody of their children for a significant portion of the year, and do not qualify to file under a head of household filing status. The head of household filing status is generally allowed to parents (single, divorced, or separated) whose children live with them for more than half the year. To compensate taxpayers for expenses borne on behalf of their dependents, the head of household status provides for lower tax rates than does the single filing status. Where parents have a joint custody agreement providing for equal shared custody, it is common that neither will qualify for head of household filing status. Thus, they must compute their tax at the higher single status tax rate. This credit recognizes that taxpayers whose children live with them for part of a year have greater expenditures than (otherwise similarly situated) taxpayers with no children, but lower expenditures than taxpayers whose children live with them for more than half of the year. This credit allows these taxpayers some relief, but not as much as if the children were living with them for the period of time required to qualify for the more favorable head of household tax rates. This credit is successful in reducing the tax liability of taxpayers with joint custody arrangements.

25. Community Development Financial Institutions Credit

Description:

This credit is equal to 20 percent of “qualified investment” in a “community-development financial institution” (CDFI). A *qualified investment* is “a deposit or loan that does not earn interest, or an equity investment, that is equal to or greater than \$50,000 and is made for a minimum duration of 60 months.” A *CDFI* is “a private financial institution located in California and certified by the California Organized Investment Network (COIN) that has community development as its primary mission and lends in urban, rural, or reservation-based communities in California.” A CDFI may include a community-development bank, a community-development loan fund, a community-development

credit union, a micro-enterprise fund, a community-development corporation-based lender, and a community-development venture fund. This credit is scheduled to sunset for taxable years beginning before 2012.

Amount:

In tax year 2005, the amount of credits applied was \$1 million.

Number of Tax Returns Affected:

In tax year 2005, credits were applied on 7 PIT returns and 4 Corporation Tax returns.

Discussion:

The purpose of this credit is to increase investment in certain economically disadvantaged communities.

Most investments that qualify for this credit also qualify for the federal New Markets Tax Credit. The federal credit is 5 percent of qualified contributions in each of the first three years and 6 percent in each of the fourth through seventh years.

This program will be considered successful if it generates new investment activity in targeted communities. For any investments that would have been made anyhow, this provision represents a windfall gain to the taxpayer. The portion of investments receiving this credit that would not have been made in its absence is unknown.

Another state program whose goals are very similar to the goals of this credit is the deduction available for loans made to economically depressed areas, including enterprise zones and targeted tax areas.

A policy alternative would be direct government funding of community development financial institutions.

26. Qualified Senior Head of Household Credit

Description:

This program allows qualified taxpayers 65 years or older to claim a credit equal to 2 percent of taxable income. Qualified taxpayers are those who qualified for head of household status in at least one of the two preceding tax years, but no longer qualify because the qualifying individual that they supported has died. This credit was limited to taxpayers with adjusted gross income of not more than \$63,831 in 2008. The maximum credit available in 2008 was \$1,203. The income and credit limits are adjusted annually for inflation.

Amount:

In tax year 2005, the amount of credits applied was \$0.4 million.

Number of Tax Returns Affected:

In tax year 2005, credits were applied on 1,243 PIT returns.

Distribution:

Qualified Senior Head of Household Credit: 2005		
Adjusted Gross Income Class	Number of Returns	Amount Reported (Thousands)
Less Than \$10,000	36	\$8.3
\$10,000 to \$19,999	155	\$13.2
\$20,000 to \$49,999	932	\$325.8
\$50,000 to \$99,999	118	\$75.0
More Than \$99,999	0	\$0.0
Total	1,241	\$422.2

Source: 2005 PIT Return Merge File
Detail may not add to total due to rounding.

Discussion:

This credit is designed to provide tax relief to low-income seniors who qualified for head of household filing status because they provided a household for a qualifying individual (generally a dependent relative, but not a spouse) who died during one of the two preceding years. Presumably, most of the taxpayer's expenses from the care of the qualifying individual ended soon after the qualifying individual's death, so it is not clear why these taxpayers require relief for two additional years. There are few qualified taxpayers with incomes between the zero tax threshold and the income limit for this credit.

27. Disability Access Expenditure Credit

Description:

The Disabled Access Expenditure Credit allows small businesses to deduct costs for providing access to disabled persons. The credit is limited to 50% of the first \$250 of eligible expenses. To qualify for the credit, the business must either have less than one million dollars of gross receipts in the previous year or employ no more than 30 full-time employees.

Amount:

In tax year 2005, the amount of credits applied was \$61,000.

Number of Tax Returns Affected:

In tax year 2005, credits were applied on 527 PIT returns and 134 Corporation Tax returns.

Distribution:

Disability Access Expenditure Credit (PIT) 2005		
Adjusted Gross Income Class	Number of Returns	Amount Reported (Thousands)
Less Than \$10,000	8	\$0.2
\$10,000 to \$19,999	3	\$0.3
\$20,000 to \$49,999	37	\$3.0
\$50,000 to \$99,999	103	\$10.0
\$100,000 to \$199,999	148	\$12.2
\$200,000 to \$499,999	133	\$11.0
\$500,000 to \$999,999	55	\$4.1
More Than \$999,999	40	\$2.8
Total	527	\$43.5

Source: 2005 PIT Return Merge File
Detail may not add to total due to rounding.

Disabled Access Expenditure Credit Applied (Corp) by Industry 2005				
Industry	Returns and Credit		Percent of Total	
	Returns	Credit Applied (Thousands)	Returns	Credit Applied
Food Services	11	\$2.8	8.1%	13.8%
Health Care	88	\$14.8	65.2%	72.9%
Real Estate	14	\$1.0	10.4%	4.9%
Other	22	\$1.7	16.3%	8.4%
Total	135	\$20.3	100.0%	100.0%

Source: 2005 Business Entity Tax System extract
Detail may not add to total due to rounding.

Discussion:

The purpose of this program is to provide tax relief to taxpayers for their qualified expenditures incurred in complying with the federal Americans with Disabilities Act. This program complements a federal tax credit for 50 percent of qualified expenditures exceeding \$250 and up to \$10,250. The program is successful at directing resources to the targeted uses, but, since the credit is nonrefundable, it is successful only to the extent that taxpayers have tax liability to offset.

An obvious alternative to this credit would be to have the state partially or fully subsidize the cost of disabled access retrofits.

28. Rice Straw Credit

Description:

The Rice Straw Credit gives a credit worth \$15 per ton to taxpayers who purchase California-grown rice straw and use the rice straw for some purpose other than burning. To qualify for the credit, taxpayers must receive certification from the California Department of Food and Agriculture that they did purchase the rice straw and use it in an approved manner. Credits are limited to \$400,000 per year and are granted on a first-come, first-served basis. Taxpayers who are related to rice straw growers are not eligible for the credit. Rice straw purchases after 2007 will not be eligible for the credit.

Amount:

In tax year 2005, the amount of credits applied was \$0.3 million.

Number of Tax Returns Affected:

In tax year 2005, credits were applied on 61 PIT returns and 8 Corporate Tax returns.

Discussion:

The purpose of this credit is to encourage the development of alternatives to rice burning. It is generally believed that the burning of rice straw produces adverse aesthetic and health consequences. This credit is one of several state programs (see below) attempting to mitigate the effects of rice straw burning by encouraging the development of economically viable uses for rice straw. The purpose of this credit is not to eliminate burning by purchasing all available rice straw. The Department of Food and Agriculture notes that, "The ceiling placed on this tax credit will only address approximately one percent to two percent of the available straw, but may provide enough incentive for private concerns to develop economical uses of rice straw."

To be considered effective, this credit must induce new uses for rice straw or increase volumes of rice straw used for existing purposes, rather than simply pay rice straw consumers for existing uses. The proportion of credited alternative rice straw projects that would not have been undertaken in the absence of this credit is not known.

One policy alternative for achieving the goal of reduced rice straw burning is directly regulating the amount of rice straw burning. This option could be more effective in meeting the policy objective of reduced burning, but may impose disposal costs on Californians currently burning rice straw.

29. Dependent Parent Credit

Description:

This credit is available to a taxpayer whose status is married filing separately, who lives apart from his or her spouse for the last half of the tax year, and covers more than half of the cost of maintaining a household (not necessarily the taxpayer's) which was the principal home of a dependent mother or father for the year. The credit equals 30 percent of the taxpayer's net tax and was limited in 2008 to \$393.

Amount:

In tax year 2005, the amount of credits applied was \$151,000.

Number of Tax Returns Affected:

In tax year 2005, credits were applied on 495 PIT returns.

Distribution:

Dependent Parent Credit: 2005		
Adjusted Gross Income Class	Number of Returns	Amount Reported (Thousands)
Less Than \$10,000	5	\$1.0
\$10,000 to \$19,999	21	\$1.6
\$20,000 to \$49,999	253	\$49.5
\$50,000 to \$99,999	172	\$56.3
\$100,000 to \$199,999	39	\$13.2
More Than \$199,999	5	\$1.7
Total	495	\$123.2

Source: 2005 PIT Return Merge File;

Detail may not add to total due to rounding.

Discussion:

The purpose of this credit is to provide relief for certain taxpayers who bear the burden of maintaining a residence for his or her parent(s), but do not qualify for other forms of tax relief such as head of household filing status. The credit is successful at directing resources to its target group. A policy alternative would be direct housing subsidies for the qualifying dependent.

30. Transportation of Donated Agricultural Products Credit

Description:

This program provides taxpayers a credit for 50 percent of costs paid or incurred in transporting agricultural products donated to a nonprofit, charitable organization.

Amount:

In tax year 2005, the amount of credits applied was \$1,000.

Number of Tax Returns Affected:

In tax year 2005, credits were applied on 4 PIT returns.

Discussion:

The purpose of this program is to encourage taxpayers to donate the transportation of, or incur the costs for, transporting agricultural products to charitable organizations. The underlying rationale is that charitable organizations are providing a socially beneficial service by distributing agricultural products to needy individuals, and that this service is worthy of indirect state support. By partially offsetting the costs of transporting the agricultural products, the program encourages more taxpayers to donate or incur the costs of transporting these products. Thus, more agricultural products may reach charitable organizations than otherwise would without the incentive.

In the absence of this credit, the value of the donated transportation would still be tax deductible. It is unclear why transportation of agricultural products should be treated more favorably than other charitable contributions.

To be considered effective, this credit must increase the amount of agricultural product donated to charitable organizations. It is not known whether this credit increases agricultural donations to charitable organizations.

Policy alternatives include increases in targeted aid, i.e. food stamps to disadvantaged individuals and government grants to charitable institutions providing food assistance.

31. Prison Inmate Labor Costs Credit

Description:

This program allows employers a tax credit equal to 10 percent of the wages they pay to state prison inmates employed in a joint-venture program between the taxpayer and the California Department of Corrections. This program resulted from the approval of Proposition 139 (1990), *Prison Inmate Labor*.

Amount:

In tax year 2005, the amount of credits applied was \$60,000.

Number of Tax Returns Affected:

In tax year 2005, credits were applied on 10 PIT returns and 10 Corporation Tax returns.

Discussion:

The purpose of this credit is to increase the number of inmates hired under joint-venture programs. It is hoped that this employment will enhance prospects for the inmates' employment once they are released from prison, and reduce recidivism. In addition to the potential benefit to the rehabilitation of the inmate, part of the wages earned by inmates is used in a socially beneficial way – either to pay taxes, pay for prison room and board, pay restitution to crime victims, or to provide support for the inmate's family.

In order to be effective, this program must increase the number of inmates employed in joint-venture programs. The programs must enable inmates to acquire better employment after release from prison or reduce recidivism rates. It is not known how many inmates in this program would not have been hired in the absence of this credit or how employment in this program affects employment after release. Studies have found that employment of inmates does improve post-release employment prospects and reduces recidivism.

Other California programs that also contribute to the goal of meaningful employment for released prisoners include support services provided to inmates after release and a variety of employment training programs and hiring incentives that are not targeted specifically at inmates. For example, some released inmates may qualify for the Enterprise Zone Hiring Credit that provides incentives (50 percent of wages up to 1½ times the minimum

wage in the first year, phased out over five years) to employers who hire disadvantaged workers. It is unknown whether pre- or post-release programs are more effective in achieving the goal of increasing the employability of inmates.

32. Farmworker Housing Costs Credit

Description:

This program provides a tax credit to any farmer who constructs, improves, or donates farm worker housing. The credit equals the lesser of 50 percent of the cost of building, repairing, or donating the farm worker housing or the amount certified by the California Tax Credit Allocation Committee. To be eligible for the credit, the housing must meet certain criteria, and the taxpayer must enter into an agreement with the committee to build or donate the house. The credit will be available in the year when the housing is completed and occupied.

A similar credit is available to lenders who provide low-interest loans for farmworker housing construction and repair. The amount of the credit is equal to the difference between the market interest rate and the rate charged by the lender.

Amount:

In tax year 2005, the amount of credits applied was \$3,000.

Number of Tax Returns Affected:

In tax year 2005, credits were applied on 3 PIT returns.

Discussion:

The purpose of the credit is to encourage farm owners to provide housing for their employees.

Historically, many farm workers have been unable to procure housing that most people would consider to be of minimal acceptable quality. Because of the itinerant nature of much farm work, dormitory-style housing is generally considered the most efficient means of providing them with minimally acceptable housing. However, this type of housing does not qualify for the Low-Income Housing Credit. The Farmworker Housing Credit is a response to this gap in the coverage of the Low-Income Housing Credit.

The program can be considered successful if it increases the amount of housing available for farm workers. Credits claimed for housing investments that would have been made even in the absence of the credit would be considered windfall. The amount of housing that would not have been built in the absence of this credit is unknown; but judging from the small number of credits claimed on tax returns, the credit does not seem to have a strong incentive effect.

A policy alternative to this credit would be to expand the Low-Income Housing Credit.

CONFORMITY TAX EXPENDITURE ITEMS

The next section of this report discusses tax expenditures for which California law generally conforms to federal law. At first glance it may appear that since the federal government is already providing these tax benefits, there is no reason for the state to provide additional benefits. In fact, conformity can be justified for many tax expenditures. For example, it makes sense for the state to conform to tax expenditures, such as the deduction for medical and dental expenses, which are designed to provide hardship relief to a class of taxpayers. This is because the condition that impedes the taxpayer's capacity for paying federal taxes will also impede their ability to pay state taxes.

The analysis of conformity is more complicated for tax expenditures whose primary purpose is to provide incentives to alter taxpayer behavior. State level behavioral incentives have two effects. The first is that they encourage more of the tax-favored behavior. For example, state level tax preferences for Individual Retirement Accounts will induce increases in contributions to these accounts. Whether or not this is a good thing depends on whether the federal government has already provided an optimal incentive for this behavior. If the federal incentive is not strong enough to induce the optimal level of contributions to these accounts, the additional state incentive will encourage a more productive allocation of savings. If, on the other hand, the federal incentive by itself stimulated sufficient savings, additional state incentives will cause too much savings in these accounts, leading to economic inefficiencies.

The second effect of state level behavioral incentives is to encourage taxpayers to engage in tax-favored activities in California. For example, special treatment of research and development expenditures may induce firms to conduct research in California rather than elsewhere. Again, depending on other factors in the economy, this may be beneficial to California, or it may cause an inefficient distortion of investment decisions.

Conformity also reduces the administrative burden for both taxpayers and the state. The reduction in administrative costs is much greater for some tax expenditures than for others. In general, administrative savings are greater for exclusions and exemptions than for deductions. This is because exclusions often make record keeping unnecessary. For example, since miscellaneous fringe benefits are excluded from income, employers do not need to report to the employee or to the state how much of these benefits they provide, employees do not need to track the value of these benefits, and the state does not have to audit the level of these benefits received. The reduction in administrative burden is much less for deductions, since deduction amounts must still be tracked and verified. For most deductions, nonconformity with federal law would only require taxpayers to adjust their calculation of income taxable in California by backing out the deduction claimed for federal purposes. For example, California taxpayers are currently required to back out their deduction for state income taxes when calculating California income.

1. Exclusion of Capital Gains on the Sale of Principal Residence

Description:

Under this provision, the gain realized on the sale or exchange of a principal residence, up to \$250,000 for single filers and \$500,000 for joint filers, is excluded from taxation. The property must have been used as a principal residence in two of the previous five years. Taxpayers who do not meet the ownership and use requirements may still qualify for a reduced exclusion amount. To qualify, they must show that the sale or exchange is due to a change in employment, health, or in some cases unforeseen circumstances. The exclusion can be applied multiple times during a taxpayer's life, but only to one sale or exchange every two years.

This provision of California law conforms to federal law, except that, under California law, the two-year period of use can be reduced by as much as 18 months for Peace Corps volunteers.

Amount:

We estimate this program to have cost the state \$6.2 billion in tax year 2005.

Discussion:

In the absence of this provision, the capital gains generated by sales of houses would receive the same tax treatment as other types of capital gains.

There are a number of reasons why many taxpayers would view this as unfair. Opposition stems partly from the psychology of housing sales. Housing sales are often traumatic experiences even without tax considerations. The gains from housing sales are often very large relative to the seller's other income, so the tax due if housing sales were treated like other gains may appear unfairly large relative to the taxpayer's non-gain income. This feeling is exacerbated by the fact that, because the income tax is progressive, fully taxing gains on housing sales would push many taxpayers into a higher tax bracket. Another psychological complication arises from the fact that most house sellers purchase another house at approximately the same time as the sale of the first house. When a taxpayer moves to a more expensive house, they generally feel as though they have taken on a new financial burden, not as though they have generated a capital gain. Finally, many people argue that all capital gains should be excluded from income, not just gains on housing sales. The capital gains exclusion for sales of residences is an effective response to the perceived injustice of fully taxing these capital gains.

This provision encourages people to buy and sell houses more often. Many sellers of primary residences purchase another house at approximately the same time that they sell their house. Some homeowners would choose to stay in their original house, rather than sell it and buy a new one, if they had to pay capital gains on the sale of their first house. This "lock-in" effect would reduce the efficiency of the housing market.

The exclusion also increases the rate of return on investments in housing. This should increase the amount of investment in the housing sector. This may result in an increase in the number of people who own their own home or, as most economists believe, the value

of the tax break may be capitalized in the value of housing; i.e., on average, housing prices are increased by the value of the tax break, so houses are not more affordable than they would be in the absence of this exclusion.

A policy alternative would be to tax capital gains on houses the same as other capital gains. A more refined policy would allow the capital gain to be rolled over when a more expensive house is purchased at approximately the same time as the gain-generating sale. This would solve the lock-in problem in which taxpayers opt not to sell and buy houses, because the tax on the sale deprives them of resources necessary for the purchase of the next house.

2. Mortgage Interest Expenses Deduction

Description:

This provision allows a taxpayer to deduct qualified mortgage interest expenses from income. Qualified mortgage interest includes mortgage interest incurred in acquiring, constructing, substantially improving, or refinancing the principal residence of the taxpayer and one other residence (e.g. vacation home), as well as interest on home equity borrowing, secured by the residence. This deduction is only available to taxpayers who itemize their deductions.

For purchasing, constructing, or improving a home, only interest paid on the first one million dollars borrowed (\$500,000 for married individuals filing separate returns) may be deducted. On home equity loans, interest on the first \$100,000 borrowed (\$50,000 married, filing separately) may be deducted. Home equity loans must be secured by a qualified residence and may not exceed the fair market value of the residence reduced by any outstanding debts incurred in the process of purchasing or constructing the home. Interest on home equity loans is deductible, even if the proceeds are used for personal expenditures.

Home mortgage interest is not deductible in the calculation of the Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT). Thus, taxpayers who owe AMT, and those whose credits are limited by the Tentative Minimum Tax calculation, must defer the benefits from this deduction.

This provision of California law conforms to federal law.

Amount:

In tax year 2005, PIT taxpayers claimed \$76.7 billion in mortgage interest deductions, lowering their taxes by about \$4.4 billion.

Number of Tax Returns Affected:

In tax year 2005, 5.0 million PIT taxpayers were able to use the mortgage interest deduction to reduce their tax liability.

Distribution:

Impact of Mortgage Interest Deduction: 2005			
Adjusted Gross Income Class	Number of Returns Reporting Deduction (Thousands)	Amount of Deduction Reported (Millions)	Tax Impact of Deduction (Millions)
Less Than \$10,000	136.2	\$1,993.7	\$1
\$10,000 to \$19,999	200.7	\$2,126.5	\$4
\$20,000 to \$49,999	1,137.3	\$13,937.1	\$262
\$50,000 to \$99,999	1,815.3	\$25,121.4	\$1,455
\$100,000 to \$199,999	1,172.4	\$20,714.3	\$1,779
More Than \$199,999	489.0	\$12,788.0	\$931
Total	4,950.9	\$76,681.0	\$4,432

Source: 2005 Personal Income Tax Sample and micro-simulation model
Detail may not add to total due to rounding.

Discussion:

This program's goal is to provide an incentive for home ownership. Many people believe that increasing home ownership is desirable because it promotes neighborhood stability and civic responsibility. It is thought that homeownership can do this by giving individuals a financial stake (i.e., maintaining the value of real property owned) in the neighborhood's quality.

Whether or not increasing homeownership is a valid goal, most economists believe that the value of this tax break is generally capitalized into the value of housing. In other words, on average, housing prices should increase by the expected tax savings over the time period that the house will be owned. Therefore, this deduction does not actually make housing more affordable for homeowners. Instead, it results in a transfer from the state treasury to people who already owned homes at the time the deduction was granted or, in the case of new construction, to whoever owned the land at the time it becomes obvious that the land will likely be zoned for residential use. In fact, homeowners who do not itemize or whose income places them in low rate brackets are likely to find housing less affordable, because they will not receive a tax reduction large enough to offset the increased price of housing. Additionally, if the goal is to encourage homeownership, there is no reason to extend the benefit to second homes.

Another aspect of this program is that many taxpayers have used the home equity provision to engage in tax-favored borrowing for purposes other than purchasing or remodeling homes. This is done by taking out unnecessarily large loans on houses instead of taking out nontax-favored loans for other purposes.¹⁰

Policy alternatives that may bring this program more in line with its intended objectives include lower limits on the amount of deductible interest or limiting deductions to loans for first-time home purchases.

¹⁰ Note that, as described above, while the regular PIT does not limit the deductibility (other than the overall limit on mortgage indebtedness) of home equity interest, the AMT does. Thus, many taxpayers are effectively prohibited from deducting home equity interest.

The reduction or elimination of mortgage interest deductions could harm current homeowners in two ways. First, homeowners who itemize their deductions will lose the value of the tax deductions that they can no longer claim. This problem could be eliminated by “grandfathering,” i.e. allowing deductions for mortgages already existing when the policy changed. Grandfathering would enhance fairness by reducing the impact on taxpayers who took on mortgages under the assumption that the deduction would remain in place for the life of their loan. Of course, grandfathering would reduce the revenue gain to the state from this policy reform. Grandfathering would also create a “lock-in” effect that would reduce the efficiency of the housing market. There are two reasons for this. First, since only the current owner can claim the interest deduction, a grandfathered house is more valuable to its current owner than to a prospective buyer. Second, because the grandfathered owner can only claim the interest deduction on his current house, the grandfathered house is more valuable to its owner than another otherwise equally valuable house. Both of these effects will distort economic activity by discouraging home buying and selling (locking owners into their current homes). Our second alternative policy, limiting deductions to first-time home purchasers, would only lock homeowners into their first homes.

The second impact of the proposed policy alternatives on current homeowners is that this policy change will likely reduce home values. We argued above that the mortgage interest deduction is generally capitalized into the value of housing. Removing or reducing the deduction should lower home prices by approximately the value of the eliminated tax benefit. Since most current homeowners purchased their homes after the implementation of the mortgage interest deduction raised housing values, most current homeowners will be unfairly harmed by this reduction in housing values.

However, it should be pointed out that, in the long run, removing the mortgage interest deduction would decrease the inequities arising from tax-driven fluctuations in housing prices. Under the current system, the tax value of the interest deduction changes every time tax rates are changed. Through the capitalization process, any increase (decrease) in statutory tax rates will increase (decrease) housing values, producing windfall gains (losses) to homeowners. Removing the deduction will eliminate these unintended changes to wealth that results whenever tax rates change.

3. Exclusion of Employer Contributions to Pension Plans

Description:

Subject to certain conditions, employers’ contributions to qualified retirement plans and simplified employee pension plans are excluded from the gross income of employees. In addition, the earnings in these pension plans are excluded from income until they are withdrawn. Employees do, however, have to pay taxes upon withdrawal on the portion of the retirement benefits they receive that were funded by nontaxed contributions. For defined contribution plans, in 2008, the exclusion is limited to the lesser of \$46,000 or 100 percent of earned income. For defined benefit plans, the exclusion is limited to the maximum level required to fully fund the plan.

This provision of California law conforms to federal law.

Amount:

We estimate this program to have cost the state \$3.9 billion in tax year 2005.

Discussion:

The goal of this exemption/deferral is to encourage participation in retirement programs. It is hoped that participation in these programs will increase the proportion of retirees who are financially self-sufficient, rather than dependent on government aid.

Some taxpayers would save for retirement even without tax incentives to do so. To the extent that funds are transferred from other savings vehicles to tax-favored accounts, this program represents a windfall for taxpayers. The proportion of retirement funds that represent new savings rather than savings redirected from other sources is unknown.

4. Basis Step-up on Inherited Property

Description:

Under this provision, when property is transferred from a decedent to an heir, the basis of the inherited property is adjusted upwards, for tax purposes, to equal its fair market value at the time of the decedent's death. Therefore, any appreciation in the property's value that occurred prior to the decedent's death is exempted from capital gains taxation.

This provision of California law conforms to federal law.

Amount:

We estimate this program to have cost the state \$3.1 billion in tax year 2005.

Discussion:

The original justification for this exemption was that, since taxpayers had to pay taxes on inherited property, taxing capital gains would constitute double taxation. This concern is no longer applicable since California removed its taxes on inherited property in 1982.

Another concern is that it is sometimes very difficult for heirs to determine the original basis of the property they are inheriting. Many bequeathed assets are purchased by the deceased years prior to the year of inheritance. The heir may not know when the asset was purchased. This makes it very difficult to determine the asset's basis. Of course, recent improvements in record-keeping technology and increases in the percentage of assets held in major financial institutions should, over time, reduce the relative importance of this problem. One imperfect solution to this problem would be to provide a safe harbor basis. For example, taxpayers could be allowed to claim a basis equal to 50 percent of the sales price if they have no documentation to prove otherwise.

5. Exclusion of Employer Contributions to Accident and Health Plans

Description:

Under this program, employer contributions to accident and health plans are excluded from employees' gross income for tax purposes.

This provision of California law conforms to federal law.

Amount:

We estimate this program to have cost the state \$2.4 billion in tax year 2005.

Discussion:

This exemption provides employers an incentive to include these types of insurance as part of the employees' compensation packages. Program supporters argue that this is a desirable social goal, because it provides security to workers, increases productivity, and reduces the need for the government to provide accident and health care programs. It is also sometimes argued that taxing noncash benefits imposes financial hardship on some taxpayers.

By creating large insurance pools, employer-based insurance programs may enhance the efficiency of the insurance market by mitigating a problem known as "adverse selection," which arises because people who know that they are in ill health are more likely than others to purchase health insurance. This drives up the price of insurance and, in turn, causes more people to forgo insurance. This problem is less likely to arise when employers insure large numbers of people. There are, however, a variety of non-employer-based methods of financing health care that can also overcome the adverse selection problem.

The consensus of economists is that state and federal programs like this one have contributed significantly to shifting the mix of employee compensation from wages and salary income towards non-monetary fringe benefits. To the extent that this is true, these programs can result in a misallocation of economic resources.

Another resource allocation problem arises from tying health insurance to employment. There are important advantages from enabling people to maintain continuity in their health insurance over time. Many people change jobs more frequently than they would like to change health plans. Establishing otherwise identical health insurance plans that are not linked to a person's place of employment would eliminate disruptions and other changes in health coverage caused by job changes (or losses). This provision in the tax code, however, provides a strong incentive to maintain employment-related health plans.

One of the most difficult issues in designing health care policy is determining the optimal level of government support for health insurance. The tax savings provided by this provision lowers the price of health care services. Lower prices will induce people to seek health care services more frequently. When this results in consumers seeking

preventative health services in a timely fashion, this can further enhance the efficiency of the health care system. On the other hand, when the price of health services is too low, many people will demand to see doctors when there is no need for them to, reducing the efficiency of the system. The desirability of government-subsidized health care depends on the relative frequency of these two behavioral reactions to the subsidies.

6. Charitable Contribution Deduction

Description:

This provision allows taxpayers to deduct from income cash contributions and the value of specified noncash contributions to charities, religious organizations, governmental bodies, and other qualifying nonprofit organizations. For individuals, the itemized deduction is generally limited to 50 percent of adjusted gross income. This deduction is only available to taxpayers who itemize their deductions. When taxpayers make qualified donations of appreciated property, the capital gains on the appreciated property is exempt from taxation. For corporations, in general, the deduction is limited to 10 percent of net income. Contributions that exceed these limits may be carried over for five years.

This provision of California law conforms to federal law.

Amount:

In tax year 2005, PIT taxpayers claimed \$31.3 billion in charitable contribution deductions, lowering their taxes by \$1.6 billion. For corporate taxpayers, we estimate this deduction to have cost the state \$95 million.

Number of Tax Returns Affected:

In tax year 2005, 5.4 million PIT taxpayers used a charitable contribution deduction to reduce their tax liability.

Distribution:

Impact of Charitable Contribution Deduction: 2005			
Adjusted Gross Income Class	Number of Returns Reporting Deduction (Thousands)	Amount of Deduction Reported (Millions)	Tax Impact of Deduction (Millions)
Less Than \$10,000	93.6	\$171.0	\$0.9
\$10,000 to \$19,999	205.8	\$332.6	\$0.8
\$20,000 to \$49,999	1,257.2	\$2,383.0	\$56.7
\$50,000 to \$99,999	1,976.8	\$5,066.9	\$284.0
\$100,000 to \$199,999	1,287.1	\$4,895.3	\$393.3
More Than \$199,999	574.6	\$18,471.6	\$842.7
Total	5,395.2	\$31,320.4	\$1,578.3

Source: 2005 Personal Income Tax Sample and micro-simulation model
Detail may not add to total due to rounding.

Discussion:

This program's purpose is to provide taxpayers an incentive to make contributions to qualifying charitable organizations. The original justification for the charitable contribution deduction at the federal level grew out of a concern that high-income taxpayers (the only individuals subject to the income tax in its early years) would have less income to contribute to charities because of the federal income tax. It was believed that charitable organizations would suffer substantial declines in income without the deduction.

The underlying reason for supporting charitable organizations is that charitable organizations provide services that benefit society as a whole. One potential problem with this rationale is that charitable organizations often work at cross-purposes with other charitable organizations. For example, some charitable organizations might work to stop the development of certain portions of land, whereas other charitable organizations work to protect the rights of landowners to develop that same land. Also, much of what religious organizations do is at cross-purposes from other religious organizations. Likewise, most churches (as well as synagogues, mosques, and temples) adhere to certain doctrines and work, with a greater or lesser degree of vigor, to promote the view that those doctrines are correct. How can two sets of services that contradict each other both provide a benefit to society? There are several ways to view this. One is that society benefits from most services provided by charitable organizations. While society doesn't benefit from all the services provided by charitable organizations (such as offsetting legal advocacy) they benefit from the majority of the services or, at least, from a large enough portion of the services that it justifies the subsidy. In other words, the government may not want to subsidize all the activities of charitable organizations, but it believes that there would be a greater harm done by attempting to distinguish which activities of charitable organizations are socially beneficial and which are not.

It also may be the case that the advocacy done by charitable organizations, even when it contradicts the advocacy done by other charitable organizations, is considered healthy in the sense that it encourages competition of different political, social, and religious ideas. Just as a free market for goods can weed out inefficient producers, a free market for ideas can weed out those ideas that have insufficient efficacy or substance.¹¹ Finally, it may be the case that involvement in charitable organizations is considered to make the contributor a better citizen, apart from the contribution. That is, just the fact that a person aligns himself with an organization (as evidenced through a contribution) may provide that individual with an impetus to act as a better citizen (obey laws, pay taxes, treat others civilly). One possible way this could happen is by causing the individual to feel that he has a stake in at least some aspect of the community.

Given that there is at least the appearance of an *externality*, or "benefit to society beyond the benefit realized by the giver and the receiver of the contribution," associated with charitable contributions, it is useful to ask how effective this preferential treatment for charitable contributions has been for encouraging contributions. Using reasonable

¹¹ Of course, the argument against this reasoning is that, if we want a free marketplace for the exchange of ideas, why does the government need to be involved in subsidizing the exchange of ideas.

estimates of the responsiveness of charitable contributions to the rate of tax suggests that, if California were to repeal the deductibility of charitable contributions, contributions would drop by 5 to 10 percent.

Even if there is a valid purpose for government to subsidize some contributions to charities, much of what falls under the guise of charitable contributions could be more accurately characterized as club dues. Those “club dues” are spent largely for the benefit of the dues-paying members. For example, when the local Little League builds new diamonds, buys new equipment, or pays into the national organization, the majority of the benefits accrue to the members of the Little League. The same could be said for most charitable organizations including religious organizations such as churches, synagogues, mosques, and temples. If the reason government subsidizes charitable organizations is the belief that club membership in itself makes people better citizens, there is no real problem with allowing the deductibility of club dues as charitable giving. However, if the justification for subsidizing charitable organizations is that they do good deeds for others outside their own organization, then the subsidy for that part of the dues that is expended internally is not well spent.

The charitable contribution deduction is only available to itemizers. Since a greater percentage of high-income taxpayers itemize, limiting this deduction to itemizers tends to treat low-income taxpayers less favorably than high-income taxpayers. Conceptually, a portion of the standard deduction is intended to account for charitable contributions by non-itemizers. Nonetheless, if a taxpayer who is taking the standard deduction makes larger contributions to a charity than another non-itemizing taxpayer, the first taxpayer will get no tax benefit from the additional contribution.

The exemption of capital gains on donated appreciated property increases the tax savings from these donations. This should increase the amount of donations to charity. To the extent that donations would have been made even if capital gains on donations were not excluded, this represents a windfall. Furthermore, this provision creates inequities between taxpayers who use different methods to make equivalent charitable donations. This occurs because some taxpayers have appreciated property to donate and others do not; therefore, some taxpayers will receive a greater tax benefit than others making the same size charitable donation.

7. Real Property Tax Deduction

Description:

Taxpayers can deduct from gross income taxes paid to local, state, or foreign governments on real property.

This provision of California law conforms to federal law.

Amount:

In tax year 2005, PIT taxpayers claimed \$21.8 billion in real property tax deductions, lowering their taxes by about \$1.2 million.

Number of Tax Returns Affected:

In tax year 2005, the deduction was reported on 5.2 million PIT returns.

Distribution:

Impact of Real Property Tax Deduction: 2005			
Adjusted Gross Income Class	Number of Returns Reporting Deduction (Thousand)	Amount of Deduction Reported (Millions)	Tax Impact of Deduction (Millions)
Less Than \$10,000	154.2	\$603.8	\$1
\$10,000 to \$19,999	234.8	\$606.3	\$1
\$20,000 to \$49,999	1,189.6	\$3,149.6	\$65
\$50,000 to \$99,999	1,859.1	\$5,946.8	\$355
\$100,000 to \$199,999	1,245.6	\$5,756.0	\$477
More Than \$199,999	560.5	\$5,723.8	\$345
Total	5,243.7	\$21,786.3	\$1,244

Source: 2005 Personal Income Tax Sample and micro-simulation model
Detail may not add to total due to rounding.

Discussion:

This deduction most likely grew out of a view of fiscal federalism that higher-level governments should not interfere in, but in fact should encourage, the revenue-generating efforts of lower-level governments. Thus, the federal government encouraged lower-level governments to levy sales, property, and income taxes by allowing a deduction for these taxes. The State of California conformed to this approach partly because of the inherent benefits of conformity, and partly to encourage revenue generation by county and city governments. For a variety of reasons (often arising from actions by parties with very different motivations), California has moved away from this independence approach to fiscal federalism to one where much of the revenue of local jurisdictions is actually raised by the state and then distributed out to the jurisdictions. As such, the original motivation for this deduction may no longer be relevant.¹² However, as is the case on the expenditure side of the budget, if a tax benefit is available for a long enough time, it comes to be viewed as an entitlement. As such, there is likely little political will, relative to the political cost, of removing this benefit.

This deduction also has the effect, like the mortgage interest deduction, of subsidizing the cost of purchasing or maintaining property. Most economists believe, however, that any such subsidies are generally capitalized into the price of the property, i.e., the price is increased by approximately the value of the tax savings, so that the purchaser is no better off than they would be without the deduction.

¹² Note that the deduction for sales tax was repealed at the federal level in the Tax Reform Act of 1986. California conformed to this repeal in 1987.

Finally, this deduction has the side benefit of offsetting some of the inequities caused by Proposition 13. Under Proposition 13, in which property values can only be adjusted 2 percent per year, unless the property is sold, homeowners who hold onto their homes for long periods of time during inflationary periods can be paying dramatically less in property taxes than their newly-arrived neighbor who is living in a comparable home. This deduction would partially offset this deduction by giving the person paying the higher property tax a larger deduction.

8. Exclusion of Proceeds from Life Insurance and Annuity Contracts

Description:

These provisions allow taxpayers to exclude from gross income proceeds received from a deceased person's life insurance policies. If the proceeds are received in circumstances other than death, only the actual investment portion of the proceeds is excludable from gross income. In the case of proceeds received as installments, the interest component of such proceeds must be included in the taxpayer's gross income.

Also, the insured who receives "living benefits" from a life insurance policy upon having a catastrophic or life-threatening illness or condition is allowed to exclude the proceeds from gross income. In such a case, the policy owner can trade the right to receive death benefits under the policy for a compensation amount less than the death benefits (a viatical settlement) and still exclude the amounts received from gross income.

Amount:

We estimate this program to have cost the state \$1.1 billion in tax year 2005.

Discussion:

This program's purpose is to provide tax relief for those who receive benefits as designated beneficiaries of a deceased person's life insurance policies. The rationale for this program is that beneficiaries often face economic hardships due to the loss of income and/or services provided by the deceased and, thus, need an additional benefit.

Alternative policy would be to address the specific financial hardships involved, rather than to favor life insurance as a vehicle for financing them; e.g., the government could provide direct expenditures for items such as funeral expenses or childcare for children who lose a parent. Direct expenditures could be provided to all who are in need, not just to those who receive life insurance (and, hence, are less likely to be severely financially distressed).

9. Exclusion of Benefits Provided Under Cafeteria Plans

Description:

This program allows taxpayers to exclude qualified benefits received from cafeteria plans from gross income. Cafeteria plans are packages offered by employers that provide a choice of qualified benefits or monetary compensation. Qualified benefits may include

accident and health coverage, group term life insurance coverage, or child and dependent care benefits. Qualified benefits do not include deferred compensation except for certain plans maintained by educational institutions. If the taxpayer prefers monetary compensation to qualified benefits, the monetary compensation must be included in gross income subject to taxation.

This provision of California law conforms to federal law.

Amount:

We estimate this program to have cost the state \$1.0 billion in tax year 2005.

Discussion:

For the most part, the benefits (health insurance, life insurance) that can be provided on a tax-free basis through cafeteria plans can be offered on a tax-free basis without a cafeteria plan. The benefit of the cafeteria plan is that it allows employers to offer choices to their employees so that each employee can better tailor the benefits they receive to match their particular needs. In so doing, this provision is likely to encourage non-wage compensation over wage compensation. Whether this is a desirable policy goal depends on whether it is desirable to subsidize the underlying forms of non-wage compensation (health insurance, life insurance, childcare), and, if so, to what extent. For more analyses of these issues, see the relevant sections of this report. It is not known by how much the tax treatment of cafeteria plans has increased the provision of non-wage forms of compensation.

10. Employee Business and Miscellaneous Expense Deduction

Description:

A taxpayer is allowed to deduct from gross income a portion of certain unreimbursed, business-related expenses. These include business expenses such as travel, meals, entertainment, and lodging, as well as miscellaneous expenses related to producing or collecting taxable income; management, conservation, or maintenance of income-producing property; and tax return preparation fees.

Currently, 50 percent of meals and entertainment expenses can be deducted, provided that they exceed 2 percent of the taxpayer's federal AGI.

This provision of California law conforms to federal law.

Amount:

In tax year 2005, PIT taxpayers claimed \$17.5 billion in employee business and miscellaneous expense deductions, lowering their taxes by \$710 million.

Number of Tax Returns Affected:

In tax year 2005, 2.3 million PIT taxpayers reported this deduction.

Distribution:

Impact of Employee Business and Miscellaneous Expense Deduction: 2005			
Adjusted Gross Income Class	Number of Returns Reporting Deduction (Thousands)	Amount Deduction Reported (Millions)	Tax Impact of Deduction (Millions)
Less Than \$10,000	235.6	\$475.9	\$1.6
\$10,000 to \$19,999	92.6	\$306.0	\$1.6
\$20,000 to \$49,999	580.4	\$3,133.9	\$79.0
\$50,000 to \$99,999	837.9	\$4,926.8	\$252.3
\$100,000 to \$199,999	433.2	\$3,447.8	\$228.3
More Than \$199,999	141.2	\$5,199.8	\$146.8
Total	2,321	\$17,490.1	\$709.6

Source: 2005 Personal Income Tax Sample and micro-simulation model
Detail may not add to total due to rounding.

Discussion:

The expenses covered by this provision are expenses that employees must incur in order to earn income. In our income tax system, large and unusual expenses that generate income are normally deductible. The types of expenses that qualify for this deduction are expenses, such as for business travel, that are often reimbursed by employers. This provision, therefore, works toward restoring equity between otherwise similar taxpayers, some of whose employers reimburse these expenses and others whose employers do not reimburse them. It also creates equity between employees who are not reimbursed for their work-related expenses and the self-employed.

The 2 percent floor on expenses limits this benefit to employees who incur significant business related expenses. The floor simplifies the administration of the program.

The 50 percent limitation of meals and entertainment was imposed because it was felt that many taxpayers were incurring expenditures that exceeded the legitimate business purpose of the tax favored activity. For example, there may be a valid business reason for a lunch expense. Often, the business purpose could be served by meeting at a \$10 per person restaurant. The participants may, however, opt to go to lunch at a \$30 per person restaurant. Conceptually, in this case, the first \$10 per person should be deductible, but the remainder of the cost should be viewed as personal entertainment. The 50 percent rule is an administratively feasible method of addressing this problem.

Policy alternatives could include changing the types of qualifying expenses for this deduction or changing the 2 percent threshold for claiming the deduction. If this deduction were removed, it is possible that employers would feel pressure to either begin reimbursing their employees for these expenses or increase wages to compensate for the increased tax bill.

11. Head of Household and Qualifying Widow(er) Filing Status

Description:

Under the Head of Household program, taxpayers who provide a home for a qualifying relative are eligible for a lower tax rate than is available to single persons or to married persons filing separate returns. The program provides tax relief to heads of households who are single or married but living apart.

To claim the head of household filing status, a taxpayer must provide the principal home of the qualifying relative for more than one-half of the year. In addition, the taxpayer must pay more than half of the cost of maintaining that household. Single taxpayers who provide the main home for their unmarried child or grandchild can still qualify for the head of household filing status, even if they are not entitled to a Dependent Exemption Credit for the child or grandchild. For example, if a single custodial parent has moved into the home of her widowed father, the father would qualify as a head of household. Otherwise, the taxpayer must be entitled to a Dependent Exemption Credit for the relative to be qualified.

A *qualifying widow(er)* is “a taxpayer whose spouse died within two years prior to the taxable year involved and has not remarried, and who provides the main home for a child for whom the taxpayer is entitled to a dependent exemption credit.” Qualifying widow(er)s may claim a larger personal exemption in addition to the lower head of household tax rates.

Amount:

In tax year 2005, PIT taxpayers reduced their taxes by \$585 million due to the special treatment afforded head of household and qualifying widow(er) filers.

Number of Tax Returns Affected:

In tax year 2005, 2.1 million PIT taxpayers filed as head of household, while only about 11,090 taxpayers filed as qualifying widow(er). The number of returns in the table below reflects taxable filers.

Distribution:

Impact of Special Treatment for Head of Household and Qualifying Widow(er) Filers: 2005		
Adjusted Gross Income Class	Number of Returns Filing as Head of Household or Surviving Spouse (Thousands)	Tax Impact of Filing Status (Millions)
Less Than \$10,000	242.8	\$0
\$10,000 to \$19,999	529.1	\$1
\$20,000 to \$49,999	976.6	\$301
\$50,000 to \$99,999	300.5	\$302
\$100,000 to \$199,999	54.9	\$52
More Than \$199,999	16.2	\$14
Total	2,120.1	\$671

Source: 2005 Personal Income Tax Sample and micro-simulation model
Detail may not add to total due to rounding.

Discussion:

The basic structure of the income tax includes a zero percent bracket, in which the first dollars earned each year by a taxpayer are not taxed. The zero bracket is intended to recognize that a certain amount of income is vital for procuring life's basic needs. As a family increases in size, it becomes more costly to feed, house, and clothe them. The zero bracket, therefore, increases with the size of the family. For prototypical families, when a family increases in size from one member to two members, the taxpayer files a joint return instead of a single return. The joint return provides for a much larger zero bracket than the single return. Subsequent increases in family size (e.g., from two members to three) increase the zero bracket only by allowing an additional dependent credit. Prior to the recent increases in the dependent credit, the tax savings from adding another type of dependent was much smaller than the savings from adding a spouse. Allowing head of household status is consistent with the view that the addition of any second member to a household, whether or not the second member is a spouse, generates a substantial increase in the most basic financial needs of the household. Lowering the tax rate for head of household filers provides less traditional two-member households with the same tax benefit level as traditional two-member households.

This favorable treatment extended to surviving widow(er)s is intended to partially compensate them for potential loss of income. This provision generates inequities between qualifying taxpayers and other taxpayers with the same income.

12. Depreciation Amounts Beyond Economic Depreciation

Description:

This program allows taxpayers to deduct depreciation in excess of economic depreciation on qualified physical assets. California PIT Law conforms to the federal depreciation rules under the Modified Accelerated Cost Recovery System (MACRS) and to the rules on Section 179 expensing as of January 1, 2001 (California has not, as of this writing, conformed to the most recent federal expansion of Section 179). California PIT Law does

not conform, except for luxury autos, to the temporary bonus depreciation rules adopted by the federal government in 2002 and expanded in 2003. The expensing and depreciation rules are set up to provide accelerated depreciation. California corporate taxpayers, however, are not allowed to follow federal depreciation rules and must use depreciation schedules that approximate actual economic depreciation.

Amount:

We estimate this program to have cost the state \$542 million in tax year 2005.

Discussion:

Over time, the value of old business assets decreases. Conceptually, businesses should be allowed, each year, to deduct from income the amount of the decrease (i.e. their economic depreciation). By allowing more rapid tax write-offs of equipment costs, taxpayers are allowed to recover the costs of their investments more quickly. This increases the after-tax rate of return on the depreciable property. This program's purpose is to provide an incentive for taxpayers to invest in qualified assets such as equipment and buildings by increasing the rate of return on these investments. It is thought that these investments will spur general economic growth both by augmenting the economy's capital infrastructure and by stimulating demand for investment goods. Neither the extent to which this provision for PIT taxpayers has increased investment in depreciable property, nor the impact of any increased investment on the level of the state's economic output is known.

It has also been argued that, for some assets, accelerated depreciation compensates taxpayers for the failure of the tax code to update the depreciable basis of property to reflect inflation over time. A counter argument to this, however, is that no other sources of capital income (such as interest or capital gains) are allowed to adjust their reported earnings downward to reflect the impact of inflation.

Accelerated depreciation will tend to benefit certain types of investments over others. As such, accelerated depreciation can have a distortional impact on the economy and lead to inefficiencies.

Another problem with current California law is that it provides more favorable treatment to businesses subject to the PIT Law than for similar businesses subject to the Corporate Franchise Tax Law. This unequal treatment is distortional and leads to inefficiencies.

13. Individual Retirement Accounts

Description:

There are two types of Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs), traditional IRAs, and Roth IRAs. This provision allows taxpayers to deduct from income (subject to the limits described below) contributions to traditional IRAs. Also, earnings in traditional IRAs are excluded from income until they are distributed to the taxpayer. For Roth IRAs, contributions are not deductible. Earnings in Roth IRAs are excluded from income.

Distributions from Roth IRAs are also excluded from income provided that the account has been open at least five years and the recipient is at least 59 ½ years old.

The yearly maximum contribution to IRAs is the lesser of \$5,000 or 100 percent of the individual's compensation for individuals less than 50 years old.¹³ The maximum dollar amount for individuals 50 years old or older is \$500 more than the normal limit for 2002-2005, and \$1,000 more than the normal limit for 2006 and later. Taxpayers who are married filing a joint return may contribute to each spouse's IRA up to the maximums just described, even if one spouse receives little or no compensation. Special rules apply for California registered domestic partners.

California conforms to federal AGI limitations for Roth IRAs, but not traditional IRAs. For 2008, the yearly limit for contributions to Roth IRAs is phased out for single taxpayers with AGI between \$101,000 and \$116,000, and for married filers filing a joint return with AGI between \$159,000 and \$169,000. For traditional IRAs, if the taxpayer is an active participant in an employer-sponsored retirement plan, the yearly limit for contributions is phased out for single filers with AGI between \$50,000 and \$60,000, married taxpayers filing a joint return with AGI between \$80,000 and \$100,000, and married taxpayers filing separately with AGI between \$0 and \$10,000. If a married taxpayer filing a joint return is not covered by an employer's plan, but their spouse is, the deduction phases out for AGI between \$156,000 and \$166,000.

This provision of California law conforms to federal law.

Amount:

We estimate this program to have cost the state \$436 million in tax year 2005.

Discussion:

This program's purpose is to provide an incentive for taxpayers to save for retirement.

Tax relief is provided in two ways. Some relief is provided by deferral of taxes on this income. Additional relief is provided to taxpayers whose marginal tax rates are lower in retirement when withdrawals are taken than they were when the taxpayer was working. The value of these benefits has been reduced by recent reductions at the federal level in the tax rate on long-term capital gains on investments held in fully taxable accounts.

The goal of this exemption/deferral is to encourage participation in retirement programs. It is hoped that participation in these programs will increase the proportion of retirees who are financially self-sufficient, rather than dependent on government aid.

Some taxpayers would save for retirement even without tax incentives to do so. To the extent that funds are transferred from other savings vehicles to tax-favored accounts, this program represents a windfall for taxpayers. The proportion of retirement funds that represent "new" savings rather than savings redirected from other sources is not known.

¹³ The contribution limit was \$3,000 for 2002–2004, \$4,000 for 2005–2007, and \$5,000 for 2008 and later.

14. Self-Employed Retirement Plans

Description:

This provision allows taxpayers to deduct from income contributions to a self-employed retirement plan (KEOGH). The deduction claimed for California purposes must be the same as the deduction claimed for federal purposes. For defined contribution plans, in 2008, the deduction was limited to the lesser of \$46,000 or 100 percent of earned income. For defined benefit plans, the deduction is limited to the maximum level required to fully fund the plan. Income generated in these accounts is also excluded from taxation until the assets are withdrawn.

Amount:

This program is estimated to have cost the state \$329 million in tax year 2005.

Discussion:

This program's purpose is to provide an incentive for self-employed taxpayers to save for retirement. They are given the same type of tax deferral as individuals covered under employer-established retirement programs. Since contributions to employer-provided pension plans are excluded from income, it is equitable to provide a similar benefit to self-employed individuals.

The goal of this exemption/deferral is to encourage participation in retirement programs. It is hoped that participation in these programs will increase the proportion of retirees who are financially self-sufficient, rather than dependent on government aid.

Some taxpayers would save for retirement even without tax incentives to do so. To the extent that funds are transferred from other savings vehicles to tax-favored accounts, this program represents a windfall for taxpayers. The proportion of retirement funds that represent "new" savings rather than savings redirected from other sources is unknown.

15. Medical and Dental Expense Deduction

Description:

This provision allows taxpayers to claim a deduction for qualified medical and dental expenses incurred on behalf of the taxpayer, the taxpayer's spouse, or the taxpayer's dependents. Only expenditures that exceed 7.5 percent of federal adjusted gross income and not covered by other means such as insurance are deductible. The deduction is available only to taxpayers who itemize their deductions. Qualifying medical and dental expenses include payments for prevention, diagnosis, cure, mitigation, and treatment of disease; prescription drugs or nonprescription insulin, certain related travel and lodging costs; and qualified long-term care.

This provision of California law conforms to federal law.

Amount:

In tax year 2005, PIT taxpayers claimed \$9.4 billion in allowed medical and dental expense deductions, lowering their taxes by about \$258 million.

Number of Tax Returns Affected:

In tax year 2005, 1.3 million PIT taxpayers reported the medical and dental expense deductions.

Distribution:

Impact of Medical and Dental Expense Deduction: 2005			
Adjusted Gross Income Class	Number of Returns Using Deduction (Thousands)	Amount of Deduction Claimed (Millions)	Tax Impact of Deduction (Millions)
Less Than \$10,000	260.9	\$1,661.0	\$1
\$10,000 to \$19,999	145.6	\$1,006.6	\$1
\$20,000 to \$49,999	457.2	\$3,000.8	\$47
\$50,000 to \$99,999	324.8	\$2,170.1	\$95
\$100,000 to \$199,999	97.7	\$1,073.7	\$76
More Than \$199,999	14.4	\$527.6	\$38
Total	1,300.7	\$9,439.9	\$258

Source : 2005 Personal Income Tax Sample and micro-simulation model
Detail may not add to total due to rounding.

Discussion:

This program is intended to mitigate hardships faced by taxpayers who incur very large medical expenses.

The tax benefit from this deduction is greater for taxpayers who are in higher tax brackets, even though those taxpayers would seemingly be more able to absorb large medical expenses. Also, this benefit is available only to taxpayers who itemize their deductions. An alternative policy that would address these issues would be to replace the deduction with either a credit or direct government compensation for medical expenses.

Another possible concern arising from this deduction is that, by shifting a portion of medical expenses to other taxpayers, it may discourage some people from purchasing optimal levels of medical insurance.

16. Exclusion of Miscellaneous Fringe Benefits

Description:

Under this program, employees receive tax exemption for certain fringe benefits paid by their employers. These benefits include:

- Free special services provided to employees (such as free standby flights provided by airlines to their employees).
- Employee discounts for the purchase of company products.
- Use of company equipment (such as a company car).
- “De minimis” fringe benefits (such as personal use of an employer’s computer equipment or the use of on-premise gymnasium facilities).

This provision of California law conforms to federal law.

Amount:

This program is estimated to have cost the state \$230 million in tax year 2005.

Discussion:

The rationale for the tax relief depends on the type of the benefit. For example, in the case of the use of gymnasium facilities, one can argue that using such facilities improves the health, morale, and productivity of employees; therefore, this expense can be viewed as a business investment. In other cases, such as personal use of company equipment, the administrative difficulty of measuring the private benefits of the use of the equipment (business use of the equipment should not be taxed) for tax purposes is the primary justification.

This exemption increases the value to employees of these miscellaneous fringe benefits relative to wages. Therefore, this exemption will tend to encourage the provision of compensation in the form of miscellaneous benefits. The extent to which this exemption increases the amount of these benefits given to employees is not known. Repeal of these exemptions would likely increase administrative and compliance costs significantly.

17. Exclusion of Transportation Related Fringe Benefits

Description:

This provision allows employees to exclude qualified compensation for employer-provided transportation benefits from wage income. For 2008, the amount of excluded benefits includes up to \$220 per month for parking, \$115 per month for transit passes, and all expenses for ridesharing programs. The exclusion is limited to the fair market value of the benefits received. These provisions of California law generally conform to federal law, except that in California law the exclusion for ridesharing is more generous. For federal purposes, the ridesharing exclusion is limited to \$100 per month, whereas, for California, the exclusion is unlimited.

Amount:

This program is estimated to have cost the state \$170 million in tax year 2005.

Discussion:

There is no obvious policy reason for the exclusion of employer-provided parking benefits.

Favorable tax treatment for mass transit and ridesharing can be justified on the grounds that encouraging alternative forms of transportation may reduce congestion and air pollution.

The purpose of the more generous California exclusion for ridesharing is to encourage ridesharing. To the extent that ridesharing reduces the number of cars on California roads (especially if the reductions occur during commute times), both roadway congestion and air pollution will be reduced.

This program will be considered successful if it increases ridesharing. The number of taxpayers who currently utilize ridesharing programs, but wouldn't absent this provision, is unknown. The reduction in congestion from subsidized ridesharing programs could encourage some people to choose to live further from their jobs and undertake longer commutes, thus reducing the gains from the ridesharing program.

18. Self-Employed Health Insurance Premium Deduction

Description:

This provision allows self-employed taxpayers to deduct from income premiums paid for health insurance policies that they buy for themselves and their families. The deduction is limited to the taxpayer's net income earned from the trade or business for which the plan was established. The deduction can be taken regardless of whether or not the taxpayer itemizes deductions.

This provision of California law conforms to federal law.

Amount:

In tax year 2005, PIT taxpayers claimed \$3.1 billion in self-employed health insurance premium deduction, lowering their taxes by about \$159 million.

Number of Tax Returns Affected:

In tax year 2005, 0.6 million PIT taxpayers claimed a self-employed health insurance premium deduction.

Distribution:

Impact of Self-Employed Health Insurance Premium Deduction: 2005			
Adjusted Gross Income Class	Number of Returns Reporting Deduction (Thousands)	Amount of Deduction Reported (Millions)	Tax Impact of Deduction (Millions)
Less Than \$10,000	58.9	\$206.5	\$0
\$10,000 to \$19,999	59.6	\$203.3	\$2
\$20,000 to \$49,999	146.6	\$560.3	\$13
\$50,000 to \$99,999	143.6	\$649.8	\$38
\$100,000 to \$199,999	98.7	\$584.6	\$49
More Than \$199,999	104.5	\$866.1	\$57
Total	611.9	\$3,070.6	\$159

Source: 2005 Personal Income Tax Sample and micro-simulation model
Detail may not add to total due to rounding.

Discussion:

The purpose of this program is to provide self-employed taxpayers an incentive to obtain health insurance for themselves and their families. The justification for this program is that self-employed taxpayers should receive the same benefit as that received by taxpayers who work as employees. Since contributions to employer-provided health insurance plans are excluded from income, it is equitable to provide a similar benefit to self-employed individuals. This justification suggests that the deduction should not be limited to the net income of the taxpayer's trade or business, because taxpayers who are not self-employed may exclude employer-provided premiums even if the employer is losing money. However, such an extension would substantially increase the cost to the state.

For a discussion of the desirability of providing a tax incentive to link health insurance to employment, see conformity item 5.

19. Tax-Exempt Status for Qualifying Corporations

Description:

This program allows qualifying nonprofit and charitable organizations to be exempt from corporate franchise and income taxes. Qualifying corporations may include religious, charitable, educational, and scientific organizations, as well as certain homeowner organizations, civic and business organizations, and credit unions.

This provision of California law conforms to federal law.

Amount:

This program is estimated to have cost the state \$113 million in tax year 2005.

Discussion:

The purpose of this program is to provide tax relief to organizations involved in nonprofit and charitable activities and for qualified membership organizations. The justification for this program is that these organizations are providing beneficial services to society and, therefore, should be indirectly supported by the government. These qualifying organizations, however, are still subject to taxes for income derived from activities unrelated to their tax-exempt status.

For additional analysis of the desirability of governmental support for charitable organizations, see conformity item 6.

20. Exclusion of Employer Contributions for Life Insurance

Description:

Under this program, an employer's contribution to an employee's group term life insurance policy is exempted from the employee's gross income for the first \$50,000 of the employee's coverage.

The exemption does not apply when the beneficiary is an employer or a charitable organization, or to the cost of any group term life insurance provided under a qualified pension or profit sharing plan.

This provision of California law conforms to federal law.

Amount:

This program is estimated to have cost the state \$95 million in tax year 2005.

Discussion:

This program intends to provide employers and employees an incentive to incorporate life insurance in compensation packages.

The program results in horizontal inequity. The self-employed and those employees who buy their own life insurance without receiving any employer contributions do not receive such a tax relief.

Higher-income taxpayers benefit from this program more than the lower-income taxpayers, because these taxpayers are more likely to be covered by these benefits, and because they have higher marginal income tax rates, a dollar of exemption results in a greater tax reduction.

21. Personal Property and Other Tax Deductions

Description:

This program allows taxpayers to deduct from gross income taxes on personal property paid to local and state governments. The distinction between real and personal property is

that the personal property is mobile. The most common such tax is the Vehicle License Fee. Household items such as furniture and appliances are exempt from personal property taxes. City license fees, import or custom duties paid to federal customs officers, liquor or alcoholic beverage license fees, and other business, privilege, or excise taxes are also deductible under this program.

These provisions of California law conform to federal law.

Amount:

In tax year 2005, PIT taxpayers claimed \$1.8 billion in personal property tax deductions, lowering their taxes by about \$92 million.

Number of Tax Returns Affected:

In tax year 2005, 4.5 million PIT taxpayers reported a personal property tax deduction.

Distribution:

Impact of Personal Property Tax Deduction: 2005			
Adjusted Gross Income Class	Number of Returns Reporting Deduction (Thousands)	Amount of Deduction Reported (Millions)	Tax Impact of Deduction (Millions)
Less Than \$10,000	95.2	\$28.9	\$0
\$10,000 to \$19,999	167.9	\$48.9	\$0
\$20,000 to \$49,999	1,065.6	\$389.0	\$7
\$50,000 to \$99,999	1,682.9	\$632.8	\$34
\$100,000 to \$199,999	1,062.6	\$439.1	\$36
More Than \$199,999	399.1	\$214.7	\$15
Total	4,473.3	\$1,753.5	\$92

Source: 2005 Personal Income Tax Sample and micro-simulation model
Detail may not add to total due to rounding.

Discussion:

This deduction most likely grew out of a view of fiscal federalism that higher-level governments should not interfere in, and perhaps should even encourage, the revenue-generating efforts of lower-level governments. Thus, the federal government encouraged lower-level governments to levy sales, property, and income taxes by allowing a deduction for these taxes. The State of California conformed to this approach partly because of the inherent benefits of conformity, and partly to encourage revenue generation by county and city governments. For a variety of reasons (often arising from actions by parties with very different motivations), California has moved away from this independence approach to fiscal federalism to one where much of the revenue of local jurisdictions is actually raised by the state and then distributed to them. As such, the original motivation for this deduction may no longer be relevant. However, as is the case on the expenditure side of the budget, if a tax benefit is available for a long enough time, it comes to be viewed as an entitlement. As such, there is likely little political will, relative to the political cost, of removing this benefit.

Because it lowers taxes on personal property, this deduction may encourage the purchase of such property. The consumer response to the reduction in taxes may be particularly sensitive for automobiles because of the generally high level of political awareness of taxes on automobiles. However, it is likely, although not as likely as it is for home ownership subsidies, that any subsidies for car ownership are generally capitalized into the price of the car (i.e. the price is increased by approximately the value of the tax savings) so that the purchaser is no better off than they would be without the deduction.

22. Deferral of Gain on Like-Kind Exchanges

Description:

Under this program capital gains and losses are not immediately recognized for exchanges of qualifying property. Qualifying property is business or investment property that is exchanged for similar (like-kind) property. If, as part of the exchange, other property (not like-kind) or money is received, gain is recognized on the other property or money received. In a like-kind exchange, the unrecognized gain or loss typically carries over into the new asset. When the new asset is sold or exchanged in a taxable transaction, the realized gain or loss from the first transaction would then be recognized. The non-recognition rule does not apply to exchanges of inventory, stocks, bonds, notes, other securities or evidence of indebtedness, or certain other assets. Also, the like-kind exchange rules do not apply to exchanges of property the taxpayer uses for personal purposes.

Amount:

We estimate that this program cost the state \$85 million in 2005.

Discussion:

This program's purpose is to facilitate exchanges of business or investment assets. The deferral of gains on like-kind transactions affords owners of exchanged property the same tax treatment as owners of other similar property that has not been exchanged. Absent the deferral, some transactions may not be undertaken in order to avoid paying tax on the gain. This gain avoidance could result in both inefficient portfolio choices for some investors and an inefficient allocation of investments across investors. On the other hand, the deferral results in different tax treatment for taxpayers who exchange qualified property and those who exchange property that is not qualified. This differential may result in economic distortions by encouraging excessive investment in qualified properties.

By allowing investors to retain lower bases for their investments, the deferral for like kind exchanges also increases the cost of the step-up in basis at death (see conformity item 4).

Another concern is that when California property is exchanged for out-of-state property, the gains recognized on the ultimate sale of the California property may not reflect the actual increase in value of the California property. Tax will be levied on the gains of the property's second owner. These gains will be the sum of her gains on the out-of-state

property prior to the exchange and her gains on the California property after the exchange. If the pre-exchange gains on the out-of-state property are different from the pre-exchange gains on the California property, California tax will not accurately reflect all of the gains on the California property.

In 2002, an IRS ruling substantially expanded the use of like kind exchanges by allowing fractional investors in entities known as Tenant In Common arrangements to qualify for these benefits.

23. Exclusion of Compensation for Injuries and Sickness

Description:

This provision allows taxpayers to exclude from income the compensation received from workers' compensation, accident insurance, and health insurance for their physical injuries and physical sickness. The exclusion applies whether the compensation is awarded by court order or whether the taxpayer receives the award in lump sum or installments payments. In addition, reimbursement by the employer for expenses incurred for the care of an employee, the employee's spouse, or the employee's dependents is not subject to taxation. Punitive damages, however, are taxable, since they are amounts in excess of what is necessary to "make the taxpayer whole." Disability benefits received under state statutes are excludable, but reimbursements for medical expenses claimed as income tax deductions in prior years are not.

Amount:

We estimate this program to have cost the state \$54 million in tax year 2005.

Discussion:

This program provides tax relief to qualified taxpayers who suffer economic hardship resulting from injuries or sickness. This program acts as a type of insurance. This type of insurance program may address two types of hardship. The first is loss of income when the injury or sickness prevents a person from working. The second is direct expenses (primarily medical) arising from the injury or sickness.

In the first case, if the replacement income from the insurance equals the income lost due to injury or sickness, this exclusion creates inequities. This happens because a taxpayer who receives insurance payments will have a higher after-tax income than another taxpayer who earned an identical income prior to the first taxpayer's injury. In this case, the insurance income should be taxed as if it were regular income. If, on the other hand, insurance payments are less than or equal to the after-tax income that the taxpayer would have had in the absence of the injury; the exclusion works to restore equity between these taxpayers.

To the extent that this deduction compensates taxpayers for direct expenses related to their injury or sickness, it creates inequities between taxpayers receiving deductible compensation and others who suffer the same injuries or illnesses but receive no tax break. Furthermore, because this is an exclusion, the actual benefit conferred is greater

for taxpayers in higher income brackets, even though those people may be more able to withstand the financial hardship caused by the injury or sickness. A policy alternative would be direct government expenditures for the medical and other related expenses.

24. Exclusion of Scholarships, Fellowships, and Grants

Description:

This provision allows taxpayers to exclude from income any qualifying scholarships, fellowships, and grants received and used for qualified educational expenses at an educational institution. Qualified expenses include tuition, enrollment fees, books, supplies, and equipment. The exclusion also applies to incidental expenses such as travel, research, clerical assistance, and equipment.

This provision of California law conforms to federal law.

Amount:

This program is estimated to have cost the state \$44 million in tax year 2005.

Discussion:

This program provides an incentive for taxpayers to pursue education. This may be sound public policy if society as a whole benefits from having more individuals pursuing higher education. It is unknown, however, how many students would forgo these educational pursuits in the absence of this exclusion. In fact, since many colleges calibrate student aid levels to the financial needs of their students, the colleges might increase aid levels for the most needy students if the exclusion was removed. It may not, therefore, be possible to assess the overall impact of this exclusion without studying the entire higher education funding system. This system includes both direct government subsidies to educational institutions, government-backed student loans, and other tax preferences, such as the exclusion of savings in education IRAs (see conformity item 37) and Section 529 plans (see conformity item 35), the exclusion for employer-provided educational expenses (see conformity item 29), and federal education credits (Hope Credits, Lifetime Learning Credits).

Prior to 1954, these items were included in income unless the taxpayer could demonstrate that the funds constituted a gift. Some observers argued that it was inequitable to tax some students, but not others, on their expenses.

25. Accelerated Depreciation of Research and Experimental Costs

Description:

The provision allows taxpayers to deduct qualifying research and experimental expenditures more rapidly than the economic life of these investments.

Amount:

This program is estimated to have cost the state \$40 million in tax year 2005.

Discussion:

This program's purpose is to provide taxpayers an incentive to undertake research and experimental projects.

There are two reasons to encourage Research and Development (R&D). The first is that, without extra incentives, industry will typically do less R&D work than would be optimal for society. This is because R&D activity often produces "positive externalities;" (i.e. benefits to people other than the person doing the R&D). Accelerated depreciation of R&D expenditures reduces the after-tax cost of R&D investments, which should lead to an increase in R&D activity.

The second reason for favorable treatment of R&D expenditures is to encourage taxpayers to do their R&D in the United States, rather than in another country. There are two possible benefits to attracting the R&D business. The first is the addition of the R&D jobs themselves. If this were the only benefit, however, the R&D industry should not be singled out for this special benefit unless R&D jobs are substantially more desirable than other jobs. The second potential benefit from attracting R&D is that other businesses may be able to adopt innovations developed locally more rapidly than they can adopt innovations developed elsewhere. If this is the case, many local businesses, not just those receiving this incentive, will gain an advantage over their rivals in other countries. This advantage is not a result of being able to obtain technological information more quickly. Given the global communications network, information can be transported across continents relatively quickly and costlessly. The advantage may come through something economists call *economies of agglomeration*. *Economies of agglomeration* is defined as "a reduction in production costs that results when firms in the same or related industries locate near one another."

Thus, for example, if the accelerated depreciation of R&D expenditures encourages some pharmaceutical companies to locate their research facilities in an area of California, that will, likewise, encourage the growth of pharmaceutical research support firms (such as material suppliers, pharmaceutical manufacturers, universities doing biological and chemical research, and chemical engineers) in that area. Subsequently, with the growth of the support industries, other pharmaceutical firms will be attracted to the area. There are clearly many agglomeration economies within California (high-technology in Silicon Valley and motion pictures in Hollywood are two obvious examples). However, many factors contribute to the development and growth of agglomeration economies. Because of the complexity of agglomeration economies, the extent to which the accelerated depreciation of R&D expenditures has actually encouraged the development or growth of any agglomeration economies is unknown.

It is also possible for the government to provide too large an R&D incentive. If this happens, investment will be diverted from other more productive uses to relatively inefficient R&D activities. This could hurt overall economic performance.

Other government policies supporting R&D activity include direct government grants and fellowships, indirect government support such as support for educational and other research institutions, and other tax policies such as the R&D credit (nonconformity item 3). It is unknown whether the overall level of federal support for R&D is optimal.

For R&D projects that taxpayers would have undertaken even in the absence of this provision, accelerated depreciation may be considered a windfall. The amount of R&D activity that would not have taken place if R&D accelerated depreciation was not available is unknown.

26. Exclusion of Employee Child and Dependent Care Benefits

Description:

This provision allows taxpayers to exclude from income benefits from qualified employer-sponsored payroll deduction programs for child and dependent care services. The exclusion is also available to self-employed individuals and partners of a partnership. The exclusion is limited to the lowest of \$5,000 per year (\$2,500 for married filing separately), the amount of the taxpayer's earned income, or the amount of the taxpayer's spouse's earned income.

This provision of California law conforms to federal law.

Amount:

This program is estimated to have cost the state \$38 million in tax year 2005.

Discussion:

The purpose of this exclusion is to defray expenses incurred by people who must pay for child or dependent care so that they can be gainfully employed or to seek employment. This exclusion provides this relief by allowing working taxpayers to pay for childcare with pretax rather than post-tax dollars, thereby reducing the childcare costs by the amount of tax not paid on those dollars. Childcare expenses are a necessary part of working for many people. After subtracting out the childcare expenses, an employee who has childcare expenses has less income remaining than does another employee who earns the same salary. The child and dependent care benefits are intended to make the tax burden of the employee with the childcare expenses reflective of his net (after childcare expenses) rather than gross pay.

This program successfully achieves its goal of assisting workers with their child and dependent care costs.

This exclusion could potentially induce two types of behavioral changes in taxpayers. The first is that some taxpayers who would not have chosen to seek employment if they had to bear the full financial burden of their child or dependent care may now choose to seek employment. The other is that some working taxpayers who, if the exclusion did not exist, would have made informal arrangements for child or dependent care may now choose paid child or dependent care.

This exclusion is similar to, but for many taxpayers more generous than, the Child and Dependent Care Tax Credit.

27. Exclusion of Meals and Lodging Provided by Employers

Description:

Under this provision, the value of meals and lodging provided by an employer (other than the military) to an employee, spouse, or dependent is excluded from the gross income of the employee. The meals and lodging must be provided at the employer's place of business and for the convenience of the employer. Moreover, accepting the employer-provided lodging by the employee must be a precondition for the employment.

This provision of California law conforms to federal law.

Amount:

This program is estimated to have cost the state \$34 million in tax year 2005.

Discussion:

This program provides tax relief to taxpayers who are required to eat or stay at the employer's place of business fulfill the requirements of the job. Examples are firefighters and other emergency services personnel, live-in housekeepers, and resident apartment managers.

Many employees maintain their own residence, independent of the employer-provided residence (e.g., firefighters spend some nights at home and some at the station). In these cases, the value as a residence of employer-provide lodging to the employee would essentially be zero, and it makes sense not to tax the employee on the nominal value of the residence. In other cases (e.g., live-in apartment managers), the employer-provided residence is also the employee's primary residence. Since these employees are saving the cost of independent housing, they are receiving a benefit that conceptually should be treated as income.

If total compensation received by the employee is reduced by an amount equal to the value of this tax savings, the government is subsidizing employers who provide meals and lodging. The program may, therefore, provide an incentive for employers and employees to rely more than they otherwise would on non-wage compensation, since the after-tax value of a dollar of this form of non-wage income is greater than that of a dollar of regular taxable wage income. The extent to which compensation packages are altered because of this incentive is unknown.

A policy alternative would be to establish rules to distinguish whether the employer is providing the employee's primary residence or a secondary residence, and allow the exclusion only for secondary residences.

28. Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOP)

Description:

This provision allows employers that provide Employee Stock Ownership Plans a deduction for dividends paid to an ESOP, when those dividends are paid by the ESOP to participants or used to retire ESOP debt. It also allows the deferral of capital gains on the sale of stock to an ESOP, if the proceeds are used to acquire a similar type of security. The deduction is not available to S corporations.

This provision of California law conforms to federal law.

Amount:

This program is estimated to have cost the state \$33 million in tax year 2005.

Discussion:

This deduction provides employers an incentive to provide their employees with this form of compensation as an option. One justification often provided for encouraging ESOPs is that employees may be more productive if they are part owners of the companies that employ them. If, however, employee-owned businesses are more productive than non-employee-owned businesses, employee-owned businesses should become more prevalent even in the absence of government encouragement. In a truly competitive market, therefore, the government should not favor one form of business ownership over another.

29. Exclusion of Employer-Provided Education Assistance

Description:

Taxpayers may exclude from income benefits received from an employer as part of a qualified educational assistance program. Qualified benefits may include tuition, fees, books, supplies and equipment. The exclusion is limited to \$5,250 per year.

Amount:

We estimate this program to have cost the state \$30 million in tax year 2005.

Discussion:

This provision encourages participation in employer-sponsored educational activities.

For some employees, pursuing certain educational opportunities is a requirement of employment. For these employees, this exclusion may be viewed as similar to the exclusion of employer-provided fringe benefits (see conformity item 16). These employees would likely feel that it is unfair to make them pay additional taxes, because their employer required them to enroll in educational activities.

For other employees, education funding from an employer may be viewed as similar to the receipt of a scholarship or fellowship (conformity item 24). This exclusion creates equity between these students and other students who receive third-party support for their

education. On the other hand, it creates inequity between a student whose education is funded by a qualifying plan and one who receives nonqualified support (i.e., taxable wages) from their employer.

In general, government support for education is desirable if the education creates externalities – benefits to society that are not captured by the person incurring the cost of the activity.

30. Moving Expense Deduction

Description:

This program allows deductions for the portions of qualified moving expenses required to start a new job that are not paid or reimbursed by employers. The deduction is limited to the cost of transportation of household goods and personal effects and travel (including lodging but not meals) to the new residence. Where an automobile is used in making the move, a taxpayer may deduct either the actual out-of-pocket expenses incurred (gasoline and oil, but not repairs, depreciation, etc.) or a standard mileage allowance. For 2008, the mileage rate is 19 cents per mile for expenses incurred between January and June and 27 cents per mile for expenses incurred between July and December.

To qualify for the deduction, the move must pass two tests. The *distance* test requires that “the distance between the new and old locations must at least be 50 miles.” The *time* test requires that “the taxpayer be employed in the new job on a full-time basis for at least 39 weeks during the 12 months following the new employment.” This requirement for the self-employed is 78 weeks during the 24 months following the start of the new business.

If the employer pays the moving expense directly or reimburses the employee, that employer payment is an excludable fringe benefit to the employee as long as that expense would have been deductible, if paid directly by the employee rather than the employer.

This provision of California law conforms to federal law.

Amount:

In tax year 2005, resident PIT taxpayers claimed \$654 million in moving expense deductions, lowering their taxes by about \$26 million.

Number of Tax Returns Affected:

In tax year 2005, 193,000 resident PIT taxpayers claimed a moving expense deduction.

Distribution:

Impact of Moving Expense Deduction: 2005			
Adjusted Gross Income Class	Number of Returns Reporting Deduction (Thousands)	Amount of Deduction Reported (Millions)	Tax Impact of Deduction (Millions)
Less Than \$10,000	9.8	\$25.5	\$0.5
\$10,000 to \$19,999	17.2	\$44.8	\$0.4
\$20,000 to \$49,999	57.6	\$117.7	\$2.8
\$50,000 to \$99,999	63.9	\$205.8	\$8.7
\$100,000 to \$199,999	32.6	\$157.9	\$11.0
More Than \$199,999	11.7	\$102.6	\$2.6
Total	192.7	\$654.4	\$26

Source: 2005 Personal Income Tax Sample and micro-simulation model
Detail may not add to total due to rounding.

Discussion:

The rationale behind this tax relief is that moving expenses are expenses that employees must incur in order to earn income. In our system, large and unusual expenses that generate income are normally deductible. This program creates partial parity between two taxpayers, one of whom starts a new job in a distant location and another whose new job is close to home.

In addition, it is also intended to create parity between two employees, where an employee is reimbursed (or the employer directly pays for the move) and one is not.

31. Percentage Resource Depletion Allowance Deduction

Description:

This provision allows taxpayers to deduct from income a fixed percentage for resource depletion. The percentage depends on the type of resource, and the depletion allowance cannot be more than 50 percent of a taxpayer's related net income prior to the depletion deduction, or more than 100 percent in the case of oil and gas properties.

California conforms to federal tax law regarding the percentage depletion for oil and gas wells, and for geothermal deposits. The depletion rates are limited to 22 percent for regulated domestic natural gas, 10 percent for natural gas from geopressurized brine, 15 percent for domestic crude oil and natural gas from certain independent producers, and 15 percent for geothermal deposits located in the U.S.

Amount:

This program is estimated to have cost the state \$24 million in tax year 2005.

Discussion:

The purpose of this program is to encourage taxpayers to explore and develop oil, gas, and other mineral resources.

These increases in exploration and development activity are desirable if free market incentives, plus the federal deduction for these activities, are insufficient to induce the optimal level of business activity. There are two possible reasons this could occur. The first is that risk-averse firms may be unwilling to undertake risky and expensive exploration and development projects. This deduction may induce business to undertake more of these projects by increasing their expected rate of return. The large asset base of the leading natural resource firms, and their ability to diversify their risks through both financial arrangements and their ability to explore and develop multiple resource sites simultaneously, suggest that risk aversion may not be seriously retarding investment in these activities. Of course, if the government provides too great an incentive to engage in risky activity, the primary result will be an increase in this type of risky investment beyond the optimal level.

The second possible reason for government to subsidize these activities is that exploration and development of natural resources may produce externalities, benefits to society that cannot be captured by the business that generates them. The externality that one may argue arises in this case comes from a reduction in the importation of foreign natural resources. Depending on foreign resources (particularly when those foreign sources are politically unstable or unsavory) increases the risk of dramatic fluctuations in the supply and the price of these resources. These fluctuations may be very damaging to the economy. They may also induce dangerous foreign policy entanglements. On the other hand, increased exploration and development of natural resources may also generate negative externalities. For example, resource activities may cause environmental degradation. This imposes costs on all users of the environment, but these additional costs are not borne by the businesses generating them. In this case, government encouragement of these business activities may increase the overall costs to society.

The purpose of this deduction will be achieved if the deduction induces increases in exploration and development. Deductions claimed for activities that would have been undertaken even in the absence of this deduction are windfalls. The amount of qualified activity that would not have been undertaken in the absence of this deduction is unknown. Since the externalities justifying this deduction are national rather than specific to California, it is not clear why California should be offering this deduction.

32. Student Loan Interest Deduction

Description:

Under this program, taxpayers may deduct interest paid on qualified education loans. Prior to 2006, the deduction was allowed only for interest paid on qualified education loans during the first 60 months in which interest payments are required. A *qualified education loan* is defined as “the money that is borrowed to pay for the educational expenses of the taxpayer, the taxpayer’s spouse, or any dependent of the taxpayer in attending post-secondary educational institutions and certain vocational schools, and

institutions conducting internships or residency programs that lead to a degree or certificate from an institution of higher education, a hospital, or a health care facility conducting postgraduate training.” The deduction is phased out for taxpayers whose modified AGI is \$55,000 to \$70,000 (\$115,000 to \$145,000 for taxpayers filing joint returns).

Amount:

In tax year 2005, PIT taxpayers claimed \$81 million in student loan interest deductions, lowering their taxes by about \$21 million.

Number of Tax Returns Affected:

In tax year 2005, 945,724 PIT taxpayers claimed a student loan interest deduction.

Distribution:

Impact of Student Loan Interest Deduction: 2005			
Adjusted Gross Income Class	Number of Returns Reporting Deduction (Thousands of Returns)	Amount of Deduction Claimed (Millions of Dollars)	Tax Impact of Deduction (Millions of Dollars)
Less Than \$10,000	46.8	31.7	\$0
\$10,000 to \$19,999	75.3	45.9	\$1
\$20,000 to \$49,999	301.2	184.8	\$9
\$50,000 to \$99,999	257.7	171.4	\$9
\$100,000 to \$199,999	84.4	47.8	\$2
More Than \$199,999	0.1	0.1	\$0
Total	765.5	481.7	21.0

Source: 2005 Personal Income Tax Sample and microsimulation model
Detail may not add to total due to rounding

Discussion:

The goal of this program is to encourage individuals to pursue higher education. The rationale for this program, and many other programs that provide an education subsidy, is that educating individuals provides benefits to society that are not captured by the individual receiving the education. Because of this externality, the number of people seeking higher education may be less than would be best for society. Therefore, incentives must be provided to increase the number of people pursuing higher education.

The number of students who would not have opted to attend school absent this provision is unknown. For students who would have taken out student loans even in the absence of this provision, this exclusion is a windfall.

33. Exclusion of Foster Care Payments

Description:

Under this provision, taxpayers are allowed to exclude from income the payments they receive from state and local governments, as well as tax-exempt foster care placement agencies, as reimbursements for the costs of caring for a foster child. The foster child must live in the taxpayer's home for the exclusion to apply.

Also excluded from the income of foster parents are the supplemental "difficulty of care payments" paid by the state or a tax-exempt child placement agency. These are additional payments to compensate the foster parents for the care of a foster child with a physical, mental, or emotional handicap.

This provision of California law conforms to federal law.

Amount:

This program is estimated to have cost the state \$19 million in tax year 2005.

Discussion:

The rationale for this program is to provide taxpayers incentives to care for foster children. Allowing foster care payments to be nontaxable increases the value of the payments to the recipients. Because of the progressive tax rate structure, the increase in the value of payments is greater for higher-income taxpayers than for lower-income taxpayers. If this tax preference were removed, the state could increase foster care payments to restore the average value of payments to foster parents. If it did, then the net effect on state revenues would be minimal, but there would be some redistribution of resources from higher-income to lower-income foster parents.

34. Exclusion of Housing for Clergy

Description:

Clergy may exclude from gross income either the value of housing provided to them or the portion of their compensation that is designated as a housing allowance to rent or provide a home. The excludable housing allowance may not exceed the fair rental value of the home, including furnishings and a garage, plus the cost of utilities.

This provision of California law conforms to federal law, except that California does not limit the housing allowance to the fair rental value of a home.

Amount:

This program is estimated to cost the state \$16 million in tax year 2005.

Discussion:

Many clergy live on property owned by their employers. Those who live on employer-owned property benefit from the exclusion of lodging provided by their employer (see

conformity item 27). The exclusion of housing allowances for clergy provides an equivalent benefit for clergy who do not reside on employer-owned property.

This program provides tax relief to taxpayers who work for religious organizations. Presumably, religious organizations provide socially beneficial services. Subsidizing these employees may encourage more people to work for these organizations, thereby increasing the level of services that they can provide. However, this program may lead to some economic distortions. This exclusion may cause changes to the compensation packages offered to (or demanded by) clergy that would lead to an increase in the portion of their consumption devoted to housing.

35. Exclusion of Income Earned on Section 529 Accounts

Description:

Taxpayers may exclude from income earnings of Section 529 educational savings accounts (such as California's Scholarshare program), provided that, upon withdrawal, the money is used for qualified educational expenses.

Amount:

This program is estimated to have cost the state \$16 million in tax year 2005.

Discussion:

This program provides taxpayers an incentive to save for their children's post-secondary education by giving favorable tax treatment to earnings on qualified savings.

Some taxpayers would save for their children's post-secondary education even without tax incentives to do so. To the extent that funds are transferred from other savings vehicles to tax-favored accounts, this program represents a windfall for taxpayers. The proportion of education funds that represent new savings rather than savings redirected from other sources is unknown.

There are a number of other government policies that also work toward the goal of increasing participation in post-secondary education. These include direct government subsidies of colleges and universities, government aid to students for education expenses (fellowships, loans etc.), and federal tax credits for education expenses. The program most similar to Section 529 is the Education IRA (see conformity item 37). In some cases, the interactions between these different programs greatly increase the complexity of financial planning for taxpayers expecting to send their children to college.

36. Amortization of Reforestation Expenditures

Description:

Under this program, taxpayers can amortize over seven years up to \$10,000 per year of qualifying reforestation expenditures. These expenditures include the direct costs of forestation and reforestation, such as site preparation, seeds, labor, and equipment. This

treatment conforms to federal practice, except that the benefit is limited to reforestation activities located in California.

Amount:

This program is estimated to have cost the state \$5 million in tax year 2005.

Discussion:

The intent of this program is to speed up the reforestation of depleted timberlands.

For this program to be considered effective, it must increase investment in reforestation activities. Any benefits from this program accruing to investments that would have been undertaken even in the absence of this credit would be a windfall to the taxpayer. The amount of reforestation that would not have taken place absent this credit is unknown.

This tax expenditure is economically efficient only if reforestation generates positive externalities – benefits to society that are not captured by the taxpayer making the investment. This policy cannot be justified solely in terms of increased lumber available for harvest. The free market will encourage investment in reforestation sufficient to maximize profits from lumber sales. If, however, society derives additional benefits from reforestation, such as improved air quality or aesthetics, or from increases in forestlands, there may be a public interest in supporting reforestation.

A policy alternative would be direct government subsidies of reforestation activities.

37. Exclusion of Earnings on Coverdell Education Savings Accounts

Description:

This program allows taxpayers to exclude from income earnings in Coverdell Education Savings Accounts (ESAs, formerly known as Education IRAs) if these earnings are spent on qualified educational expenses. Qualified expenses may be incurred at the elementary, secondary or post-secondary level. The total yearly contributions, from all contributors, to a beneficiary's Coverdell ESA cannot exceed \$2,000 per year. Qualified educational expenses include tuition, fees, books, supplies, equipment, and room and board.

The annual contribution limit of \$2,000 is available for married couples filing a joint return with modified AGI below \$190,000 and \$95,000 for single filers. The contribution limit is phased out for joint filers with modified AGI from \$190,000 to \$220,000 and for single filers with modified AGI from \$95,000 to \$110,000. Contributions to a Coverdell ESA are not deductible.

This provision of California law conforms to federal law.

Amount:

This program is estimated to have cost the state \$3 million in tax year 2005.

Discussion:

This program provides taxpayers an incentive to save for their children's post-secondary education by giving favorable tax treatment to earnings on qualified savings.

Some taxpayers would save for their children's post-secondary education even without tax incentives to do so. To the extent that funds are transferred from other savings vehicles to tax-favored accounts, this program represents a windfall for taxpayers. The proportion of education funds that represent new savings, rather than savings redirected from other sources, is unknown.

There are a number of other government policies that also work toward the goal of increasing participation in post-secondary education. These include direct government subsidies of colleges and universities, government aid to students for education expenses (fellowships, loans etc.), and federal tax credits for education expenses. The program most similar to the Education IRA is Section 529 (see conformity item 35). In some cases, the interactions between these different programs greatly increase the complexity of financial planning for taxpayers expecting to send their children to college.

38. Expensing of Agricultural Costs for Soil or Water Conservation and Prevention of Erosion

Description:

This program allows taxpayers to expense qualified costs associated with soil and water conservation, and the prevention of erosion.

This provision of California law conforms to federal law.

Amount:

This program is estimated to have cost the state \$2 million in tax year 2005.

Discussion:

This program is intended to encourage certain types of farming-related investments to encourage soil or water conservation, or to prevent erosion of land used in farming. Government encouragement for these types of investment may be necessary if these investments generate externalities, benefits to the public (in the form of a cleaner environment) that cannot be captured by the taxpayers undertaking the investment. This program can be considered successful if it induces an increase in qualified investments. To the extent that taxpayers would have undertaken these investments even in the absence of the program, the tax relief given to this group is a windfall. The proportion of qualified investments that would not have been made in the absence of this incentive is unknown.

Another potential concern is that some taxpayers might try to portray unqualified investment expenses as qualified investments. Such behavior would result in increased administrative costs to ensure compliance.

An obvious policy alternative would be a direct expenditure program providing grants to Californians making the desired types of investments. This alternative may be particularly attractive in the case of farming, since many farms operate at a loss and, therefore, may be less responsive to a tax benefit since they have no taxes to reduce.

39. Exclusion of Recycled or Redeemed Beverage Container Redemption Payments

Description:

This program exempts from gross income amounts received by a consumer for delivering empty beverage containers to a recycling center.

Amount:

This program is estimated to cost the state \$1 million annually.

Discussion:

The intent of the program is to encourage beverage container recycling because recycling reduces litter and can conserve resources.

This program may be considered successful if it increases the number of recycled containers. It is unknown what proportion of currently recycled containers would not be recycled in the absence of this exemption.

This exemption also simplifies tax administration. The refund for most recyclable containers is between 5 cents to 10 cents. The time and effort required to track and tabulate income earned in 5-cent increments are likely quite large relative to the amount of revenue generated. The administrative burden would be particularly onerous for recycling centers if they were to be required to issue Form 1099s to refund recipients. Also, it could be argued that refunds received by the individual who initially paid the deposit should not be considered income. Distinguishing refunds paid to individuals who paid the deposit from those paid to individuals collecting recyclables for profit would be very difficult.

40. Expensing of Circulation Costs for Periodicals

Description:

Under this program, a taxpayer can expense the costs of establishing, maintaining, or increasing the circulation of a periodical it publishes, excluding purchases of land or depreciable property. The taxpayer may instead elect to amortize the costs over a period of three years. In the absence of this program, the taxpayer would have to amortize the expenses over the period of time that the expenditure was deemed to generate income.

This provision of California law conforms to federal law.

Amount:

This program is estimated to have cost the state \$1 million in tax year 2005.

Discussion:

This provision encourages periodicals to increase investments related to increasing their circulation. For investments that would have been undertaken even absent of this provision, expensing provides a windfall. To the extent that taxpayers redirect funds from other investment activities to circulation-related activities, this provision creates distortions in the economy that likely are inefficient.

41. Medical Savings Account Deduction

Description:

This provision allows taxpayers to deduct from income contributions made to Medical Savings Accounts (MSAs). In addition, any earnings accumulated in the Medical Savings Accounts are tax-free, if used for qualified medical expenses.

Contributions include those from both employers and employees. In general, employer or employee contributions are limited to 65 percent of the annual health insurance deductible for taxpayers with individual insurance coverage and to 75 percent with family coverage. Contributions to and earnings from this account may be withdrawn for medical purposes without penalty or tax. Other withdrawals may be subject to tax as well as penalty.

This provision of California law conforms to federal law.

Amount:

This program is estimated to have cost the state \$1 million in tax year 2005.

Discussion:

This program's purpose is to provide an incentive for taxpayers to save for medical treatments and emergencies.

MSAs are similar to health insurance policies in that an individual makes periodic payments in exchange for a larger return payment in a time of need. Unlike regular insurance policies, however, MSAs do not enable risk sharing. As a result, an individual who incurs a very large medical expense will not be able to cover the entire expense from their MSA. On the other hand, if the individual does not have large expenses, their contributions will not be used for payments to other individuals who do have large medical expenses. Instead, the excess contributions will essentially be converted into another retirement fund account. For a discussion of the desirability of government subsidies for retirement programs see conformity item 3.

The tax benefit from this deduction is greater for taxpayers who are in higher tax brackets, even though those taxpayers would seemingly be more able to absorb large medical expenses. An alternative policy that would address these issues would be to replace the deduction with either a credit or direct government compensation for medical expenses.

42. Reserve Allowance for Bad Debts Deduction

Description:

The Reserve Allowance for Bad Debts Deduction program allows financial institutions with assets of less than \$500 million who make qualified additions to their bad debt reserves to treat those additions as deductions from taxable income. Financial institutions with assets in excess of \$500 million are allowed to deduct debts only as those debts are determined to be worthless. For smaller institutions, the ending balance for the bad debt reserve is determined by a formula, using historical loss ratios for the past five years and the loss ratio and loan balance for the current year. Debts that become uncollectible in the current year are charged against (subtracted from) the reserve. At the end of the year the proper balance is recalculated using the aforementioned formula. The taxpayer will then need to make an addition to the reserve to bring it up to the proper balance. This addition to the reserve is deductible. To the extent that this deduction is greater than the actual amount of bad debts written off in a given year, the bad-debt reserve allowance provides a tax benefit.

This provision of California law conforms to federal law.

Amount:

This program is estimated to have cost the state \$0.5 million in tax year 2005.

Discussion:

The Securities and Exchange Commission requires financial institutions to maintain prudent reserves for debts that likely will prove to be uncollectible. This provision lowers the cost of maintaining these reserves by allowing financial institutions to deduct increases to these reserves from income. The policy motivation for providing this favorable treatment to small financial institutions, but not to large ones, is not clear.